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Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and
International Human Rights
Anita Ramasastry*
ABSTRACT

This Article explores the relationshipof Swiss banks and
their tradition of bank secrecy to the activities of a particular
group of depositors: war criminals and other human rights
violators. The Article focuses on litigation brought in U.S.
courts by plaintiffs seeking access to Swiss bank deposits
made by the Nazis and Ferdinand Marcos. The Article
examines the possibility of holding banks accountable under
internationallaw for assistinga customer who has committed
a serious breachof internationallaw.
PartI introduces the role of bank secrecy in the current
litigation. Part 11 describes the Swiss tradition of bank
secrecy. Part 1ff examines the continued popularity of Swiss
banks as loci for the "retirement accounts" of dictators,
despite Swiss reform efforts. PartIV analyzes the Holocaust
Victims Asset Litigation and discusses the claims in detail.
Part V describes the Marcos human rights litigation as an
example of claims that Swiss banks were functioning as
agents of a dictator. Part V discusses the possible
establishment of 'indigenous spoliation" as an international
crime, and its possible application to culpable bankers. Part
VII summarizes the lessons of the Marcos and Holocaust
cases, and notes especially the need for clearer legal
standardsand effective internationallegal mechanisms.
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"There is no such thing as good money or bad money, there's just
money."
Lucky Luciano, gangster

I. INTRODUCTION
What do Hitler and Marcos have in common? Their bankers.
Both leaders used numbered Swiss accounts in order to deposit
ill-gotten gains. Why? Bank secrecy. In its basic form, bank
secrecy refers to the obligation of a bank and its employees to
keep information about their customers strictly confidential. 1
Switzerland has been an attractive place to store money because
it has historically offered customers confidentiality and security. 2
The term bank secrecy denotes different things to different
people. For some, bank secrecy means the ability of banks to
protect an individual's right to financial privacy. People even refer
to bank secrecy and financial privacy as human rights or
fundamental rights.3 Banks are seen as guardians, institutions

that protect assets and prudently manage money. 4

In Switzerland, bank secrecy was established to protect
individuals who were vulnerable to government intrusion. Article
47 of Swiss Federal Banking Law provides that bank employees
shall be subject to criminal prosecution if they divulge
confidential information about their customers. 5
Some
commentators suggest that Swiss banks enacted Article 47 in the
1930s when they sought to make their banking industry more
attractive to Jews and other targets of persecution by enacting

1.
See ROBERT KINSMAN, YOUR NEW Swiss BANK BOOK 7-41 (rev. ed. 1979)
(discussing secrecy, security, and stability as reasons why depositors are
attracted to Swiss banking); see also Melanie Warner, How to Open a Swiss Bank
Account (Try It; You'll Like It), FORTUNE, Mar. 31, 1997, at 166 (discussing various
types of clients who can open bank accounts, from deposed dictators to individual
consumers wanting to keep funds away from ex-spouses).
2.
Id.
3.
The Author uses these phrases generally, rather than referring to
"fundamental rights" as the term might be used by constitutional law scholars.

4.
The benevolent face of bank secrecy is associated with protecting
people from the threat of asset confiscation. A less benevolent but more accepted
rationale for bank secrecy is to protect private money from the tax authorities.
5.

1.

Article 47(a) of Swiss Federal Banking Statute states:

Whoever discloses a secret that was entrusted to him, or of which he

has knowledge in his capacity as a member of an organ of the bank, as an
employer, agent, liquidator, trustee, observer of the Banking Commission,

or director or as an employee of a chartered accounting or audit firm, and
whoever instigates another to such violation of the professional secrecy
shall be punished by way of imprisonment or by a fine ....
Bankengesetz [hereinafter BG] [Banking Statute] art. 47, RS 952.0 (Switz.).
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comprehensive bank secrecy laws designed to shield the identities
of their depositors and protect them from the Gestapo. 6 Prior to
World War Two, European Jews became increasingly worried
about their fate under the Third Reich. They brought their
savings to Switzerland, traveling directly or using agents to store
their valuables. These customers were attracted by promises of
confidentiality offered by the Swiss. 7 Article 47 thus was created
both as a means of attracting wealth and as a way of safeguarding
individuals in great need of protection.
Ironically, bank secrecy has proven to be a powerful tool
whereby dictators, despots, and war criminals can hide their loot
with impunity. Among the notorious leaders who have stashed
away money in bank secrecy jurisdictions are the Philippines'
Ferdinand Marcos, Romania's Nicolai Ceausescu, Haiti's Jean
Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seku. s
Many of these leaders also have violated the human rights of their
citizens. 9 International public opinion displays discomfort with

6.
See Lutz Krauskopf, Regents' Lectures: Comments on Switzerland's
Insider Trading,Money Laundering, and Banking Secrecy Laws, 9 INTL TAX & Bus.
LAW. 277, 293 (1991). Another Swiss lawyer notes:
[T]here were various references made [in the Swiss legislative bodies] to

the fact that the major purpose of Article 47 was to guard against foreign
espionage'. These statements were directed against the attempts of the
Hitler regime to discover and repatriate funds held by Germans abroad. A
considerable amount of Nazi spying had developed in Switzerland, and
cases had been reported in which pressure was brought to bear on Swiss
banks by foreign tax authorities to obtain the disclosure of German assets.
Hermine Herta Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionagein Switzerland,
23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 284, 290 (1954-1955) (footnotes omitted). See also Werner
De Capitani, Banking Secrecy Today, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 57, 59-60 (1988).
De Capitani states that, after Hitler took power, a law was enacted that
confiscated Jewish property. Id. at 60. In addition, German citizens were forced
to sign waivers that permitted German authorities to gain access to Swiss bank
information. Id. De Capitani also notes that while Swiss bank secrecy did protect
Jewish and German account holders from the German government, there is also a
less beneficent reason for the enactment of Article 47: the Swiss Penal Code
drafts also contained secrecy provisions, and because it took a long time for that
Code to be enacted (this finally occurred in 1942), "it was possibly merely a
question of time saving that Switzerland had its secrecy provision in the Banking
Act." Id.
7.
ToM BOWER, NAZI GOLD 42-43 (1997).
8.
In the early 1980s, an ex-Mobutu Minister revealed a list of Mobutu's
estimated holdings including $143 million in a Swiss bank. See Jonathan Kwitny,
Out of Zaire: Where Mobutu's Millions Go, NATION, May 19, 1984, at 606; Edward
Cody, Swiss Show More Readiness to Freeze Assets of Despots; Ceausescu and
Noriega are latest targets, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1990, at Al; Samantha McArthur,
Revolutions Rout Dictators But Their Funds Look Unassailable, REUTERS, Jan. 30,
1990.
9.
Kwitny also cites a 1980 Amnesty International Report that lists
Mobutu's human rights violations, which include: detention of political

330

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:325

the thought of Swiss banks depositing and profiting from funds
that are placed there by such notorious individuals. Perhaps
even more egregious is the thought that war criminals have been
able to store their spoils in secret accounts. As Chairman of the
World Jewish Congress (WJC) Edgar Bronfman declared: "Nobody
should be allowed to make a profit from the ashes of the
Holocaust."1 ° The roles of Swiss banks in relation to the Third
Reich and the Marcos regime have been brought into the spotlight
due to two recent cases being litigated in U.S. courts. These
cases highlight the more problematic aspects of bank secrecy.
At the same time, these cases also demonstrate that
awareness of bank secrecy and the role of bankers has evolved.
Swiss banks that accepted Nazi assets during World War Two did
so under a distinctly different set of international norms. As
scrutiny of non-state actors has grown, so has the understanding
of the role of corporate enterprises under international law. Swiss
banks and multinational banks generally are held to much higher
legal standards today.
A. Introductionto the Marcos and HolocaustAssets Litigation
On February 26, 1986, attorney Marvin Belli filed a suit in
Hawaii on behalf of eight Filipinos who were U.S. residents
claiming to have been tortured by the Marcos government. 1 1 The
suit was filed while Marcos and his entourage were fleeing Manila
opponents without trial for long periods, imprisonment of political
prisoners convicted at trials that do not conform to international
standards, torture, high frequency of deaths in custody due to torture, use
of the death penalty in criminal and political cases, and extrajudicial
executions. Kwitny, supra note 8, at 607. See Stephen J. Solarz, The U.S.
Should Tell Zaire's Mobutu His Time is Up, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25,
1991, at 18.
Congressman Solarz writes:
"Unfortunately, Mobutu's
transgressions go well beyond personal corruption and greed. It is widely
acknowledged that his government engages in systematic abuses of human
rights. Detention, beatings, and torture are the all-too-frequent fare of
Zaire's citizens." Solarz, supra; see also Justice; Dictators Beware; Torture
Victims May Finally See Money From the Marcos Vaults, ASIAWEEI, Oct. 13,
1995, at 48, available in LEXIS, News Library, ASIAWK File (discussing
various human rights violations committed by Marcos including murder,
torture and involuntary detention) [hereinafter Justice;Dictators Beware].
10.
The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi
Victims: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 104th
Cong. 35 (1996) (statement of Edgar M. Bronfman) [hereinafter Bronfman
Statement].
11.
For detailed and thoughtful analyses of the Marcos human rights
litigation, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga:
Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 65 (1995); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Futureof the Alien Tort Claims
Act of 1789, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 491 (1993); see also Justice; Dictators
Beware, supra note 9.
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and were en route to Hawaii after a democratic uprising forced
them to leave the country.12 Marcos was served when he landed
at Hickam Air Force base. In all, five cases were filed against
These cases were eventually consolidated by the
Marcos. 13
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and assigned to Judge
14
Manuel Real in the federal district court in Hawaii.
Marcos died in Hawaii in 1989, but the litigation against his

estate continued.1 5 In 1995, after receiving a two billion dollar

judgment, 16 the Marcos plaintiffs (Marcos Plaintiffs) tried to gain
access to more than five hundred million dollars that Marcos had
deposited in Swiss accounts. 17 The Marcos Plaintiffs alleged that

Swiss banks as agents for the Marcos estate had done more than
accept funds-they had actively helped Marcos conceal his
wealth. Those who had suffered under Marcos's rule sought
compensation for torture, summary execution, disappearance,
and prolonged arbitrary detention. 1s
At the same time, the Philippine government has attempted
to retrieve the same funds from Switzerland through international
diplomatic efforts. At some times, the Philippine government has
been hostile to the human rights litigants. 19 Thus, there have
been competing claims for the same assets. In December 1997,
the Swiss Supreme Court ordered several Swiss banks to transfer
a fifth of the Marcos funds to an escrow account in the Philippine

In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 94 F.3d
12.
539, 542 (9th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Marcos Litigation].
Clemente v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Hilao v.
13.
Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Ortigas v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439
(9th Cir. 1989); Sison v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989); Trajano v.
Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989) (all five unpublished decisions were
reversed and remanded).
14.
Order of Sept. 5, 1990 (D. Haw. 1990) (MDL No. 840).
15.
See McArthur, supranote 8.
16.
Justice; DictatorsBeware, supra note 9. The judgment was not easily
achieved. It took more than six years of pretrial activity, multiple appeals to the
Ninth Circuit, and two weeks of trial before the Marcos estate was found liable to
the class of ten thousand Filipinos. See Steinhardt, supra note 11, at 65 n.2.
17.
See Justice; Dictators Beware, supra note 9 (noting a federal district
court in Hawaii gave plaintiffs effective title to the Marcos estate's Swiss bank
accounts).
18.
Marcos Litigation, 94 F.3d 539 at 542.
19.
See Manila Says Its Claim on Marcos Money Superior to Victims' Claim,

Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Apr. 15, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
DPA File. In April 1997, then Swiss Federal Councillor and Economic Minister
Jean-Pascal Delamuraz visited the Philippines and urged the claimants to settle
Id.
Previous attempts at
their dispute with the Philippine government.
negotiation between the Philippine Government, the Marcos heirs, and the human
rights victims, hosted by the Swiss banks in Hong Kong in 1995, had failed. Id.
In response to the renewed call for settlement, Philippine President Fidel Ramos
stated that "[t]he claim of the Philippine government is superior because this is
taxpayers' money." Id.
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National Bank.20 How and if the money will be distributed to
21
human rights claimants is uncertain.
More recently, several class action lawsuits have been filed by
Holocaust survivors and the relatives of Holocaust victims in an
effort to recover money deposited in Swiss bank accounts prior to
and during World War Two. 2 2 Joined in these lawsuits are: (1)
Holocaust survivors who were forced by the Nazis to engage in
slave labor and (2) Holocaust survivors and the heirs of Holocaust
victims who had property looted by the Nazis.2 3 These Holocaust

assets plaintiffs (Holocaust Plaintiffs) allege that Swiss banks
knowingly accepted profits derived from slave labor as well as
looted assets. Additionally, the Holocaust Plaintiffs claim that
Swiss banks actively financed such efforts. In these capacities,
the Swiss banks are alleged to have violated customary
international law.
Both of these cases are similar in several respects. First, the
Marcos Plaintiffs and the Holocaust Plaintiffs seek compensation
for violations of their human rights. Second, these cases are
class actions whereby plaintiffs seek some form of redress for
human rights injuries under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),
which grants federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. "2 4 In effect,

20.
Ramos Denies Trip to Switzerland Aimed at Marcos Wealth, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, Jan. 7, 1998, at BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA
File.
21.
In February 1998, Marcos heirs lodged an appeal with the Swiss
Supreme Court in Lausanne seeking to freeze the transfer of the Marcos assets.
The petition was formally lodged by four Lichtenstein foundations that manage
the Marcos funds who are acting on behalf of the Marcos heirs. The Swiss
Supreme Court rejected this appeal in March 1998. See Swiss Court Rejects
Appeal Against Marcos Fund Repatriation,Agence France Presse', Mar. 25, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
22.
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-CV-4849 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3,
1996) (Am. Compl. Jan. 24, 1997) [hereinafter Weisshaus Compl.]; Friedman v.
Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-CV-5161 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996) (Am. Compl.
1997) [hereinafter Friedman Compl.]; World Council of Orthodox Jewish
Communities, Inc. v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 97-CV-0461 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
1997) (Am. Comp. July 1997) [hereinafter WCOJC Compl.]. These are all class
action suits filed on behalf of Holocaust survivors and their descendants against
three Swiss banks: Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, and Swiss Bank
Corporation as joint defendants.
23.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs eventually amended their complaints and
separated the classes of plaintiffs to some extent by claims. In their amended
complaints, the deposited asset claims are separate from the looted assets and
slave labor claims. See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text. See
Holocaust Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Post Hearing Memorandum of Law and
Declaration of Pierre Tercier, Master Docket No. CV-96-4989 (filed Sept. 12, 1997)
[hereinafter Holocaust Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Reply].
24.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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the Marcos and Holocaust cases both involve class action lawsuits
for alleged violations of international human rights. Finally, in
each of these lawsuits, Swiss banks are alleged to have played an
active role in shielding the wealth of the wrongdoers.
Switzerland's bank secrecy laws, furthermore, are portrayed as
the reasons why: (1) the Nazis and Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos

placed their stolen wealth in Swiss banks; and (2) it has been

difficult to reconstruct accurately the trail of assets that ended up
in Switzerland.
B. Swiss Bank Secrecy and the CurrentLitigation
Why is bank secrecy so entwined with these questions?
Bank secrecy has previously enabled war criminals and corrupt
heads of state (who may or may not have also committed grave
human rights violations) to secrete their wealth in a safe
jurisdiction. In other words, the existence of numbered Swiss
bank accounts has previously encouraged wrongdoers to secrete
their plunder in Switzerland.
To address these issues, the Swiss have amended their laws
over the years to provide for information in criminal matters.
Based on current legislation, it appears more difficult for a
criminal to deposit his ill-gotten gains in Switzerland today and to
be guaranteed confidentiality in the event that he is indicted or
prosecuted in another country.2 5 Nonetheless, the issue still
remains-should Switzerland be in the business of accepting
these funds in the first place? One could argue that Swiss bank
secrecy has made it more difficult for governments and claimants
to recover funds once they have been placed in Swiss vaults.
Swiss banks are not to be held responsible for being global
policemen. 2 6 They might bear some responsibility, however, for
actively assisting wrongdoers who are culpable of more than fiscal

25.
26.

See infra Part II.B.
As one commentator who has written on the history, vagaries and

benefits of the Swiss banking system notes:
Such are the vagaries of Swiss banks. They simply cannot be a monolithic
blotch of diligence, honesty, hard work and utter secrecy. Arguments that
Swiss banks are generally blind acceptors of illegal funds are just as
specious as arguments that Swiss banks can't collapse in that Swiss
banks never harbor funds which have been illegally obtained under Swiss
law. It should come as little surprise at this point in the book, that Swiss
It is the elder of Swiss
bankers have their own notions of ethics ....
banking which has built an image not wholly correct, and which I have
subjected to some factual tests. The lure remains primarily the banking
secrecy system and one might fairly say that it attracts all forms of funds,
legal and illegal.
KINSMAN, supranote 1, at 37-38.
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crime. A line needs to be drawn between the bank as repository
and the bank as a facilitator. Additionally, to the extent that

human rights victims have a legal cause of action against a leader
or head of state, the question remains largely unanswered as to
how such victims might gain civil redress if the wrongdoer has
placed his or her assets in bank accounts within bank secrecy
jurisdictions.
There are several categories of wrongdoers who use or have
used the services of Swiss banks.2 7 These wrongdoers include
war criminals, political criminals, organized criminals, and
individual criminals. 28 One can distinguish at least five separate
types of criminal bank customers. First, there are war criminals,
such as the Nazis, who used Swiss banks to hide the assets they
systematically plundered from occupied nations and wealth they
amassed from extermination of Jews and other victims during the
Holocaust. Second, there are leaders of nations or "political"
criminals, often dictators or heads of totalitarian states, who may
also be guilty of human rights violations. These same leaders
often secrete their wealth and funds from the nations' treasuries
in Swiss bank accounts. Ferdinand Marcos would fit into this
category. 2 9 A third category involves the politician or head of
state who has stolen money or received illegal funds (e.g., through
taking bribes) and stores such money in Switzerland. The Author
draws a distinction between category two and three because a
corrupt politician does not necessarily engage in violations of
human rights (e.g., torture, unlawful detention, murder).
A
fourth category involves a politician or government official who is
guilty of accepting bribes or stealing money but on a smaller scale
than systematic plunder. A fifth category is criminals such as
organized criminals and drug traffickers who may also hide their
30
bounty in bank secrecy jurisdictions.
Bank secrecy can shield the assets of these different
wrongdoers equally well.
It is impractical, however, for
Switzerland and other bank secrecy jurisdictions to have the

27.
"[C]rime money of all sorts finds its way into Switzerland. Swiss
banks receive money generated through political crime, war crime,

individual crime (e.g., tax violations, insider trading, illegal laundering,
and undisclosed corporate payments) and organized crime. . .

."

Pieter J.

Hoets & Sara G. Zwart, Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Marcos Affair, 9 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 75, 76 (1988).
28.
1d.
29.
Barry James, Swiss Facing Suit on Holocaust Gold, INT'I. HI.;RAI.D) TRILM,
July 11, 1997, at 5; Thomas Netter, Swiss Take New Look at Secrecy, CHI. TRIII.,
Jan. 18, 1997, at Cl.
30.
John F. Brown, In Bhutto's Wake, Pakistan Finds Trial of
Corruption,AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Jan. 11, 1998, at A8; Alan Riding, New
Rule Reduces Swiss Banking Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at Dl. See
also Netter, supranote 29.
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same level of legal responsibility for accepting funds from each of
Furthermore, the gravity of a war criminal's
these sources.
actions is quite different from that of a politician who has taken
petty bribes. At some point, however, Swiss banks, and banks in
other jurisdictions, may cease being passive repositories of
illegally obtained wealth and become active participants in
concealing funds belonging to someone who has violated
international law. As a U.S. government document characterized
Swiss banks during World War Two: "[Ilt should be pointed out
that their aid to the enemy in the banking field was clearly
beyond the obligations under which a neutral must continue to
trade with a belligerent, and dictated solely by the profit motive of
"3 1
Swiss banks.

By examining the Marcos and Holocaust assets litigation,
this Article explores the role of Swiss banks and their relationship
to war criminals and leaders who commit egregious violations of
human rights. These two lawsuits contemplate the notion that a
bank's complicity should create legal responsibility under
international law when a bank actively and knowingly assists
clients who are war criminals or who have violated human
rights.3 2 There has been a growing jurisprudence concerning the
role of non-state actors such as corporations under international
law. 3 3 Banks, however, have been largely omitted from this
analysis.1 Although the Holocaust assets and Marcos cases both
have internal weaknesses, 3 5 these cases pave the way for further

31.

FOREIGN ECON. ADMIN., THE WAR TRADE OF GERMANY AND THE NEUTRALS

(1944) (cited in Friedman Compl. 117).
The Holocaust assets litigation also focuses on questions related to
32.
assets deposited by Holocaust victims and thus raises additional issues as to the
legal and moral responsibilities of the Swiss banks with respect to these deposits.
See, e.g., Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human
33.
Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1963 (1996); Mark Gibney & R. David
Emerick, The ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law and the Protection of
Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International
Standards, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123 (1996); David Weissbrodt & Marci
Hoffman, The Global Economy and Human Rights: A Selective Bibliography, 6 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 189 (1997).

There is no equivalent literature concerning the role of international banks or
bank secrecy jurisdictions in safeguarding international human rights. Scholars
have often discussed the role of "development" banks, such as the World Bank
and the Asian Development bank, with respect to human rights responsibilities.

These "banks", of which many nations are members, loan money for development
projects in various nations. They differ from commercial banks in that they do
not provide traditional account-related services and do not have "depositors".
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the role of bankers as individuals
34.
capable of breaching international law originates at Nuremberg where several
bankers and financiers were prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and crimes of peace. See infranotes 397-436 and accompanying text.

The Holocaust assets litigation asks us to explore the status of
35.
customary international law prior to and during World War Two. At that time, the
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analysis of the responsibilities of banks in relation to
international law and human rights.
This Article will examine whether banks, particularly those in
jurisdictions with strong bank secrecy laws, can ever be held
accountable under international law for assisting customers who
have themselves committed a serious breach of international
law-as in the case of war criminals such as the Nazis, or a head
of state who orchestrates mass torture like Marcos. If banks are
not directly accountable, to what extent should they be obligated
to compensate victims of human rights violations in situations
where wrongdoers have placed their money into these banks?
Additionally, this Article will examine to what extent banks
should be held accountable under international law for assisting
dictators or other leaders to abscond with their nations' funds.
This has been referred to by commentators as "indigenous
" a6
spoliation.
Finally, this Article suggests that an international
mechanism should be used to deal with the aforementioned
situations. Switzerland has been forthcoming in providing legal
assistance to various nations who are seeking lost wealth. As in
the Marcos case, however, this procedure has taken over a
decade. Furthermore, bilateral assistance does not resolve the
problem of human rights victims who may seek redress for
injuries caused by the wrongdoer availing himself of a Swiss bank
account.
This Article advocates, therefore, the use of an

legal status of corporate entities such as banks was not developed to the extent it
is today. The Marcos litigation is the first attempt to redefine banks as active
participants and agents who facilitate violations of international law. The Marcos
Plaintiffs, however, had to compete with the Philippine government's claims to the
Marcos funds.
36.
In 1989, Professor Michael Reisman suggested there was a growing
need to address international spoliation by national leaders.
W. Michael
Reisman, Comment, Harnessing International Law to Restrain and Recapture
Indigenous Spoliations, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 56, 56-59 (1989). He refers to a
government official's draining a country of its wealth as "indigenous spoliation".
Id. at 56. Reisman notes that:

The ritual condemnation of foreign corporations' spoliations of the
resources of developing countries and their elevation to the level of
international concern have obscured the problem of spoliations by
national officials of the wealth of the states of which they are temporary
custodians.
Id.; see also Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patromonicide: The InternationalEconomic Crime of
Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45 (1995). Kofele-Kale defines
indigenous spoliation as "an illegal act of depredation committed for private ends
by constitutionally responsible rulers,public officials, or private individuals." Kofele-

Kale, supra,at 56 (emphasis added).
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for
international convention and claims resolution procedure
37
dealing with deposed kleptocrats and war criminals.
C. Alternatives to Litigation
The Author recognizes that, in certain circumstances,
diplomatic resolutions and settlements may provide the resolution
of claims involving war crimes or human rights violations.3 8 For
example, the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) and the World
Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding which provides for the creation of

the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (ICEP) to examine

While this Article focuses primarily on the activities of Swiss banks, it
37.
is meant to address the problem of bank secrecy jurisdictions in a much broader
context. Switzerland is not the only nation to have benefited from bank secrecy
and perhaps has been more open than other countries when challenged. See
Suspicions and Explanations, Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., Nov. 1, 1996 (stating that
"the only way to form an appropriate conception of the role played by Swiss
financial markets before and during the war is to understand how money and
other assets were being transferred throughout the international financial system
at that time. Britain, Canada, the United States and South American banks
functioned then and still function now as safe havens for money escaping the
grasp of governments."). Other countries with bank secrecy laws that provide for
criminal sanctions against violators include Austria, Denmark, Finland, Mexico,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey. See De Capitani, supranote 6, at 60-6 1.
38.
The United States has applauded efforts of the Swiss Bankers
Association and an Independent Committee of Eminent Persons headed by former
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker to review the account records of major
Swiss banks and establish a claims resolution procedure in Switzerland for
See, e.g., Press Statement of Nicholas Burns,
dormant account funds.
Spokesman for the U.S. Department of State, Feb. 5, 1997 (visited Mar. 13, 1998)
<http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/9702/970205.html>. Burns stated:
The United States applauds the announcement by three Swiss banks of a
new private sector humanitarian fund to alleviate the plight of Holocaust
victims and their heirs. This is an important demonstration of good will by
the major banks of Switzerland....
More broadly, we've been encouraged . . . by a number of actions
undertaken by the Swiss. You know that they've lifted their bank secrecy
rules; that they have established the Volcker Commission to investigate
dormant accounts from the Second World War and after. They've also
created a Historical Commission to look into Switzerland's entire
relationship with Nazi Germany and the Nazi-seized assets before, during,
and after the Second World War.

We believe that these actions demonstrate a willingness to examine
the past and to let the
themselves.

facts, however

uncomfortable,

speak for
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is chaired by
the fate of dormant accounts. 3 9 This committee
40
former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.
The ICEP will supervise an audit of Swiss banks with respect
to the historical and present status of dormant accounts. While
the ICEP is nongovernmental, it has received the support of the
Swiss Federation and the U.S. government. 4 1 Thus, it might be
viewed as part of a diplomatic solution. The Philippines has been
involved in protracted negotiations with Swiss authorities over
Marcos's assets. The United States has officially supported these
negotiations.

39.
Memorandum of Understanding between the World Jewish Restitution
Organization, the World Jewish Congress and the SBA, May 2, 1996 (copy on file
with Author). As part of the Memorandum, the parties stipulated that:
(1)

An Independent Committee of Eminent Persons will be appointed.

Three persons will be appointed by the World Jewish Restitution
Organization (WJRO) and three persons by the Swiss Bankers Association
(SBA). The Committee of six will jointly appoint an additional person as
Chairperson....
(1) The Committee of Eminent Persons will appoint an international
auditing company; this company must be licensed by the Federal Banking
Commission (FBC) to operate in Switzerland. The SBA will assure the
auditors' unfettered access to all relevant files in banking institutions
regarding dormant accounts and other assets and financial instruments
deposited before, during and immediately after the Second World War.
The parties of the agreement will cooperate to assure that the Swiss
(1)
Government will deal with the question of looted assets in Swiss banks or
other institutions which were not reported or returned under the relevant
laws during the years before, during and immediately after the Second
World War.
Id.
The ICEP has appointed several international accounting firms to conduct the
audit. As part of the audit, the auditors are charged to determine the scope and
effectiveness of the methodologies used by the Swiss Ombudsman and by Swiss
banks in previous searches for dormant accounts as well as the number and
value of dormant accounts that were opened between 1933 and 1945. The
auditors are also asked to determine whether there has been any deliberate or
inadvertent recordkeeping errors by Swiss banks as well as any lapses in ethical
standards. ICEP Memorandum, "Audit Firm Mandate and Instructions-The First
Phase," Nov. 19, 1996 (on file with Author).
Other members of the ICEP include Reuben Beraja, Abraham Burg,
40.
Professor Dr. Curt Gasteyger, Professor Rene Rhinow, Professor Dr. Klaus Jacobi,
and Ronald Lauder.
For example, on June 25, 1997, the ICEP, the SBA and the Swiss
41.
Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) reached an agreement concerning a
comprehensive claims resolution process for dormant accounts. Joint Press
Release of Kurt Hauri, Chairman of SFBC and Paul Volcker, Chairman of ICEP,
June 25, 1997 (on file with Author).
The Swiss government has also enacted special laws to permit the ICEP audit
to occur through a waiver of bank secrecy laws. ICEP Press Release 2, Jan. 31,

1997 (on file with Author).
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Diplomatic channels may provide ways to deal with Swiss
Such channels,
banks or other bank secrecy jurisdictions.
however, are not always readily available. Furthermore, human
rights claimants may not always trust government-sponsored
forums or mechanisms to deal with their concerns and
interests. 4 2 More generally, individual victims of human rights
violations have fewer mechanisms for seeking enforcement of
their rights or redress for past violations. 4" Consequently, it is
important to analyze alternative methods for dealing with the
paradoxes inherent in bank secrecy and its relationship to global
human rights.
Part II of this Article describes the tradition of bank secrecy
in Swiss law and recent legislative changes to that tradition. Part
III discusses several discoveries of hidden funds of corrupt
political leaders in Swiss banks. Part IV explores the history of
the Holocaust assets litigation and discusses in detail the current
claims. Part V describes the Marcos human rights litigation as an
example of claims that the Swiss banks were functioning as
agents of a dictator. The characterization of spoliations as an
international crime is discussed in Part VI. Finally, Part VII
gleans lessons from the Marcos and Holocaust Assets Litigation
and proposes recommendations for the future.

II. RULES OF THE GAME: SWISS BANK SECRECY AT A GLANCE
A. Bank Secrecy: Honor Thy Customer

Swiss banking secrecy has a long tradition in Swiss law and

is encompassed within a more general notion of a right to

As counsel for the Holocaust Plaintiffs noted at a hearing on defendant
42.
Swiss Banks' motion to dismiss: "There is a lack of trust among the client
population in this situation." This remark was made in response to questions by
the court concerning the role of the ICEP and the Volcker supervised arbitral
panel. Transcript of Civil Cause for Oral Argument Before the Honorable Edward
R. Korman, U.S. District Judge, at 64, in In re Holocaust Victims' Assets CV-964849, CV-96-5161, CV-97-461 (July 31, 1997) [hereinafter Holocaust Assets Oral

Argument].
Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do
43.
Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 591 (1997). Stephens notes
that U.N. human rights bodies complaint proceedings are of limited impact.
Regional human rights bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) offer more useful forums. Individuals may seek legal redress from the
ECHR (in addition to Member States) and the court's decisions are considered
final and legally binding. Id. at 591-92.
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personal privacy, which would include one's economic holdings.4
The Swiss duty of confidentiality with respect to a bank's clientele
was enshrined in the Swiss Federal Banking Statute of 1934. 4 5
As stated above, Article 47 is perhaps the core tenet of Swiss
bank secrecy laws.
A banker may be criminally prosecuted if he or she reveals
confidential information about a customer either intentionally or
negligently." Bankers have a duty of confidentiality with respect
to the customer's name, the banker's relationship with the
customer, the type of bank account, the transactions that take
place with the account, and any information supplied by the
customer in connection with the account. 4 7 A banker may be
prosecuted under Article 47 even if the injured party (the
customer) does not file a complaint. 4 8 In addition, Article 273 of
the Swiss Penal Code makes it a crime for a person to divulge
secret business information to a foreign government authority or
its agents. 4 9 Breach of the duty of confidentiality could subject a

44.

See Krauskopf, supra note 6, at 293; De Capitani, supra note 6, at 59;

Meyer, supranote 6, at 288. Meyer notes:
Each "secret" is considered intangible property and its violation is an
actionable tort under the general principles of Article 28 of the Civil Code
and Articles 41 and 49 of the Code of Obligations.... Up to 1935 there
were no statutory provisions regulating the banking secret. It was based
on usage and its violation subjected the banks only to civil liability for
damages under the tort provisions just cited and for breach of contract
since the courts ruled that a bank's duty to observe silence about the
affairs of its clients was an implied contractual obligation on the part of

the bank, even if nothing was said in the contract.
Id.; see SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZUCH [hereinafter ZGB] [Swiss Civil Code] art.
28; SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT [hereinafter OR] [Swiss Code of
Obligations]. For an English translation of the Swiss Civil Code, see IvY WILLIAMS,
THE SWISS CIVIL CODE (Sigfried Wyler & Barbara Wyler eds., rev. ed. 1987); for an
English translation of Code of Obligations, see SWISS CONTRACT LAW (SwissAmerican Chamber of Commerce trans., 2d. ed. 1984).
45.
Some commentators note that the duty of confidentiality has existed as
a customary principle which pre-dates the 1934 law. Elliot A. Stultz, Swiss Bank
Secrecy and United States Efforts to Obtain Infornationfrom Swiss Banks, 21 VAND.
J. TRANSNATL L. 63, 67 (1988).
46.
See Krauskopf, supranote 6, at 294.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Article 273 states:
Any person who seeks to discover a manufacturing or business secret with
a view to making it available to a foreign official or private organization or
to a foreign private enterprise or to the agents thereof or any person who
makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official or
private enterprise or to the agents thereof shall be punished by
imprisonment or in serious cases to "reclusion." The judge may, in
addition, impose a fine.
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banker to civil liability in both contract and tort.5 0 Finally, the
Swiss Banking Act permits the Swiss Bank Commission to impose
administrative sanctions upon a Swiss bank for violations of a
customer's right to confidentiality. 5 ' These sanctions include
suspension of a bank executive
revocation of a bank's license or
52
convicted of a secrecy violation.
The banker's duty of confidentiality, however, is not
absolute.5 3 Customers may give their consent to disclosure of
their account information. Customer consent, however, requires
an affirmative act such as a written waiver.5 4 In the absence of
consent, there are other circumstances under which Swiss
bankers may provide customer information to third parties-who
in most instances are Swiss government authorities rather than
individual parties. For example, Article 47 states that a bank's
obligation to maintain bank secrecy is subject to "the provision of
federal and cantonal law providing for the obligation to report to
its authorities and give evidence in legal proceedings."5 5
In Swiss criminal proceedings, bank secrecy may be set
aside.5 6 In civil proceedings, "[g]enerally secrecy is preserved by
the federal judiciary. Moreover, in six cantons, the rules are
similar to the federal civil procedures."5 7 The heirs of a deceased
account holder are also legally entitled to information about the
decedent's bank account.5 8
Swiss bank secrecy often has been viewed as an impediment
to tracing the assets of criminals. Over the past two decades,
however, Switzerland has amended its laws to ease its previously
For example, foreign government
rigid secrecy restrictions.
matters by
authorities may now obtain assistance in criminal
59
invoking a Swiss treaty on mutual assistance.,
In 1981, the Swiss Federal Assembly enacted the Law 6on
0
International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC).

SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [hereinafter STGB] [Swiss Penal Code]
art. 273, reprintedin Krauskopf, supra note 6, at 295.

50.

Krauskopf, supranote 6, at 296.

51.
52.

Id. at 297.
Id.

53.
Beat Kleiner, Banking Law, in INTRODUCTION TO Swiss LAW 173, 176
(Francois Dessemontet & Tugrul Ansay eds., 1981) (discussing how banks must
inform persons such as guardians, administrators, and executors of wills).
54.
See Krauskopf, supranote 6, at 298.
BG art. 47; see also Krauskopf, supranote 6, at 298.
55.

Id.
56.
Id. at 299. At the time of this presentation, Lutz Krauskopf was a
57.
Deputy Attorney General in the Swiss Federal Office of Justice.
58.
See De Capitani, supranote 6, at 62.
Federal Law on International Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 20,
59.
1981, 20 I.L.M. 1339 (1981) [hereinafter IMAC].
Id. The United States had previously negotiated a similar bilateral
60.
legal assistance treaty in 1973 that became effective in 1977. This treaty also
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The law went into effect on January 1, 1983. Part three of the
IMAC deals with acts of assistance, obtaining of records and

documents, and the obtaining of evidence. 61 Swiss authorities
will provide information only in connection with foreign crimes
that also constitute criminal offenses under Swiss law.6 2 If there
is no equivalent crime in the Swiss penal code, the Swiss
authorities are not obliged to waive their secrecy laws. For
example, Swiss authorities will not provide assistance with
63
respect to tax evasion, which is not criminalized in Switzerland.
Swiss authorities will, however, provide assistance with respect to
tax fraud. A law criminalizing money laundering finally was
passed in 1990, making mutual assistance possible for a broader
range of criminal acts. 6 4 Article 18 of the IMAC provided for the
freezing of a bank account's assets pending review after a request
for assistance. 65 Furthermore, all mutual assistance treaties
signed by Switzerland exclude judicial assistance for the purpose
of prosecuting political or military offenses. 6 6 The Swiss Federal
Government amended IMAC in 1995 because of the delays
experienced in the Philippine request to recover Marcos assets.
The amendment unified the procedures used in various cantons
7
and limited certain procedural remedies. 6
B. Know Your Customer
Various aspects of Swiss banking law and practice require
commercial banks to ascertain the identity of their customers and
to cease relations if the customer is suspected of having obtained
his or her funds through illegal activity. This has been seen as a

included a specific chapter dealing with assistance in cases involving organized

crime. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, U.S.Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Criminal Assistance Treaty].
61.
IMAC art. 63(1).
62.
Article 64 of IMAC states:
Measures according to Article 63 which involve the application of
compulsory measures may be ordered only if the statement of the relevant
facts shows that the offense prosecuted abroad contains the objective
elements of an offense punishable under Swiss law.
IMAC art 64.
63.
The Swiss Supreme Court has stated that the tax fraud exception does
not apply to all tax offenses.
64.

Franco Taisch, Swiss Statutes Concerning Money Laundering, 26 INT'L

LAW. 695 (1992).
65.
IMAC art. 18.
66.
See Criminal Assistance Treaty, supranote 60, art. 2.
67.
John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Switzerland to Revise Law on
International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters with Effects on the SwissAmerican MLAT, 1 TRANsNAT'L L. UPDATE, Oct. 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, ARCNWS File.
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way in which banks can prevent criminals from using numbered
accounts to store their loot.
The SBA has taken some of its own measures to improve its
image and to prevent illicit use of its banking system. In 1977, it
adopted a "Convention of Diligence" (Convention) that is also
referred to as a "Know Your Customer"6 8 Agreement. The
Convention is monitored by the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission. Swiss banks promise not to help foreigners violate
foreign exchange control regulations or speculate against the
Swiss franc. Consequently, Swiss banks are obligated to exercise
"due diligence" in ascertaining the true beneficiaries of bank
accounts. Swiss banks are required under the terms of the
Convention to ascertain the identity of the "beneficial owner" of a
bank account. Banks, therefore, must request proof of the
customer's identity, which may include official documents or
letters of reference from trustworthy persons. In the spring of
1988, the SBA established a requirement that bank chiefs must
and
handle the applications of foreign statesmen or "strongmen"
69
trouble."
of
sign
first
the
at
down
them
"turn
supposedly
The main exception to this requirement was for accounts
opened by Swiss individuals who are bound by professional
secrecy. Professional secrecy means the duty of confidentiality
required of certain professionals, such as lawyers or bankers,
Thus, the Convention previously
toward their customers.
provided that attorneys and others protected by professional
secrecy could simply complete a document labeled Form B when
opening an account on behalf of a client.70 Form B did not reveal
the identity of the beneficial account owner. Instead, Form B was
a declaration that the attorney or other professional knew the
account holder and that no forbidden or illegal transaction was

68.

Hoets & Zwart, supra note 27, at 78-79 (citing Agreement of the

Signatory Banks and the SBA with the Swiss National Bank on the Observance of
Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of Banking Secrecy of
July 1, 1977). The Diligence Agreement has a five year term and has been
renewed subsequently. See, e.g., Bankers Code of Conduct Agreement 1982
Concluded Between the Swiss Bankers' Association and the Swiss National Bank,
reprinted in 1 CoM. LAws OF EUR. 195-209 (Luisa Ten Kate ed., 1984). The

convention was renewed and amended in 1987 and 1992. See Agreement on the
Swiss Bank's Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence
between SBA and the Signatory Banks of July 1, 1987, reprinted in BOSTON U. L.
SCH., MATERIALS FROM CONFERENCE ON TRENDS AND FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL
BANKING LAW 95-108 (1990).
David Lawday, PST-Swiss Accounts are no Secret, U.S. NEWS AND
69.
WORLD REP., July 4, 1988, at 47. Furthermore, absconding with national funds is
a crime under Swiss law, paving the way for foreign countries to seek assistance
under the IMAC. Ellen Wallace, Swiss Banks: Private or Secret?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1986, at 1.
Hoets & Zwart, supranote 27, at 87.
70.
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The use of Form B was abolished by federal

regulation on April 25, 1991.71

The Swiss enacted a new federal law on money laundering in
1990.72 Article 305, one of the new provisions for the Swiss Penal
Code, came into force on March 23, 1990. Under this provision,
"[a]ny person who professionally accepts, keeps on deposit,
manages or transfers assets belonging to a third party, and fails
to establish with all due diligence the identity of the beneficial
owner, shall be punished by imprisonment up to one year,
detention, or fine."7 3 Based on this law, when a customer opens
an account, a banker has a duty to ascertain the customer's
identity and to take action if the customer appears to be opening
a bank account to store proceeds of criminal activity. 74
In 1992, Swiss legislation was enacted that prohibited banks
from opening truly anonymous accounts. Banks were required to
ascertain the identity of the account holder even if keeping that
information confidential and restricted to just a few members of
banking management. 75 Swiss banks were not always receptive
to these changes. Union Bank of Switzerland, for example, stated
in its 1990 annual report: "We reject any additional moves
toward imposing policing tasks on the banks."76 Robert Studer,
then president of the bank, stated in a newspaper interview: "We

do not refuse the money of political leaders as a matter of
principle. That would be extraordinarily unjust. But before we do
business with a political leader, it first must be approved by a
member of the executive board."7 7

71.

Steven Mufson, Swiss to End Anonymous Bank Accounts; 57-Year

TraditionProvidedHaven forDictators and Drug Dealers,WASH. POST, May 4, 1991,
at A20.
72.
See Taisch, supranote 64, at 695.
73.
STGB art. 305, reprinted in Taisch, supra note 64, at 695 (English
translation provided by Author). Taisch also mentions that Article 305 applies
not only to offenses committed with intent but also to situations he terms "quasinegligence" where the banker or person accepting funds is aware of his or her
duty and acts recklessly in not performing due diligence inquiry. Taisch, supra
note 64, at 709.
74.
Mufson, supra note 71 (stating that Swiss banks should take
appropriate steps if they have reason to believe there is an illegal transaction
taking place either at beginning of bank-customer relationship or subsequently).
For example, banks should refrain from doing business with money launderers,
sever existing relationships, and block accounts.
75.
See Nicolas Killen & Nicolas Pi~rard, Regional Development:
Switzerland, 26 INTL LAW. 545 (1992) (discussing the regulation passed by the
Swiss Federal Baning Commission on April 25, 1991 stating that attorneys,
notaries, trust administrators, and money managers could no longer rely on Form
B when opening bank accounts on a fiduciary basis).
76.
Id
77.
Rone Tempest, Ex-Despots Can't Bank on the Swiss; The World's
Dictators are Being Put on Notice-If You're Ousted, Don't Expect Your Nest
Egg to be Waiting in Zurich or Basel, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990, at Al.
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Swiss bank secrecy still remains a potent obstacle with
respect to civil legal proceedings and even diplomatic
negotiations. Furthermore, it is unclear where human rights
violations fit within the current Swiss legal framework. Other
problems with Swiss bank secrecy also remain. For example, it is
not mandatory for Swiss officials to report money laundering and
suspicious transactions to Swiss authorities under Article 47(a).
Therefore, illegal money has still been deposited in Swiss
accounts. 78 The multilateral Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF) recently commissioned an international
mission to draw up a report on the status of antimoneylaundering initiatives in Switzerland.7 9
The three person
delegation included Anne-Marie Moulin, a leading civil servant at
the Bank of France; Fritz Zehder, an Austrian legal and financial
expert, and Jean-Claude Delepierres, the chief of Belgium's
national antimoney-laundering agency.80
The delegation
interviewed fifty Swiss officials, examining magistrates, and
officials from the Swiss federal finance department and Swiss
banks. 8 '
The FATF delegation found that the Swiss had made some
progress with respect to the fight against money laundering. The
report also noted, however, that Switzerland still does not have
requirements for banks to report suspicious transactions to the

federal banking authorities.8 2

Switzerland had promised such

legislation three years ago. s" In response to the FATF report,
Switzerland has proposed to implement a requirement in April
1998 that would require banks to report suspicious transactions
to the Office of Federal Organized Crime.8 4 This legislation was
passed in October 1997 and will oblige bankers, asset managers,
investment advisers, trust companies, life insurers, currency

78.
"Discretion is still the watchword of Swiss banking, and Swiss law
encourages it. Bankers may report fishy-smelling deposits, but they are not
obliged to. If the stench of dirty money gets too strong, they can close suspect
accounts without telling the authorities."
Banking Secrecy. Keeping Mum,
ECONOMisT, Feb. 17, 1996, at 71; see also FT Guide to Gold, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1996.
79.
Swiss Under Fire by FATF, INTELLIGENCE NEWSL., Sept. 11, 1997,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. FATF was established by the G-7
summit in Paris in 1989 to examine measures to combat money laundering. In
April 1990, FATF issued a report which contains 40 recommendations that
institutions can take to prevent money laundering. The FATF recommendations

are not a binding international convention. At present, FATF has 30 member
countries. Switzerland is a member of FATF. The FATF Web Site is located at
<http://www.oecd.org/fatf>.
80.
81.
82.

See Swiss UnderFire by FATF, supra note 79.
Id.
Id.

83.

Id.
Id.

84.
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exchanges, and financial intermediaries to report suspicious
85
transactions.
At this juncture, it is unclear what effect the reporting of
suspicious customer information will have upon the Swiss
banking industry. First, it is unclear whether the reporting
requirement will cause Swiss banks to identify when existing
customers may have crossed the line with respect to illegal
activity.
Furthermore, it will be important for the Swiss
government to use the information gathered to prosecute
customers for money laundering in the event their deposited
funds are the result of illegal activity.
The evolution and changes in Swiss banking legislation
demonstrate that the Swiss have taken positive steps toward
correcting problems associated with bank secrecy and criminal
activity. Nonetheless, one legacy of bank secrecy is that criminals
have previously deposited funds that are now quite difficult to
extricate. As the discussion below reveals, it is an open question
whether banks have knowingly or recklessly accepted funds that
they perhaps should have rejected.

III. SAVING FOR A RAINY DAY

Ironically, many of the headlines that emerged in 1997 and
early 1998 about the end of Swiss banking secrecy have been
seen before. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, commentators
hailed the end of Switzerland's role as a safe haven for dictators'
retirement funds.8 6
In 1990, Deputy Director of the Swiss
Banking Commission Daniel Zuberbuhler stated: "Ifyou are a
dishonest leader of a country, you better not put your money here
in Switzerland."8 7
With each such assertion, however, new
stories appear in the press about dictators who have Swiss
accounts.
Furthermore, each time a new dictator is deposed, one learns
that he has Swiss bank accounts. Mr. Zuberbuhler stated in
1990: "It would seem now that if some bank has Mr. Mobutu's
money, they should get rid of it as soon as possible."8 8 Swiss

85.
Stephanie Nebehay, Top Swiss Prosecutor Seeks National Anti-Crime
Body, AAP NEWSFEED, Dec. 31, 1997 in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. As
of April 1998, the new Swiss money laundering legislation went into effect. See
Balz Brupacher, New Swiss Law Closes Banking, Financial Loopholes, AAP
Newsfeed, Apr. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
86.
Id.
87.
Tempest, supranote 77, at Al.
88.
Id.
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banks did not heed Zuberbuhler's advice. 8 9 During the early
summer of 1997, Swiss bankers first insisted that Zaire dictator
Mobuto Sese Seko did not have any money in Swiss accounts. 90
In June 1997, Swiss banking officials found $3.4 million in six of
92
the nations' banks. 9 1 A day later, they found additional funds.
At present, the Swiss claim they are unable to locate more

without bank account names, numbers, and information about
93
Mobutu's crimes. Mobutu died in exile on September 7, 1997.
Switzerland has been a popular location for dictators'
retirement accounts. After Marcos was deposed in 1986, the

89.

In 1997, commentators were still seeking details concerning dictators'

accounts:
Three client accounts held by Swiss banks, those of the late Nicolae
Ceausescu, Ferdinand Marcos and Baby Doc Duvalier, ought also to be
brought into the open. In the light of his murderous record, the banks
should also be put under pressure to disclose the finances of Saddam
Hussein-rather than, as they have done in the past, blocking the efforts
of those who seek to track down his treasure.
Dirty Money that Stains Swiss Vaults, OBSERVER, Aug. 4, 1996, at 27.

90.

See Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Resist Disclosing any Mobutu Funds, N.Y.

TIMES, May 6, 1997, at A14.

In Mr. Mobutu's case, the Swiss Banking Commission took the unusual
step of reporting last month that the 12 largest banks have denied holding
Mobutu deposits. "Either banks have chucked him out, or he has left
himself," said Daniel Zuberbuhler, managing director of the [Swiss
Banking] Commission. 'There's no excuse to take money from someone
who is known to be corrupt. And it certainly would not be billions in

Swiss banks."
Id.
Another commentator asks:
Here is a $4 billion question. It has to do with secret accounts in Swiss
banks, but it has nothing to do with Nazi gold.

The question: What will happen to the staggering sums that Zaire's
President Mobutu Sese Seko looted from his country, and from
international lenders?
Mobutu's billions are believed to be largely
accounts, as well as invested in European
companies. So far, Swiss bankers claim they
lucre, but that denial is so thin that the
Commission has just promised to look harder.

hidden in secret Swiss
properties held by front
aren't holding any of his
Swiss Federal Banking

Trudy Rubin, West Should Help Track Down Mobutu's Millions. Forner Leader
Looted Zaire, RECORD, May 20, 1997, at L13, available in LEXIS, News Library,
NJREC File.
91.
Swiss Find Mobutu Money, FIN. TIMES (London), June 4, 1997, at
A3.
Id.
92.
J.Y. Smith, Congo Ex-Ruler Mobutu Dies in Exile, WASIi. PosT, Sept. 8,
93.
1997, at Al (noting that "[s]tealing was so widespread [in the Mobutu regime] that
the word 'kleptocracy' was coined to describe the regime.").
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Swiss seemed willing to aid countries that sought to trace his
assets. 9 4
Previously, the Swiss had refused to cooperate in
political cases. 95 At this time, the Swiss government froze the

assets of dictators from the Philippines, Haiti, Panama, Paraguay,
and Romania. 9 6 Each of these cases, however, must wind its way
through the judicial system of the home country, as well as
through Swiss courts. The Swiss require that the country seeking
the assets of a deposed dictator hold a "legally binding" criminal
trial in the home country before the Swiss approve a transfer of
funds. 9 7 In the case of the Philippines, a Swiss court in 1990
gave the country one year to start criminal proceedings. 9 8 After
the criminal proceedings, the Philippine government initially faced
the prospect of having to prove its claim to the Marcos funds
99
through protracted civil proceedings.
When the Swiss governing council requires banks to freeze
the assets of an account holder, the account holder is legally
obliged to come forward and report which accounts are in the
person's name and how much money is in the accounts. Swiss
banks are also required to know the identity of their depositors.
This does not, however, guarantee full disclosure. Dictators and
criminals can use false names or send relatives or friends to make
deposits. This was the strategy used by Raul Salinas de Gortari,
the brother of Mexico's former president. 0 0
He used a fake
passport with a pseudonym when he made deposits at Geneva's
Banque Pictet & Cie. His wife was later arrested when she
attempted to close the eighty-four million dollar account. 101
Benazir Bhutto is the latest leader to be accused of large
scale theft and corruption.
In December 1997, the Swiss

94.
In order to avoid challenges and disputes over the Marcos wealth, the
SFBC ordered Swiss banks to freeze Marcos's accounts when Marcos was
deposed by a popular democratic uprising. See Oliver Dunant & Michele
Wassmer, Swiss Bank Secrecy: Its Limits Under Suiss and InternationalLaws, 20
CASEW. RES. J. INT' L. 541, 564 (1988).
95.
For example, when Ethiopia's Haile Selassie was dethroned in 1974,
the Swiss refused to open his account to the new Ethiopian government. John
Tagliabue, The Swiss Stop Keeping Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1986, at F4.
Similarly, the Swiss declined a request to freeze the funds of the Shah of Iran.
Tempest, supranote 76, at Al.
96.
See, e.g., Tagliabue, supra note 95, at F4 (noting the Swiss had frozen
Marcos's and Duvalier's assets and were willing to cooperate).
97.
Swiss CourtRules for the Philippines. Manila Can Claim Marcos Millions,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 27, 1990, at A3.
98.
Id. at A3. The Swiss Supreme Court further declared that the
Philippine trial had to conform to the standards set forth in the Swiss constitution
and the European Human Rights Convention, which discuss the judicial
independence and impartiality. Id.
99.
Id.
100. Olson, supranote 90, at A14.
101. Id.
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government froze bank accounts of Bhutto and her family. 102 The
Pakistani government has filed charges of corruption against
Bhutto and her husband, Asif All Zardari. l0 3 At present, more
than one hundred million dollars of bank deposits and properties
linked to Bhutto's family have been identified overseas.1 0 4 These
assets are alleged to have resulted from secret payments made by
foreign companies seeking favor in Pakistan with respect to
While
business opportunities and government contracts. l0 5
Bhutto's husband has been directly linked as the originator of
various illegal schemes, the role that Bhutto played in these
activities remains unclear. 106
Some issues remain problematic despite the evolution of
Swiss law to provide greater transparency and cooperation. First,
why have banks previously accepted the assets of dictators?
Second, once it is known that a dictator is suspected of human
rights violations, why do the banks continue to safeguard his
assets?1 0 7 Nonetheless, it is commendable that Switzerland has
been willing to freeze the assets of deposed dictators and to
respond to nations seeking mutual assistance in tracing national
funds with which the dictator absconded. 108
Only the Philippines and Mali though have recovered any
money through the use of mutual assistance. In both instances,
the proceedings extended for multiple years. In April 1997, Mali
was the first nation to receive funds of a deposed leader via

102.

Swivss Authorities Conffirm Freeze on Bhutto Bank Accounts, BBC

SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
BBCSWB File; see also Eric Margolis, Pakistan's "Princess"Dethroned; Once
Idolized By the Western Media, The Ugly Truth About Benazir Bhutto Is Now
Revealed, TORONTO SUN, Jan. 18, 1998.

103. John F. Burns et al., Bhutto Clan Leaves Trail of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1998, at Al.
104. Id.
105. Id. The Pakistani Government purchased a cache of documents that
allegedly detail the extent of corruption and bribery that occurred while Bhutto
was in power. Id.
106. Id.
107. As one journalist writes:
Mr. Grobet, who practices law in Geneva, noted that despite Swiss laws
that limit bank secrecy, questions crop up repeatedly about financial
One of the most
dealings with dictators from developing nations.
notorious cases was that of the late Philippines dictator, Ferdinand
Marcos, whose $500 minion in Switzerland provoked a decade-long legal
battle over whom it rightfully belongs to now.
Other foreign leaders who have availed themselves of Swiss bank accounts
include the former Haitian dictator, Jean Claude Duvalier, former
President Moussa Traore of Mali and the former Romanian leader Nicolae

Ceausescu.
Olson, supranote 90, at A14.

108.

See Kwitny, supranote 8.
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mutual assistance.
On April 25, 1997, Mali received
approximately $2.3 million based on a request for mutual
assistance lodged in 1991.109 The funds belonged to ex-Malian
dictator Moussa Traore, who was overthrown in a 1991 military
coup. 1 10 In 1991, when Traore was deposed, the funds he and
Malian managers had stashed in Switzerland were estimated at
more than one billion Swiss francs."' Thus, mutual assistance
may not be the most practical solution to the problem of the
leader who has engaged in indigenous spoliation. Furthermore, if
the leader simultaneously engaged in human rights violations, as
in the Marcos situation, the need for the funds becomes more
acute.
The next two Parts discuss the Holocaust assets litigation
and the Marcos litigation in turn. In each instance, Swiss banks
are alleged to have knowingly played a role in protecting illegally
obtained assets. The role of the Swiss banks has paved the way
for interesting new approaches to liability of the commercial
enterprise.

IV. THE PARADIGM OF BANKER AS AGENT AND FACILITATOR: THE
HOLOCAUST VICTIMS ASSET LITIGATION

A. Show Me the Money: Prelude to the
Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation
During the summer of 1997, three separate lawsuits were
filed against three major Swiss banks in an effort to recover bank
deposits of Nazi victims that remain unclaimed in Swiss vaults.
Why were plaintiffs suing the Swiss banks? In recent years, it
has become increasingly apparent that the Swiss have not fully
disclosed the status of assets belonging to the Third Reich and to
Holocaust victims. Furthermore, critics assert that the Swiss

government did not live up to its pledge with respect to the
liquidation of German assets after World War Two. Allegedly,
Holocaust survivors around the globe have received less financial
support than they would have had the Swiss kept their original
agreements with the Allies at the end of the war.

109. Sylvia Passelaigue-Merle, Mali Wins Payback from Switzerland in
Embezzlement Procedures, Agence France Presse, Apr. 25, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
110. Id.
111. Id. Swiss lawyers assisting Mali assert the Swiss accounts could have

been partly emptied by Traore's colleagues during the 1991-1997 waiting period.
Id.
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Moreover, Holocaust victims feel that the assets, which
belong to them, are still held in Swiss vaults. The plaintiffs seek
an accounting. They want the banks to open their ledgers and
make them public. 1 2 The truth-telling function of both the

Volcker inquiry and the litigation will put to rest many suspicions
and doubts held by victims. Ambassador Eizenstat, the U.S.
Special Envoy for Property Claims of Nazi
Undersecretary for Commerce, recently noted:

Victims

and

We must acknowledge, although attempts have been made to
revisit this issue ever since, the frustration of Holocaust survivors
and their heirs that this issue now almost 50 years later is still
[Tihere are many tragic accounts in which these
with us...
survivors or their heirs have been stymied in efforts to obtain
information about dormant accounts or other assets in
Switzerland. Many have lately questioned why it has taken nearly
50 years to obtain a comprehensive and transparent accounting of
13

this issue. 1

The lawsuits are the culmination of several partial attempts
by Swiss banks and the Swiss government to deal with the issue
of dormant accounts as well as German assets situated in
Switzerland at the end of the war.1 1 4 This section discusses the
search for dormant accounts as well as property confiscated from
Jews by the Nazis, which allegedly were hidden in Swiss bank
accounts. In contrast to victims of forced labor or those who had
property confiscated, the plaintiffs who are suing to recover

112. See Weisshaus Amended Complaint,
accompanying text. Plaintiffs ask for an accounting
accounts of Holocaust victims as well as assets
German industrialists during World War Two.
113. Prepared Statement by Stuart Eizenstat

16 and
infra note 241,
of the status of dormant bank
deposited by the Nazis and
Undersecretary of Commerce,

Before the House Banking and FinancialServices Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec.
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNWS file [hereinafter Eizenstat
Testimony].
114. As noted in one government report:
Over the years, the inflexibility of the Swiss Bankers' Association and
other Swiss banks made it extremely difficult for surviving family members
of Nazi victims to successfully fie claims to secure bank records and other
assets. This overall pattern of apparent Swiss bankers' indifference to the
needs of the victims of the Holocaust and their heirs persisted until the
current international pressures came to bear....
WILLIAM Z. SLANY, U.S. DEPOT OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND
RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD

WAR II, PRELIMINARY STUDY, at viii (coordinated by Stuart E. Eizenstat) (May 1997)
[hereinafter EIZENSTAT REPORT]. For a general discussion of the current dormant
accounts controversy, see Jodi Berlin Ganz, Note, Heirs Without Assets and Asset
Without Heirs: Recovering and Reclaiming Dormant Swiss Bank Accounts, 20
FoRDHAM INTL L.J. 1306 (1997), which surveys international dispute resolution
mechanisms and recommends general international claims resolution tribunals
or panels as a means of resolving dormant account claims.
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dormant accounts do not bring their claims under international
law. Nonetheless, the dormant accounts controversy illustrates
the manner in which bank secrecy can serve as a potential
obstacle to the truth. Furthermore, the existence of the dormant

accounts engendered the related controversy over looted assets
and Nazi wealth accepted and retained by Swiss banks. An
analysis of the manner in which claims to dormant accounts, as

well as Nazi assets, have been handled after World War Two
illustrates some problems of bank secrecy and restitution to
Holocaust survivors and human rights plaintiffs.
It is important to remember that there are several distinct
but related Swiss actors that historically have been involved with
the issue of dormant accounts and German assets that were
deposited in Switzerland. 11 5 For example, the Swiss Central Bank
dealt with Hitler and his agents with respect to foreign exchange
and gold exchange during the war. These government actors have
often taken steps that impacted Swiss commercial banks. Swiss
banks were also involved in Swiss fiscal policy during World War
Two to the extent that they accepted deposits from Jewish
1 16
customers as well as Nazis.
It is unclear, however, whether one can characterize Swiss
banks as agents of the Swiss government merely due to their
fiscal relationships with Germany and German customers. The
banks' actions were often constrained and limited by treaties and
regulations promulgated by the Swiss government. Swiss banks
also had their conduct prescribed by the SBA. The Swiss Central
Bank and Swiss commercial banks were separate entities with
different responsibilities. Despite the tendency to lump together
all "banking" activity, one must remember that the role of a
government-supervised central bank is quite different from that of
a commercial banking operation.
1. Allies' Requests for Identification of German Assets in Swiss
Accounts
Prior to the end of World War Two, the United States had
requested that Switzerland identify German assets located in
Swiss accounts. From the very beginning, bank secrecy laws
were a formidable obstacle for all concerned. Orvis A. Schmidt,
the Director of Foreign Funds Control for the U.S. Treasury
Department, was part of the Currier mission to Bern in January

115. See, e.g., EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 114, at 32-33 (discussing role
of Swiss Government and Swiss Central Bank with respect to German gold
purchases during World War Two).
116. For a general discussion of the alleged role of Swiss banks with respect
to German assets during World War Two, see EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 114,
at 3-5.
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1945 which discussed Switzerland's agreement to halt trade with
Germany. With respect to lifting bank secrecy, Schmidt stated:
Even at this late date, the Swiss Government is loath to take the
necessary steps to force banks and other cloaking institutions to
disclose the owners of assets held in or through Switzerland. This
means that German assets held in or through Switzerland will not
be identified. Thus, the true picture of German financial and
industrial penetration throughout the world will be kept a secret.
By the same token, Swiss banks will continue to profit by
protecting, through their secrecy laws, Germany's war potential1 17
the hidden assets of it[s] financiers and industrialists.

In 1946, the Allied powers met in Paris and signed the Paris
Reparations Agreement (Paris Agreement). The parties to the
Paris Agreement charged the United States, the United Kingdom,
and France with recovering German assets retained in neutral
countries and making the net proceeds available to the InterAllied Reparation Agency. These funds were earmarked for
stateless Holocaust victims who needed aid but were unable to
claim the assistance of any government directly." 8 The Paris
Agreement provided that neutral countries were to make available
heirless assets of individual Nazi victims for the intergovernmental committee on refugees. At the 1946 Paris meeting,
it was also decided that ninety percent of dormant account funds
recovered in neutral countries would be used for the
rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish refugees.119
Separate agreements were subsequently negotiated with each
of the neutral countries that held Nazi assets at the end of World
War Two-Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal. 120 In 1946, the
Allies and the Swiss government entered into the Washington
Accord. The Accord dealt primarily with the issue of monetary
gold and external German assets. Under this agreement, the
Swiss agreed to transfer approximately sixty million dollars (in
further claims to
1946 value) in gold. The Allies dropped any
12
monetary gold after reaching this settlement. 1

117. EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 33 (citing July 24, 1945 telegram
to Bern).
118. Eizenstat Testimony, supranote 113, at 28-29.
119. This was to be achieved via the Inter-Governmental Committee on
Refugees. Id. at 29.
120. EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at xxvii-xxx.
121. See Frontline,A Chronology of Events Surrounding the Lost Assets
14,
1998)
Mar.
Germany
(visited
of
Nazi
of
Victims
<http: / /www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/nazis/ etc/cron.html>

[hereinafter Frontline Chronology]. Another chronology has been prepared
See Chronology: Unclaimed
by the Swiss Federal Assembly.
Assets/Switzerland and the Second World War (visited Mar. 14, 1998)

<http: / /wvv.parliament.ch/Poly/Framesets/E/Frame-E.htm>
Swiss Chronology].

[hereinafter
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The Swiss government initially disputed the Allies' claims to
all German assets in Switzerland and eventually settled upon a
fifty percent split.
They did not, however, live up to this
agreement. After protracted negotiations, a second and final
settlement was reached in 1952.
The Swiss transferred
approximately thirty-four million dollars of German assets (in
1952 dollars) to the Allies. These funds were used for reparations
and refugee relief.' 2 2 The Allies relinquished any further claim
concerning German assets retained in Switzerland.
Dormant accounts were only tangentially addressed as part
of the Washington Accord. These accounts formed the subject of
a side letter to the Accord in which the head of the Swiss
delegation pledged that the Swiss government "would examine
sympathetically possibilities for making available for relief and
rehabilitation proceeds of property found in Switzerland which
123
belonged to Nazi victims who died without heirs."
Current commentary is critical of Switzerland's stance during
post-war negotiations.
In May 1997, the U.S. government
released an official report on "U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover
and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany
During World War I. " 1 2 4 The 1997 report was prepared by the
U.S. government under the supervision of Undersecretary of
Commerce Stuart Eizenstat and is therefore referred to as the
"Eizenstat Report". It states:
Switzerland's "business as usual" attitude persisted in the postwar
negotiations....

The Swiss team were obdurate negotiators, using

legalistic positions to defend their every interest, regardless of the
moral issues also at stake. Initially, for instance, they opposed
returning any Nazi gold to those from whom it was stolen, and they
denied having received any looted gold. 125

122.
See Eizenstat Testimony, supranote 113.
123. Id.; see also EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 114, at 194 ("The Swiss
responded on September 11, 1946 that they were studying the matter
sympathetically and conducting an investigation into the number and amounts of
heirless estates.").
124.
EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 114. Negotiations were influenced
by (1) Switzerland's belief it was entitled to keep certain assets as the
bounty of war and (2) the Allies eagerness to conclude negotiations and
lack of meaningful leverage. Confusions Over the Washington Agreement,
Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., Nov. 1.

1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,

SWSWLD File.
125.
EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at vii. The Report continues:
But the other part of the [Washington] Accord, the liquidation of hundreds
of millions of dollars in German assets, was neither promptly nor ever fully
implemented. The Swiss raised one objection after another, arguing over
exchange rates, insisting that German debt settlements be included, and
demanding that the U.S. unblock assets from German companies seized
during the war but which the Bern government claimed were actually
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The United States, however, did not broach the issue with the
Swiss government during the post-war years. As the Eizenstat
Report documents, the question of heirless assets "did not appear

to have

a high

officials." 126

priority

among Senior

State

Department

2. Jewish Organizations' Discussions with the Swiss Government

The lack of U.S. action caused Jewish organizations to raise
In 1949,
the issue with the Swiss government directly.
The main issues in these
discussions were held in Bern.

discussions
involved finding a way to penetrate Swiss bank secrecy in a
manner that would enable the identification of heirless assets as
well as establishing whether Switzerland or the country of the
decedent had a right to dispose of such assets. Another concern
among Jewish groups was that the Swiss Bankers' Association had
established rules for proving ownership of bank accounts that
made it virtually impossible for surviving family members of Nazi
127
victims to file claims.

For example, Swiss banks sometimes required that relatives of

persons murdered in the Holocaust provide a death certificate
28
before they could have access to bank records of the deceased.1

Swiss-owned. They refused to make an exemption for the assets of
surviving Jews from Germany and heirless German Jewish assets, and
continued to make them subject to liquidation. They refused to recognize
any moral obligation to return looted Dutch gold when evidence became
available after the conclusion of the 1946 negotiations. U.S. negotiators
concluded by 1950 that the Swiss had no intention of ever implementing
the 1946 Washington Accord. Secretary of State Dean Acheson remarked
that if Sweden was an intransigent negotiator, then Switzerland was
intransigence "cubed."
Id.
126.
127.

Id. at 199.
Id.; see also JACQUES PICARD, THE ASSETS OF THE MISSING VICTIMS OF THE

NAZIs (1993), reprinted in The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by
Missing Nazi Victims: Hearing before the House Committee on Banking and Fin.
Servs., 104th Cong. 236 (1996) [hereinafter PICARD REPORT]. Dr. Picard was
commissioned by Lawrence Lever, the financial editor of a newspaper and a BBC
film producer, to examine Switzerland's administration of Holocaust victims'
assets. The Picard Report states: "The former Western allies seldom showed any
interest in the promises made by Switzerland in the Washington Agreement to
examine the question of assets of former Nazi victims, if indeed they returned to
the subject at all in any serious way." Id. § 5.1, at 252.
128. Edgar Bronfinan, when testifying before the House Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, noted:
Numerous letters of appeal to the State Department after the War from
Jews seeking to recover family funds from Swiss banks [ ] have been
located at the National Archives. As an example, in 1947 Frances
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Additional obstacles for the heirs of Holocaust victims included
demonstrating a right to inheritance and identifying the location
of the assets. 12 9 Negotiations between Jewish groups and the
Swiss did not produce positive results.

Greenfield contacted U.S. officials requesting assistance in locating an
account in a Zurich bank belonging to her sister, Gisella Tuttman, who
perished in a concentration camp. On August 15, 1947 the American
Legation in Berne noted that the Swiss Federal Political Department had
indicated [that] there is evidence of certain assets in Switzerland, "but that
if Mrs. Greenfield desires to obtain detailed information she will be obliged
to supply proof of the decease of the person or persons in whose names
the account or. accounts are recorded, as well as documentation that Mrs.
Greenfield is either the sole heir or represents the heirs of the deceased."
The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims:
Hearing Before the House Comm. On Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 108
(1996) (prepared testimony of Edgar M. Bronfinan, President World Jewish
Congress, World Jewish Restitution Organization) [hereinafter Bronfman
Testimony]. The Nazis did not keep a record of victims they exterminated at
concentration camps, and Swiss inheritance law itself was quite complicated
following World War Two. Authorities were required to declare a person missing
and dead. This involved registering assets, a publication of a notice and a lengthy
process for officially declaring the person missing and presumed dead. See
PICARD REPoRT, supranote 127, at 240.
129. See PICARD REPoRT, supra note 127, § 4.2.2, at 246. Another report
prepared by Swiss historians outlines situations in which claimants had difficulty
obtaining information about the assets of their relatives had perished during the
Holocaust
It was only in halting steps that the [Swiss] legal authorities addressed
themselves to the problems which resulted from the crimes of the German
State, over and above the fact of its collapse.
This distance is revealed also in the context of the abandoned wealth of
Nazi victims in Switzerland. No special legislation was passed until 1962,
yet an abundance of estates left by both Nazi and war casualties remained
to be settled. The following case examples shed light on the legal and
administrative problems which resulted.
The claimants who most easily succeeded in retrieving properties of Nazi
and war victims which were located in Switzerland, were those who knew
their rights and could prove their right of entitlement with a death
certificate and document of inheritance, as illustrated in the Reginek case.
In the case of Berliner the petitioner was in possession of notarized
inheritance documents, but did not know in which Swiss bank the
presumed wealth might be located. In the cases of Courten, Beetschen,
and the District Court of Kreuzlingen there was a legitimate claim to a
known estate, but it was not legally clear whether the testator, a nonSwiss national, was indeed missing and presumed dead. The situation
became even more difficult when the claimant could not prove the death of
the testator, nor entitlement to inherit, nor even the existence of an estate
(the cases of Mastbaum, Wohlin, and Schimschon). The Trachsel case
demonstrates that there were banks which stopped payment of interest on
deposit balances in the absence of contact with the client, and which
absorbed those balances into their reserves upon elapse of a limitation
period. The Dunajewski case shows that Swiss authorities could receive
information several times about vacated assets without passing along the
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The Jewish community was further outraged when later
press reports announced a Swiss-Polish agreement regarding
heirless assets of Polish origin which were being held in
Switzerland. This secret agreement was concluded on June 25,
1949.130 It allowed the Polish State to acquire the assets of
deceased Polish citizens without heirs. These assets were then
used to compensate Swiss citizens who had expropriation claims
against Poland. By 1975, Switzerland had transferred 480,000
13
Swiss francs to Poland in fulfillment of its 1949 obligations. '
Jewish leaders and U.S. politicians have expressed
consternation that Switzerland was able to identify the dormant
accounts of Polish citizens with some certainty while remaining
unable to provide a proper accounting of other Holocaust victims'
assets. Furthermore, in 1949, the U.S. Legation in Bern notified
the Swiss government that its Polish agreement was inconsistent
with its previous declarations concerning the disposition of
heirless assets. 132
In 1952, the Swiss Jewish Communities Association (SJC), a
Jewish humanitarian organization that provided relief to Jewish
refugees, met with the SBA. The SJC and the WJC had met with
the Swiss government as early as 1946 to request the release of

information. This case also provides a precedent that the Clearing house
should not provide custodial trusteeship for such assets.
PETER HUG & MARC PERRENOUD, ASSETS INSWITZERLAND OF VICTIMS OF NAZISM AND
THE COMPENSATION AGREEMENTS WITH EAST BLOC COUNTRIES, reprinted in The
Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims: Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 357 (1996)
[hereinafter Swiss HISTORLANS' REPORT].
130. As detailed in the Swiss Historians' Report, on June 25, 1949:

In an exchange of confidential side letters in the context of the SwissPolish compensation agreement, the Swiss delegation gave the Polish
delegation assurances that assets of Polish nationals who were resident in
Poland on September 1, 1939, and of whom there had been no news since
May 9, 1945, would be made available to the Polish state in accordance
with an agreed procedure. The Polish Government accepted a guarantee
On the basis of unchecked
obligation in respect of these moneys.
statements by the [Swiss] Bankers' Association, the Swiss delegation
indicated to the Polish delegation that unclaimed assets of a very wide
range of Polish owners could be expected to amount to SFr. 2 million.
Under pressure from the [SBA], the government initially treated the
exchange of letters as confidential, against its original intention.
Swiss HISTORIANS' REPORT, supranote 129, at 14.
13 1.
EIZENTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 200. The report also notes that,
"[a]lthough defensible under international law, (since the Poles committed
themselves to restore these heirless assets to any surviving Polish claimants),
there was no Swiss follow through. Switzerland failed to provide Poland with the
names of Polish heirless accounts until a few months ago." Swiss HISTORIANS'
REPORT, supranote 129, pt. I, at 18.
132.
EIZENTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 200.
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any heirless assets.1 3 3 At the 1952 meeting, the SBA objected to
the idea of specific legislation for the problem of dormant

accounts or heirless assets. 134 Specifically, the SBA made it clear
that it did not support the enactment of special legislation that
would require compulsory registration by banks of unclaimed

World War Two-era assets. At the same time, the banks assured
the SJC that the banks were merely custodians of assets and had

no

intention

of making

any

legal

claim

to

the

assets

themselves. 135
According to one commentator, the SBA and the SJC agreed
as to the need for a solution to the problem of unclaimed heirless
assets remaining in Swiss banks. The parties differed, however,
on the following issues:
(a)
the question of necessity:
the [SJCi regarded the
adoption of legislative measures as absolutely essential; the [SBA]
felt that the existing arrangements were adequate;
(b)
the tracing of heirless assets: obligatory registration
which would affect banking secrecy was completely ruled out by
the [SBA], whereas the [SIC demanded it on considerations of
fundamental rights;
(c)
Extent of the assets: The banks considered the survey
they had made showed that the total worth of the assets in
Switzerland of former Nazi victims was trivial, whilst the [SJC]
suspected that far larger amounts were involved.
(d)
Finally the [Swiss Foreign ministry] and the [SBA] feared
that the exclusion of claims by foreign countries to the heirless
assets would give rise to difficulties and that to take such a step
could have negative consequences for Switzerland in the areas of
13 6
both foreign relations and foreign trade.

3. Swiss Response to Concerns about Heirless and Dormant
Accounts
The Swiss did not take further actions concerning heirless or
dormant accounts until 1962. In 1957, Swiss Federal Councilor
Harold Huber introduced a motion in the federal Parliament
asking that the Swiss government address this issue.1 3 7 In

133.
134.
135.
136.

PICARD REPORT, supranote 127, § 2.2, at 244.
Id. § 4.4, at 247.
Id.
Id. § 4.4, at 248-49.

137.

Id. § 4.5, at 249. Huber commented on some of the problems faced by

bankers and notaries who were hindered by practical and legal considerations:
The administrator may know that his clients were in a concentration
camp, but knows nothing about their subsequent fate. He does not know
whether or how or when they lost their lives. Nor does he know whether
there are any surviving children and, if so, where they are living; and of
course he has no idea where these assets may be in Switzerland and
particularly under what pseudonym they are being held. Banks and
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response, the Swiss government passed the Federal Resolution of
December 20, 1962 (1962 Resolution) in order to safeguard
13 8
heirless assets for their legal owners.
The 1962 Resolution created procedures for declaring persons
missing or dead, determining their heirs, and transferring heirless
assets to a special unclaimed assets fund. l3 9 The resolution
covered any assets whose "last known owners are foreign
nationals or stateless persons about whom no reliable information
has been received since the May 9, 1945 and who are known or
presumed to have fallen victim to racial, religious or political
persecution... ."140 The 1962 Resolution required that private
individuals and private and commercial companies (including
fmancial institutions) "administering, possessing, holding in
safekeeping or overseeing such assets" register with the Swiss
government and "furnish all facts known to him or her which
could serve to establish the identity, the domicile or other place of
residence, and the fate of the owner or his or her legal successors
or representatives." 14 1 Furthermore, the duty to report assets
preempted any legal obligations for preserving bank secrecy. 14 2

lawyers have an obligation to maintain professional secrecy. They are not
allowed to issue public notices asking for information

on the persons

concerned, in the hope of begin able to make contact with third parties,
because to do so would risk infringing banking and professional secrecy.
The administrator may himself be totally convinced that the rightful
owners are no longer living, but such a subjective conviction is not
sufficient justification for going any further in the matter.
Id. § 4.5, at 250. Huber also acknowledged that there were always untrustworthy
administrators as well but distinguished them from other professionals who
would not intentionally seek to gain from the Holocaust victims' assets but who
might eventually end up in a situation of inaction. Id.
138.
Id. § 4.6, at 251; see also Federal Resolution on the Assets in
Switzerland of Foreigners or Stateless Persons who have been Victims of Racial,
Religious and Political Persecution (1962), reprinted in The Disposition of Assets
Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Sews., 104th Cong. 264 (1996) [hereinafter 1962
Resolution].
139.
See Tibor Sallay, Comments: New Legislation, 12 AM. J. COmP. L. 87
(1963) (analyzing the 1962 Act on Assets of Victims of National Socialism). The
Swiss Banks estimated that assets in question represented an insignificant
amount of funds. At the time, less than $230,000 worth of assets had been
discovered. Id.
140.
1962 Resolution, supra note 138, art. 1(1), at 264.
The 1962
Resolution also required that safe deposit boxes be opened if they might contain
relevant assets or papers that would establish the existence of such assets. Id.
art. 1(2).
141. Id. art. 3, at 265.
142. Id. art. 7. Article 7 stated: "The obligation to report to the registration
authority and to provide information takes precedence over any obligation to
secrecy, in particular of banks, insurance companies, fiduciary companies,
lawyers, notaries and legal advisors." Id. art. 7(1). The Swiss registration
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The issue of specific regulations dealing with the dormant or
"heirless" accounts was first raised in 1949 by the Swiss Foreign
Ministry and the Swiss Justice Ministry. 14 3 The Swiss Justice
Ministry was the site of the newly-created registration authority
under the 1962 Resolution. 14 4 Enforcement of the resolution may
have been minimal. 14 5 The inquiries made, however, were not
reviewed or questioned by the Swiss government. 146 Criticism
has also been raised about the level of reporting by Swiss
banks. 147
The Registry strictly defined its jurisdiction to

authority was authorized to divulge information "about the circumstances of the
missing owners only to their legal successors and their authorized
representatives. Private individuals may for special reasons be given summary
information about the existence of assets, if these private individuals are able to
prove that they have a credible claim to inheritance." Id. art. 7(2).
143.
PICARD REPORT, supranote 127, § 4, at 245.
144. Id. § 6.2, at 254.
145.
Swiss HISTORIANS' REPORT, supranote 129, pt. I, at 38.
146. In his opening statement before the House Committee's hearing
regarding the disposition of assets deposited in Swiss banks by missing Nazi
victims, Congressman James Leach stated:
[A] 1962 Swiss proposal to compel banks to register dormant accounts
started out as a genuine attempt to get at the truth. But after bankers
and lawyers groups objected, the law that was enacted ended up
excluding a large class of potential claimants and demanded of heirs exact

details and unambiguous proof of claims-standards difficult to meet
because of the Gestapo confiscation of personal property and records and
SS refusal to issue death certificates at the gas chambers of Buchenwald
and Auschwitz and Majdanek.
The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 96
(1996) (opening statement of Rep. James A. Leach, Chairman, House Committee
on Banking and Financial Services) [hereinafter Leach Testimony].
Plaintiffs contended that the Swiss Banking Association objected to the
legislation. Compl. at
149, Friedman (No. 96-5161) (citing U.S. Embassy
Airgram to Bern (Oct. 5, 1996)).
147. As the Swiss Historians' Report indicates, many of the major Swiss
banks requested large volumes of claims reporting forms. Despite the high
volume of requests for forms, the SBA and the Association of Swiss Insurance
Companies conducted a survey of members to determine the total amount of
unclaimed assets located in Switzerland.
They came up with a figure of
approximately 1 million Swiss franks. Hug and Perrenoud seem skeptical of this
figure:
Just how far this result was influenced by speculation that, based on the
results nothing be undertaken, e.g. that the whole affair not warrant
setting special standards, can better be judged on the basis of the
evidence emerging today. One can not avoid the assumption that the
managers of unclaimed assets simply were not ready to cooperate. How
else could the enormous orders of forms by the largest banking
institutions be explained, if not by the fact that considerably more
unclaimed assets were present, than had at first been reported.
Swiss HIsTORIANS' REPoRT, supranote 129, § III(3)(b), at 77.
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encompass "only a very specific category of foreign and stateless
assets." 148 Therefore, anyone who died a "natural" death due to
hunger and inadequate medical care would not fall under the
scope of the 1962 Regulation. 14 9 Thus, "if persons were involved
whose disappearance had nothing to do with the persecution
specified in the law, who instead had disappeared due to other

causes, for instance, military service, bombardments, emigration,
is°
natural death, etc., then the law would not apply to [them]."

Additionally,

money that was deposited

by Eastern

European

depositors was disqualified from the search. 151

As a result of the 1962 Resolution, a total of SF 7.5 million in
961 accounts was turned over to claimants and an additional two
million Swiss Francs given to Swiss Jewish communities and a
Swiss refugee organization.' 5 2
As the Eizenstat Report
comments: "After long denying the possession of any heirless
assets, some Swiss banks then found over $2 million in bank
accounts, most of which was not transferred to Jewish and other
relief organizations until the 1970s. The Unclaimed Assets Fund
was finally dispersed in 1975 with a distribution of two-thirds of
the fund to the Swiss Association of Jewish Communities and
one-third to the Swiss Central Office for Refugee Aid."' 5 3 It is

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. § III(3)(c), at 77.
Id. § III(3)(c), at 78.
Id. § III(3)(c), at 77.
The Swiss Historians' Report comments:

Of even more far reaching significance was the decision to refrain from any
process whatsoever for declaring a person missing or for calling for heirs
and instead, directly to credit any assets originating in Albania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia by administrative decision to the
"unclaimed assets" fund.
Swiss HISTORIANS' REPORT, supranote 129, § III(3)(e), at 82.
. The Department of Justice decided in the late 1960s that, as a general rule,
no procedures for declaring a person missing would be implemented for persons
in Eastern Europe. The Department reasoned that sending a letter into an
Eastern Europe country implying that an Eastern European national had had
contact with a Swiss Bank could endanger the national's life. Id. § III(3)(c), at 83.
As Perrenoud and Hug indicate, this decision had no valid legal basis. Rather,
Article 8, paragraph 3 of the 1963 Registration Decree stated that the Swiss could

dispense with declaring a person missing "[i]f grounds existed for assuming that
the persons sought might experience unwelcome difficulties." Id. This provision
was included to protect residents in Eastern Europe from adverse consequences
of contact from a Swiss bank. The decree was silent, however, on how to handle
unclaimed assets in the absence of a process for declaring a person missing. Id.
Nowhere did it state that no contact should be made with Eastern European
claimants or that their property should revert quickly to the unclaimed assets
fund. Id. § III(3)(e), at 83.
152.
See WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, POLICY DISPATCH NUMBER 10, located at
<http://www.virtual.co.il/orgs/orgs/wjc>.
153.
Swiss HISTORIANS' REPORT, supranote 129, pt. III(3)(0), at 86, 88.
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estimated, however, that more than five million Swiss Francs
remained with the assets managers (including banks) because the
Claims Registry declared itself not competent to handle those
claims.' 5 4 Some of these claims, however, may well have been
paid out later to claimants directly by the asset managers.1 5 5 The
Swiss Federal Finance Commission closed the Unclaimed Assets
Fund account on August 20, 1980.156

4. Questions about Dormant Bank Accounts between 1980-1995
Recently, many questions have been raised about what
happened from 1980 to 1995 regarding the dormant bank
accounts. As the Swiss Historians' Report indicates, many
accounts that went unpaid belonged to Eastern European citizens
who were unable to claim their property while living in a socialist
country.' 5 7 Furthermore, banks may not have been furnished
with the ability to locate missing customers. Bank secrecy also
prevented the banks from publishing the names of dormant
accountholders. Thus, it was necessary for claimants to come
forward to inquire about an account.' 58
In 1995, the SBA adopted its own guidelines regarding
dormant accounts in an effort to relax the requirements for heirs
5 9
seeking to recover funds of their deceased relations.'
Specifically, the SBA would assist heirs even if they did not

154. Id at 91. The distribution was made pursuant to the Federal Decree on
the Use to be Made of the Assets in Switzerland Belonging to Foreigners or
Stateless Persons Persecuted for Reasons of Race, Religion or Political Beliefs,
approved on March 3, 1975.
155. Id.
156. Id. para. I, at 14, 18.
157. The Swiss Historians' Report is sensitive to difficulties the Swiss banks
faced with respect to Eastern European account holders, but nonetheless asserts
that the bankers should not have decided to deliver these funds to the Unclaimed
Assets Fund:
The failures and omissions depicted in this chapter in the Registration
Decree of 1962 and the states of Eastern Europe in respect of identifying
legitimate claimants to registered unclaimed assets, and to pay them their
due, can now be put right at least in part. In the Swiss Federal Archives
are to be found the very well preserved documents on 1048 owners of
bank accounts and the assets situated in Switzerland, concerning which
there had been no contact with the customer since the end of the war.
Among these are the assets belonging primarily to Eastern European
depositors which were incorporated "administratively" into the Unclaimed
Assets Fund without serious inquiries being made...
Swiss HISTORIANS' REPORT, supranote 129, pt. 11 (4), at 86, 89.
158. See Swiss Banks Under Pressure,Swiss REV. WORuD Ar., Nov. 1,
1996, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, SWSWLD File.
159. See Swiss Chronology, supra note 113; see also Ganz, supra note 114,
at 1350.
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the
possess the requisite documentary evidence establishing
160
inheritance.
an
to
right
heir's
the
or
account
an
of
existence
The SBA Guidelines also created the Contact Office for the
Search for Dormant Accounts Administered by Swiss Banks. 16 1 A
Swiss banking Ombudsman, Hans-Peter Hani, was appointed in
1995 to handle claims of Nazi victims and their heirs. His work
was financed by a foundation established by Swiss banks. 162 The
eight thousand dollars in
Ombudsman was only able to uncover
163
accounts during his initial efforts.
According to data provided by the Ombudsman's office in
September 1996, from a survey of 892 questionnaires received by
the Ombudsman, only eleven cases led to a positive result.164 Of
these claimants, three were accountholders murdered by the
Nazis and two other customers were Jews who lived in Romania
and were dispossessed during World War Two because of
discriminatory legislation. 165 WJC Chainnan Edgar Bronfman
reacted to this attempt by stating: "It is not merely pathetic but
an indictment of his methods. Indeed, fees he charged holocaust
to process their
survivors, and the families of holocaust 16victims,
6
claims far exceeds the $8,000 he found."
The Central Contact Office attributes the disappointing
results to several factors. First, the Contact Office claims that, in

160.
See Ganz, supranote 114, at 1350.
161.
See Geneva Private Bankers Association (GPB), The Swiss Banking
Ombudsman and the Contact Office for the Search for Dormant Accounts (visited

Mar. 15, 1998) <http://wwv.geneva-finance.ch./En/0mbudsman.htm>.

The

Ombudsman works independently of other organizations and assists persons in
search of dormant accounts at any of the Swiss banks. Before the Ombudsman
will initiate a search, however, a claimant must meet the following criteria:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Substantiate that an account might exist in Switzerland;
Supply the name of the person whose account is sought;
Explain that the bank customer has been dead or presumed dead for
ten years or more;
Substantiate his claim to the existing account;
Explain in which region of Switzerland to search.

GPB, Who May Introduce a Search and How? (visited Mar. 15, 1998)
<http://www.geneva-fmnance.ch/En/ContactOfficeQ3.htm>.
162.
See Arnold Kemp, Swiss Lies and Nazi Gold, OBSERVER, Sept. 15, 1996,
at 17. In an interview with a newspaper, Hani stated: "I think the banks did their
job in 1962. They delivered what could be seen to be from Holocaust victims, and
I fear we won't find much for people who are searching now." Id.
163.
See GPB, What are the Results Already Reached? (visited Mar. 15,
1998) <http://www.geneva-finance.ch/En/ContacLOfficeQ8.htm>.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Bronfman Testimony, supra note 128, at 36. Bronfman also stated:
166.
"During the past six months, we have been undertaking research in the U.S.
archives to determine the facts behind what is undoubtedly the greatest robbery
in the history of mankind." Id.
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accordance with the 1962 Regulation, Swiss banks had previously
to hand over dormant assets to the Swiss government if they had
originally belonged to victims of racial, religious, or political
persecution. 1 67 Some investments, such as World War Two era
securities or bonds, are now worthless. 168 Finally, a lack of
documentation has complicated the Ombudsman's task: under
Swiss law, records of bank accounts which are closed by a
customer or other authorized party need only be maintained for
ten years.1 69 Thus, if the account was closed and a balance
withdrawn, there may be no trace at all of the account's
70
existence.1
5. Recent Investigations in the United States and Switzerland
In 1996, Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York consulted with
the head of the WJC and decided to undertake an in-depth search
of the National Archives to uncover more about Nazi gold and the
assets of Holocaust victims.' 7 1 With Senator D'Amato as its
chair, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee held hearings on April
23, 1996 concerning the status of dormant accounts and called
for the United States to declassify various World War Two era
documents.' 72
The U.S. House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services had a second round of hearings on December
11, 1996.173

Facing growing international pressure, the Swiss responded
with their own efforts. In October 1996, the Swiss government
commissioned a report entitled Assets in Switzerland of Victims of
Nazism and the Compensation Agreements with East Bloc
Countries (Swiss Historians' Report) concerning the claims filed
prior to and after the enactment of the 1962 Regulation. The
Swiss Historians' Report also focused on public allegations that
the Swiss had used the unclaimed bank accounts of Holocaust

167.
See GPB, How Can These DisappointingResults be Explained? (visited
Mar. 15, 1998) < http://www/geneva-finance.ch./En/ContacOfficeQ9.htm>.
168. Id.
169.
See GPB, What are the Main Difficulties Encountered by the Central

Contact

Office?

(visited

Mar.

15,

1998)

<http://www.geneva-

finance.ch./En/ContacLOfficeQ6.h tm>.

170.
171.

Id.
See Greg Bradsher, Searchingfor Documents on Nazi Gold, (visited Mar.

15, 1998) <http://www.nara.gov/nara/research/nazigold.html>.

172. Hearings on Banking Deposits of WWII Jews in Swiss Banks before Sen.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 23,
1996) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter Hearings on
Banking Deposits]. The testifiers included Stuart Eizenstat, Edgar M. Bronfman,
President of the WJC, and President of the WJRO, Hans J. Baer, Chairman of
Baer Holdings Ltd. on behalf of the SBS, and Greta Beer, a Holocaust survivor.
173. See Swiss HISTORIANS'REPORT, supranote 129.
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Swiss
victims from Eastern European nations to 17compensate
4

citizens for property seized in Eastern Europe.
On December 13, 1996, the Swiss Parliament passed a
Federal Decree Concerning Historical and Legal investigations
into the fate of "assets which reached Switzerland as a result of
National Socialist Rule" (Swiss Historical Decree).17 5 The Swiss
Historical Decree calls for a broad investigation extending to all
assets belonging to the victims of Nazi persecution that were
deposited in Switzerland and have not been claimed from their
beneficial owners. In addition to dormant accounts and deposited
assets, the investigation would try to determine the amount and
date of assets deposited in Switzerland that were confiscated from
their rightful owners under racial laws or other discriminatory
measures of the Nazi regime.1 76 Finally, the investigation would
review all financial transactions entered into by Switzerland with
members of the National Socialist Party, with the German Reich,
and with its institutions, representatives, and persons with close

Id.; see also HolocaustProbe Ordered, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1996, at

174.

2.
175.
Swiss Fed. Dep't of Foreign Affairs, Federal Decree Concerning the
Historical and Legal Investigation of the Fate of Assets Which Reached
Switzerland as a Result of National Socialist Rules (visited Mar. 15, 1998)
[hereinafter
<http: / /www.switzerland.taskforce.ch/doc/961213_e.htm>
Swiss Historical Decree]; see also Frontline Chronology, supra note 121; GPB,
The Federal Decree on Historical and Legal Investigations (visited Mar. 15,
[hereinafter GPB
1998) <http://www.geneva-fmance.ch/En/arr-fed.htm>
Website].
176. Article 1(1) of the Historical Decree sets forth the scope of the historical
investigation:
The Investigation covers the extent and fate of assets of all kinds
1.
which were transferred to banks, insurance companies, attorneys,
notaries, fiduciaries, asset managers, or other physical or legal persons or
groups of persons residing or headquartered in Switzerland for deposit,

investment or transfer to third parties, or were acquired by such physical
or legal persons or groups of persons or were received by the Swiss
National Bank and
1.

belonged to persons who became victims of National Socialist

rule or about whom, because of this rule, reliable information is not
available, and whose assets have since then not been claimed by
legitimate claimants;
as a consequence of the racial laws or other discriminatory
2.
measures within the sphere of the National Socialist German Reich
were taken from their rightful owners; or
3.
originate from members of the NSDAP, from the NationalSocialist German Reich, its institutions or representatives as well as
physical or legal persons closely connected with it, including all
financial transactions which were carried out with these assets.
Swiss Historical Decree, supranote 175.
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ties to the German Reich. 17 7 At the same time, the Swiss
Parliament waived Swiss bank secrecy laws for five years 8to
facilitate the work of the historical experts as well as the ICEP.17
Several days later, a Swiss Historical Committee of Inquiry
was assembled, with Swiss Professor Jean-Frangois Bergier, a
Professor at the Federal Polytechnic School of Zurich, as
Chairman of the Commission.' 79 The Independent Commission of
Experts (ICEC) also known as the Bergier Commission, is
comprised of nine historians who will investigate Switzerland's
wartime activities.18 0
In late December 1996, outgoing Swiss President Jean-Pascal
Delamuraz accused the WJC of extortion and blackmail in its
attempts to secure restitution for Holocaust victims.' 8 ' This
prompted Jewish groups to consider publicly a boycott of Swiss
banks.' 8 2
Delamuraz, in 1 8the
wake of public outcry, soon
3
thereafter issued an apology.
During the escalation of international pressure, the Swiss
faced further embarrassment concerning related actions. On
January 14, 1997, a Swiss night watchman at the Union Bank of
Switzerland rescued documents dating from the Second World
War from the shredder. These documents were records from a
smaller Swiss bank that had been acquired by Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS).18 4
UBS claimed that an in-house historian
had previously reviewed these documents and had found them to
be of minimal significance.' ss
Others claimed that these
documents consisted of records of a Swiss bank subsidiary that
had extensive dealing with the Third Reich.' 8 6 The guard turned
the documents over to Jewish leaders and was promptly

177.

See GPB Website, supra note 175. This would also include an

examination of transactions made by the Swiss National Bank. See id.
178. Id.
179. GPB, The Members of the Commission, (visited Mar. 15, 1998)
<http://wvw.geneva-finance.ch/En/CommissionComposition.htm>.
180. Id. The other members of the ICEC include Historians Wladyslaw

Bartoszewski

(Poland), Saul Freidlaender (Israel), Harold James (United

Kingdom), George Kreis (Switzerland), Sybil Milton (United States), Jacques Picard
(Switzerland), Jakob Tanner (Switzerland), and Lawyer Joseph Voyaume
(Switzerland). Id.
181. See Alan Cowell, How Swiss Strategy on Holocaust Fund Unraveled,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at A6.
182. Id.
183. See Jim McGee, Plan for Swiss Bank Boycott Dropped;
CongressionalJewish Leaders Hail Creation of Holocaust Fund, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 1997.
184. See Carl Mortished, Swiss Banks Face Secrecy Shake-Up, TImI.:S,
May 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, TTIMES File.
185. See Edmund L. Andrews, The Rescuer of Swiss Bank Ledgers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, atA6.

186.

Id.
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terminated from his post by a private security firm-not by
UBS. 187 He was also threatened with prosecution under the bank
secrecy laws for making the documents public. 188 Ultimately, it
was revealed that some of the larger group of records involved the
sale of Jewish-owned property in Berlin. 18 9
In February 1997, three major Swiss banks announced the
creation of a seventy million dollar humanitarian fund to benefit
Holocaust victims. 190
This fund had grown to almost three
hundred million dollars by May 1997.191 In the same month, the
Swiss government, under growing international pressure,
renewed the searches for dormant accounts and found an
additional thirty-two million dollars in 775 dormant accounts.1 92
As former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker noted, however,
93
"the survey left doubts about its methods and result."
In March 1997, Swiss President Arnold Koller proposed the

creation of a $4.7 billion "Swiss Foundation for Solidarity." The

Solidarity foundation would provide funding to victims of genocide
and other severe breaches of human rights including Holocaust
victims.1 94 The Swiss Parliament would first have to pass several

pieces of legislation in order to revalue the gold.

Additionally,

there potentially would be referendums with respect to the gold
revaluation for the necessary amendments to the Swiss Federal
Constitution.195 There has been some question as to whether the

187. See Louise Jury, Saved From Shredder in a Swiss Bank. Are the Victims
Still Alive?, INDEP., Dec. 7, 1997, at 15.
188. See id.; see also Fredy Rom, FiredBank Guard May Need New Attorney
in Switzerland, Jewish
Telegraphic
Agency,
July
1,
1997
at
<http://vvwv.jta.org/ju197/01-meili.htm> (noting that Meili was fired because he
turned documents over to a third party in violation of secrecy laws. Zurich
District Attorney asked for Meili to return to Switzerland for questioning as well).
189. More Swiss Fumbling, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 4, 1991, at 8.
190. Frontline Chronology, supra note 121.
191. Id.; see also Geneva Financial Center, Steps Taken: Historicaland Legal
Inquiry into the Fate of Assets deposited in Switzerland during the Nazi Regime
(visited Mar. 15, 1998) <http://www.geneva-finance.ch/En/Measures.htm>
(chronology of actions taken by Swiss Government and Swiss banks with respect
to dormant accounts and gold controversies).
192. Id. at 2.
193. The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi
Victims: HearingBefore the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th
Cong. 50 (1996) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Independent
Committee of Eminent Persons) [hereinafter Volcker Testimony].
194. Washington, D.C. Embassy of Switzerland, Switzerland in World War I:
President of the Swiss Confederation Addresses a Joint Meeting of the Federal
Assembly (visited Mar. 15, 1998) <http://Swissemb.org/pr970305.html>
[hereinafter Koller Address].
195. See Letter from Alan G. Hevesi, Comptroller of the City of New York, to
His Excellency Alfred Defago, Swiss Ambassador to the U.S. (June 24, 1997) (on
file with Author) (stating the Swiss have misrepresented the nature of the
Solidarity Fund and the timeliness with which it will be created).
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Solidarity Fund, if created, will be used to assist Holocaust
survivors.

196

In May 1997, the United States released the Eizenstat Report.
The report suggests that, by acting as bankers for the Nazis, the
Swiss prolonged the war. 197
The Eizenstat Report identifies
specific ways in which the Swiss helped the Nazis move gold and
other financial assets out of Germany. 198
The report also
criticizes the U.S. ,role in recovering the assets of Nazi victims and
19 9
looted gold during and after World War Two.

196.

Comptroller Hevesi further states:

[Yjour comments concerning the Solidarity Funds are totally counter to
what Swiss officials said to me when I was in Switzerland. They made it
clear that the Solidarity Fund was not designed as restitution for
Holocaust victims.
The goal of this humanitarian fund, according to the Swiss President, is
to "aid people in need, victims of catastrophes in Switzerland and abroad,
victims of genocide, torture and other violations of human rights (including
victims of the Holocaust and needy descendants) . . ."
In order to

implement this proposal, the Swiss will revalue Swiss gold reserve to
current market value, which will net Switzerland many billions of francs.
The interest earned as a result of the gold revaluation will be distributed
half to the needy in Switzerland and half to humanitarian projects and the
needy around the world. Though Switzerland should be commended for
this humanitarian activity, the fund is not connected to the Holocaust.
Every Swiss official I met with made sure I understood the difference, and
that any connection to the Holocaust is incidental. It is very troubling that
you have highlighted this tenuous connection to Judge Korman.
Id. at 2.
197.
See Frontline Chronology, supra note 121.
198.
The Office of Strategic Services uncovered data concerning
Swiss/German trafficking in gold and other financial assets. X-2, a U.S. counterintelligence unit, "provided the OSS and Washington with an extensive summary
of Nazi gold and currency transfers arranged via Switzerland through most of the
war." According to X-2 these included:
* Gold and bonds looted by the Nazis from all over Europe and received by
certain Swiss banks;
* Funds sent by the Deutsche-Verkehrs-Kreditbank of Karlsruhe to Basel;
* Securities held in Zurich by private firms for the Nazi party;
* Large quantities of Swiss francs credited to private accounts in various
Swiss banks;
* Money and property held in Liechtenstein;
* More than 2 million francs held by the Reichsbank in Switzerland;
* Forty-five million Reichsmarks held in covert Swiss bank accounts[.]
EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 40.
Apparent from the obvious official transactions, these sums were brought in
by German and Swiss banks and business organizations. Eizenstat Testimony,
supranote 113, at 40.
199.
"[T]he report raises serious questions about the U.S. role. American
leadership at the time, while greater than that of our Allies, was limited. There
was a demonstrable lack of senior-level support for a tough U.S. negotiating
position with the neutrals. Moreover, there was an even greater lack of attention
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The Swiss Federal Council officially responded by stating that
and that some of its conclusions were
the report was 2"one-sided"
"unsupported." ° ° In particular, the Swiss Federal Council noted
that the foreword to the Eizenstat Report "contains political 20and
1
moral judgments that go beyond the historical report."
Additionally, the report, as well as other public accounts that
have been critical of the Swiss, may overlook the historical
complexity of the situation-specifically Switzerland's proximity to
and its "survival strategy" of neutrality to
Germany and Italy
2°2
avoid invasion.
The Swiss government has established a task force on the
Assets of Nazi Victims, headed by Ambassador Thomas Borer, to
look into the matter of dormant accounts and has also agreed20 to
3
let the ICEP oversee a wide-scale audit of Swiss bank records.
Finally, the Swiss have agreed to remove the veil of Swiss bank
secrecy to assist with the ICEP investigation. 2 ° 4 The investigation

to ensuring implementation of negotiated agreements." Eizenstat Testimony,
supranote 113, at ix.
Marilyn Henry, Swiss Slam EizenstatReport, JERUSALEM POST, May 25,
200.
1997, at 12.
William Drozdiak, Swiss Defend Wartime Policy, Reject Criticism;
201.
Bern Calls U.S. Report 'One-Sided' Judgment, WASH. POST, May 23, 1997, at
A3 1.
See Responses to the Eizenstat Report, Swiss REv. WORLD AFF., June 2,
202.
1997, available in LEXIS, Europe File, SWSWLD File. Cf. Switzerland's Past
Under the Magnifying Glass, Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., Dec. 1, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, SWSWLD File (noting the intensity of the debate can be
fully comprehended only in light of Switzerland's neutrality).
Chairman Volcker described the procedures as follows:
203.
International accounting firms selected by the committee from among
those with offices and individuals licensed to audit Swiss banks will
conduct the committee's investigative order. The use of these audit firms
will permit the investigation to proceed within the framework of Swiss
bank secrecy laws. Laws specifically designed to protect the identity of
holders of individual bank accounts from disclosure. The committee and
its members will not themselves have access to names associated with
particular dormant accounts. Nor is that necessary. Public reporting of
relevant data about the totals and distribution of the dormant accounts
and their nature will not be impeded. Specific account data can be made
available to appropriate Swiss authorities.
Volcker Testimony, supranote 193, at 51.
Swiss Ambassador Thomas Borer, at a hearing before the House
204.
Banking Committee, stated that:
[Tihe government of Switzerland has proposed new legislation of
unprecedented nature, that was put on a fast track, and unanimously
passed by both houses of the Swiss Parliament ....
In fact, the law takes the bold and unprecedented step of lifting the

banking and other professional secrecy laws for a maximum of five years.
Some have suggested a shorter period. Yet the government argued that
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by the ICEP, however, will not look into the records of lawyers, life
insurance companies, investment advisors, and others who were
agents for Holocaust victims. 20 5
Furthermore, the ICEP
investigation and claims adjudication is limited to claims relating
to dormant bank accounts. The ICEP will not look into the issue
of whether Nazi assets, such as property looted from occupied
countries or forcibly taken from Jews, remains in Swiss accounts;
nor will it provide restitution to Holocaust survivors who were
deprived of their property. Neither issue is part of the ICEP's
mandate.
On July 23, 1997, the SBA published the names of
approximately 1800 World War Two era dormant accounts of nonSwiss individuals. The publication of this list was required by the
Memorandum of Understanding, and signed by the ICEP and the
SBA.2 0 6
The revelation of new names has caused renewed
skepticism about the sincerity of Swiss banks' previous efforts to
locate dormant accounts.
On October 29, 1997, the SBA
published a second list of names, including 3687 foreign (i.e.,
non-Swiss) and 10,000 Swiss accountholders. 20 7 The October
publication brought the tally for dormant funds discovered in
20 8
Swiss vaults in the past two years to fifty-four million dollars.
The Simon Wiesenthal Center later asked Swiss banks to
freeze fifty-two of these dormant accounts, which may belong to
Nazi war criminals.2 0 9 The Wiesenthal Center derived the fiftytwo names from the October 29 list-both the first and last names
of the fifty-two identified accountholders matched the names of
Nazi war criminals.2 10 The new list confirmed the Center's belief

anything less would run the risk of depriving it of a unique opportunity to
discover all the truth.
The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims:
Hearing Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 104th
Cong. 33 (1996) (statement of Thomas Borer, Swiss Ambassador)
[hereinafter Borer Testimony].
205. Volcker Testimony, supra note 193, at 54-55.
206. Swiss Banks Commence Global Claims Process to Identify Owners of
Dormant World War II Era Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at A12
(advertisement put out by the SBA); see also Barry Bearak, Swiss Bankers, List
Throws Light on Pain and Intrigue of Wartime, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1997, at Al
(discussing reactions of various persons whose names or names of relatives
appeared on dormant accounts list).
207. List of Dormant Accounts (last modified Oct. 29, 1997)
<http://www.dormantaccounts.ch/oct_list.htm>.
208. Alan Cowell, FurtherSwiss Bank Lists Fail to Calm Uproar,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1997, at A8.
209. Tom Tugend, Wiesenthal Center Asks Swiss Banks to Freeze
Suspected Nazi Accounts, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at 4.
210. Included in the list were the names of Gestapo official Karl Bauer;
George Schwarz, an officer at Auschwitz; Emil Bauman, accused of murder and
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that only a full-fledged investigation would reveal the extent of
Nazi assets held by Swiss banks.
In the fall of 1997, the ICEP also agreed to found and
supervise an Independent Claims Resolution Foundation, which
would undertake a claims settlement process for resolving claims
to published dormant accounts. The trustees of the foundation
include Paul Volcker; Rhene Rhinow, a Swiss Senator; and Israel
Singer, Secretary General of the WJC. 2 1
Up to fifteen
independent arbitrators will be appointed to resolve claims
disputes. 2 12
The claims resolution panel will use relaxed
evidentiary rules for resolving the claims. Uncomplicated claims
will be placed on a fast track and will be heard by one
arbitrator.2 1 3 More complex claims will be heard by a panel of

arbitrators. 2 14 By late September, over 2700 claims had been
submitted by individuals claiming to be named beneficiaries of the
2 15
bank accounts that have been published by the SBA.
In late 1997, several U.S. state regulators imposed economic
sanctions against Swiss banks in an attempt to press the Swiss
Government and banks to settle with Holocaust victims more
expeditiously. During the summer of 1997, the State of California
stopped its official dealing with Swiss banks with respect to its
investment activities. 2 16 On October 10, 1997, Alan Hevesi, the
comptroller of New York City, excluded UBS from a loan
syndicate, which UBS had previously led, for the disposition of a
city loan. 2 17
Prompted by Hevesi's actions, New York State
Comptroller H. Carl McCall and Massachusetts State Treasurer
Joseph Malone imposed similar restrictions.2 1 8 In response to
California and New York's actions, Ambassador Eizenstat wrote
an open letter to the Honorable George Voinovich, Chairman of
the National Governors Association, asking the states to refrain

torture at the Srtuthof/Natzweiler concentration camp; and Alfred Meyer,
gauleiter of Westphalia. See id.
211.
Members of Independent Committee of Eminent Persons Will Become
Trustees of Claims Foundation, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS,

News Library, PRNEWS File.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Thousands File Claims on Dormant Nazi-Era Swiss Bank Accounts,
Agence France Presse, Sept. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP

File.
216.
See Swiss Chronology, supra note 121.
217.
UBS Denied Role in Letter of Credit by New York City; Others Follow,
SWISS MONITOR: AN UPDATE ON SWITZERLAND'S PROGRESS IN MAKING RESTITUTION

TO HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS, Nov. 1997 , at 1 (copy on file with Author); see also
Swiss Chronology, supra note 121.
218.
See UBS Denied Role, supra note 216; Mass. Cuts Ties to Swiss

Banks, U.P.I., Oct. 21, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
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from imposing sanctions against Switzerland or its bank.21 9
Ambassador Eizenstat met with Swiss banks in Davos,
Switzerland in late January 1998 to urge a settlement of the class
2 20
action lawsuits.
California eventually withdrew its moratorium on December
4, 1997, and agreed to a waiting period of three months to see if
the Swiss made further advances toward compensating claimants.
New York Comptroller Hevesi hosted a conference of state
financial regulators on December 8, 1997 in an attempt to achieve
2 21
a uniform waiting period among the fifty states.
B. Game Theory: The Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation

1. The Holocaust Assets Plaintiffs
Recent litigation

against Swiss banks has

suggested

a

stronger link between bank secrecy and human rights violations.
As Representative James Leach, when chairing hearings before
the House Banking and Financial Services Committee on the
assets of Nazi victims, stated:
[A]ll of this leads to a general principle; there is a great deal of
disturbance, I think, in the world and in the U.S., that people who
act in commission of political crimes and crimes against humanity
have safe havens and it is continuing even to this present day
where dictators escape from their country and loot their treasury

219. Letter from Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, U.S. Undersecretary of
State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affair to the Honorable
George Voinovich, Chairman of the National Governors Association
(undated), reprinted in U.S. Under Secretary of State Eizenstat Continues
Efforts Against Summers, Dialogue (Embassy of Switzerland, Washington,
D.C.) (on file with Author); see also U.S. Official Opposes Sanctions on Swiss
Banks, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1998, at A16.
220. William Hall, U.S. Urges Speed on Holocaust Claims, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
31, 1998, at 4. On March 27, 1998, the three defendant banks, UBS, CS and
SBC agreed to negotiate a global settlement with Holocaust victims. The banks
pledged to set up a special Holocaust fund. The plaintiffs' attorneys and
defendants negotiated a six-page confidential agreement. Allegedly, the fund
would be supervised by the federal District Court in Brooklyn and would pay
claims to victims whose Swiss accounts cannot be located or who had property
looted by the Nazis. The fund is estimated to be somewhat between $1 and $3
billion. See David E. Sanger, Swiss Banks PlanRestitution Fundfor Nazis' Victims,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 27, 1998, at Al. As of March 31, 1998, it was unclear whether
the settlement would include compensation for looted assets and profits derived
from Nazi slave labor. Swiss bank officials have stated that their main emphasis
is dormant accounts. See Alan Cowell, Swiss Seek to Narrow List of Holocaust
Funds to Be Recovered, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at A15.
221.
See Swiss Chronology, supranote 121.
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and the fund repositories. Some in Switzerland, some in other
22 2
areas of the world.

In the midst of Swiss and U.S. efforts to reopen the issue of
dormant accounts, the Holocaust Plaintiffs filed their lawsuits in
federal district court in the Eastern District of New York.
a. The Weisshaus Complaint
In October 1996, Holocaust survivor Gizella Weisshaus filed a
twenty billion dollar class-action lawsuit in federal district court
in the Eastern District of New York against UBS and Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC).223
Weisshaus sought disclosure of any
dormant accounts and restitution for all Nazi victims whose
assets vanished in Switzerland.2 2 4 Weisshaus filed an amended
complaint on January 24, 1997, which named UBS, SBC, CS, the

222. Questions by Chairman Leach to Ambassador Thomas Borer at
House Hearings, during Borer Testimony, supra note 204.
Leach

continued:
I'm talking about political criminals, criminals against humanity, people
that there aren't any laws for, reasons why we have the Nuremberg trial. I
mean we have dictators leaving their countries and looting their treasuries
and some of them having been very violent people, to have funds in your
country and other countries of this world, have allowed to live in luxury
and be very protected and there's a great deal of resentment, I think, in
the U.S. and by a lot of free people of this world, that this is aiding and
abetting a felon. But a felon of the worst kind, a felon against humanity.
Id.
223. See Gizella Weisshaus vs. The Swiss Banks, INST. INVESTOR (Intl
Ed.), Nov. 30, 1996, at 15, available in LEXIS, Banking Library, INVEST
File.
224. According to the Weisshaus Complaint, Weisshaus is a 66-yearold U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn. She was born into a family of Hasidic
Jews. She lived in Sighet, Romania until 1944 when she was transported
by sealed boxcar to a concentration camp in Auschwitz, Poland. The
Complaint further states:
Before being separated from her father, he confided in her that he had
deposited significant assets in a bank account with Union Bank of
Switzerland.
Her father and 55 other relatives died in German
concentration camps in 1944 and 1945. Weisshaus survived the German
concentration camps and emigrated to the United States in 1950. At the
end of World War H, Weisshaus requested that defendant Union Bank of
Switzerland acknowledge her father's account and pay her the proceeds
deposited therein. The defendant bank failed and refused to do so.
Weisshaus Compl. 4; see also James A. Gillaspy, A Cause that Goes Beyond
Money, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 22, 1997.
Estelle Sapir, another New York resident, originally from Poland, has a similar
story. The bankers told Sapir that they indeed had her father's account but could
do nothing unless she could produce a death certificate. See Weisshaus Compl.
11.
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SBA, and the Bank of International Settlements as joint
defendants. 2 25 The amended complaint also included three new
representative plaintiffs. 22 6 Plaintiffs in the Weisshaus suit are all
Holocaust survivors. Plaintiffs and their heirs and beneficiaries claim
to have initiated a lawsuit
to obtain an accounting and recover damages arising out of
defendants' participation in a common scheme and course of
conduct (1) to conceal and convert assets deposited in accounts
with the defendant banks prior to 1946; and (2) to be a depository
of and profit from the looting of personal property by the Nazi
Regime and its allies between 1933 and 1945.227

To support these allegations, the Weisshaus plaintiffs stated six
causes of action upon which relief could be granted: breach of
duty,230
breach
of fiduciary
accounting,2 2 9
contract, 2 28
23 3
23 2
23 1
and unjust enrichment.
conspiracy,
conversion,
b. The Friedman Complaint
After the Weisshaus

suit was filed,

another Holocaust

survivor, Jacob Friedman, filed a new suit on October 21, 1996,

along with four people whose parents were killed in Nazi
concentration camps. 2 3 4

The Friedman suit alleged that three

225.
SeeWeisshaus Compl. 99 8-12,
226. The following plaintiffs were added as representatives of the class.
Joshua Lustmann is a 55-year-old Israeli citizen who resides in Jerusalem.
Lustmann avoided arrest by the Nazis by hiding and obtaining false identification
papers. See id. 9 6. His father and other relatives perished in a concentration
camp. Estelle Sapir is a 70-year-old permanent resident of the United States who
resides in Queens, New York. Sapir survived her 1943 arrest and placement in a
detention camp and lost her father in a concentration camp. See id. 7.
227.
See Weisshaus Compl. 1.
228.
See id. 99 29-42.
229.
See id. 941.
230. See id. 9 40-42.
231.
See id. 943.
232.
See id. IT 56-59.
233.
See id. 43.
234.
Friedman Compl. Jacob Friedman is a 75-year-old U.S. citizen who
lives in Brooklyn, New York.
Both of Friedman's parents were gassed at
Auschwitz in the spring of 1944. Id. 9 16. Plaintiff Lewis Salton, an 85-year-old
citizen who resides in New York City, lost his father to Nazi gunfire in 1942. Id.
21. Plaintiff Charles Sonabend is a 65-year-old British citizen who resides in
England. Sonabend's parents died at Auschwitz. See id. 1 32. Plaintiff David
Boruchowicz is a 71-year-old Canadian citizen who resides in Toronto. Id. 40.
Buruchowicz perforfhed slave labor for a German company from 1940 to 1943.
Id.
41.
His parents and five sisters were transported to the Majdanak
concentration camp where they are believed to have perished. Id. 42. Fourteen
plaintiff law firms were listed on the Friedman complaint. See also Big Suits, AM.
LAw., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 102 (discussing the case of Friedman v. Union Bank of
Switzerland). The plaintiffs are from New York, California, Britain and
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banks, UBS, SBC, and CS, laundered money stolen from the Jews
by the Nazis and affirmatively prevented the heirs of Holocaust
victims from accessing money deposited in Swiss accounts by
their deceased relations.
The Friedman complaint names three classes of plaintiffs:
(a)
Rightful owners of Nazi Regime looted assets or
their heirs (e.g., people who had their assets looted prior to
being sent to the camps);
(b)
Slave laborers and/or their heirs (e.g., people who
worked at no pay for German companies to avoid being sent
to concentration camps or to avoid being gassed while in
those camps); and
(c)
Certain Swiss bank depositors and/or their heirs
(e.g., people who made deposits prior to and during the war
2 3s
and who have been unable to reclaim those assets).

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant Swiss banks participated in a
common scheme and course of conduct to
(1) Launder Nazi Regime... money, and fund and profit from
Nazi World War II atrocities; (2) knowingly and/or recklessly
accept looted or cloaked assets stolen or forcibly taken by the
Nazi Regime during World War II; (3) knowingly and/or
recklessly accept profits generated by Nazi Regime forced

slave laborers; and (4) act intentionally and in concert to
conceal and prevent the recovery of assets
deposited in Swiss
2 36
banks by victims of the Nazi Regime.

The Friedman claims are perhaps the most elaborate. Their
claims include: conspiracy to violate and/or complicity in
violations of international law; breach of fiduciary duty; breach of
special duty; breach of contract; conversion; unjust enrichment;
negligence; violations of Swiss Federal Banking Law; violation of
Swiss Commercial Code of Obligations; conspiracy; fraud; and
237
fraudulent concealment.
c.
The World Council
Complaint

of Orthodox

Jewish

Communities

The Philadelphia law firm of Berger & Montague initiated a
third lawsuit in January 1997 on behalf of the World Council of
Orthodox
Jewish
Communities
(WCOJC)
and
other
nongovernmental
groups whose members are Holocaust

Canada. See Swiss Banks Face Second Holocaust Suit, REUTERS FIN. WIRE,
Oct. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUFIN File.
235. See International Law-Class Action Filed Against Swiss Banks for
Withholding illegal Nazi Assets, COHEN MILSTEIN HAUFELD & TOLL'S E-JOURNAL
(visited Mar. 15, 1998) <http:// www.cmht.com/cwswsgld.htm>.
236. Friedman Compl. 1.
237. Id. 207-94.
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survivors. 23 8 Like the Friedman plaintiffs, these plaintiffs sought
to classify four separate classes of plaintiffs. 23 9 The lawsuits were
consolidated by Brooklyn federal district court Judge Edward
4
Korman on March 7, 1997.2 0
d. The Amended Complaints
Subsequent to the filing of the complaints, plaintiffs
restructured and amended their complaints to achieve required
jurisdiction and to consolidate various classes of plaintiffs. The
dormant accounts claims were kept separate from the claims
concerning violations of international law for the Swiss banks
(ie., alleged acceptance of looted assets and the profits of slave
labor).
In amending the complaints, plaintiffs from the original
Friedman Complaint including plaintiffs Sonabend and Trilling-

238. WCOJC Compl. Plaintiff Ireen Zarkowski is a U.S. citizen residing
in Brooklyn, New York who was born in 1927. Zarkowski survived
deportation and the Lunz A sea work camp, and was eventually liberated
from the Reisienstadt concentration camp in 1945. Id.
12-15. Plaintiff
Joseph Wiedner was born in 1923 and is now a U.S. citizen residing in
Brooklyn, New York. Wiedner survived forced labor at Auschwitz and
Bochum and was liberated from Buchenwald in 1945. Id.
16-19. Plaintiff
Erwin Hauer was born in 1925 and is now a U.S. citizen residing in Brooklyn,
New York, Hauer survived deportation, forced labor and also internment in
the Strasshoff concentration camp, from where he was liberated in 1945. Id.

20-22 Plaintiff Lillie Ryba was born in 1924 and is now a U.S. citizen
residing in Brooklyn, New York. She survived the Auschwitz and Husnfeld
work camps. Id.
23-25. Wendy Liebowitz, Swiss Bank Lawsuits are
Consolidated,NAT'L L.J., Mar. 24, 1997, at A6.
239. Class A includes "Swiss Bank Depositors and/or Their Heirs."
WCOJC Compl. 96. Class B includes "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime Looted
Assets and/or Their Heirs." Id. Class C includes "Rightful Owners of Nazi Regime
Looted Communal Assets and/or Their Heirs." Id. Class D includes "Slave
Laborers and/or Their Heirs" Id. The main distinction between the classes in the
Friedman Complaint and the WCOJC Complaint is Class C: the rightful owners
of Nazi Regime looted communal assets. The WCOJC Complaint describes these
plaintiffs as "all communities that are presently identified by their descendance
from communities that previously existed in Europe, whose communal assets
were looted by the Nazi Regime, or its agents, which assets were in whole or in
part the subject of any transaction executed by or through the Swiss banks." Id.
at 96.
The WCOJC claims include: Count I: Breach of Fiduciary Duty; Count II:
Breach of Contract; Count HI: Conversion; Count IV: Unjust Enrichment; Count
V: Negligence; Count VI: Conspiracy; Count VII: Accounting; and Count VIII:
Conspiracy to Violate and/or Complicity in Violations of International Law.
WCOJC Compl.
102-48.
240. The lawsuits have been consolidated for pretrial purposes only.
Terry Carter, Accidental Allies: While Fighting for Return of Stolen Assets,
Lawyers for Holocaust Victims Spar over Leadership and Fees, 83 A.B.A. J. 30
(June 1997).

1998]

SWISS BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

377

Gotch were moved into separate and distinct groupings. The
restructured complaints were thus regrouped as the Weisshaus,
Sonabend, Trilling-Gotch and WCOJC Complaints.
The
Complainants who filed the second amended Weisshaus
Complaint are those plaintiffs from the original group of
"deposited assets" (i.e., dormant accounts) plaintiffs who are not
alleging any violations of international law.2 41 The amended
complaint reduces the number of legal claims to: (1) breach of
contract; (2) obligation and fiduciary duty under New York and
2 42
Swiss law; (3) fraud; and (4) unjust enrichment.
The amended Sonabend complaint seeks redress for
defendant banks' "knowing participation and complicity in crimes
against humanity, crimes against peace, and war crimes, directed
against plaintiffs and their close family members by the Nazi

regime." 2 4

The named Sonabend plaintiffs are all citizens of

foreign states who assert their claims under federal common law
as it incorporates customary international law. 24
Plaintiffs
24 5
characterize themselves as a "looted assets/ slave labor class."
The amended TriUling-Gotch complaint plaintiffs also assert
claims arising under customary international law. 24 6 Plaintiffs
there are U.S. citizens rather than foreign residents. Their claims
mirror those in the Sonabend Amended Complaint. The WCOJC
Complaint still groups deposited assets and looted assets/slave
2 47
labor plaintiffs together.
The ICEP and the Swiss government have opposed the
continuation of the class action lawsuits and have supported
defendants' motions to dismiss.2 4 Various Jewish organizations,
nonetheless, have continued to support the litigation. The Simon

241.
See Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz., (No. CV-96-4849) (July 30,
1997) [hereinafter Weisshaus Am. Compl.]. The new Weisshaus plaintiffs include
Weisshaus, Jacob Friedman (formerly Friedman plaintiff), Estelle Sapir (former
and current Weisshaus plaintiff), and Miriam Stem (new plaintiff).
242. Id. at
39-43.
243.
Sonabend v. Union Bank of Switz., (No. CV-96-5161) (E.D.N.Y., filed

July 30, 1997), 1 [hereinafter Sonabend Am. Comp.]. The Sonabend plaintiffs
include Charles Sonabend (formerly a Friedman plaintiff), David Boruchowicz
(formerly a Friedman plaintiff), and Joshua Lustmann (formerly a Weisshaus
plaintiff).
244.
245.
246.

Id. 9(a).
Id. 20.
See Trilling-Gotch v. Union Bank of Switzerland (No. CV-96-5161)

(July 30, 1997) [hereinafter Trilling-Gotch Am. Compl.]. The Trilling-Gotch
plaintiffs include Elizabeth Trilling-Gotch a U.S. citizen who is the only surviving
heir of her parents, who died while in the hands of the Nazis; Lillie Ryba; and
Jacob Friedman (formerly a Friedman plaintif).
247.
See WCOJC Compl.
248.
Catherine Crocker, Holocaust Survivors Argue for Swiss Banks
Lawsuit; Judge Must Decide On Allowing Class Action, RECORD, Aug. 1,
1997, at A4, available in LEXIS, News Library, NJREC File.
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Wiesenthal Center, which tracks Nazi War criminals, continues to
support the suit and at a minimum has stated that the Swiss
government agrees to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts for "a
final review 9of possible collaboration of Swiss banks with Nazi
24
Germany."
This Article concentrates on the original Friedman complaint
and the amended and consolidated Sonabend and Trilling-Gotch
claims because they focus on the international law and human
rights claims being raised in this litigation. 250 The three classes
of plaintiffs that were initially joined in the litigation seek
equitable and compensatory relief including an accounting and
disgorgement of three classes of assets that correspond to the
different types of plaintiffs. The assets included "looted" assets,
"cloaked" assets, and "deposited" assets.2 5 1 First, the Author will
discuss the looted and cloaked assets classes as they help to
clarify the Holocaust Plaintiffs' legal claims with respect to Swiss
bank complicity in Nazi activity.

249. Simon Wiesenthal Center, Lawsuit Information and Mandates (visited
Mar. 15, 1998) <www.wiesenthal.com/itn/mandates.html>.
The Simon Wiesenthal Center supports the involvement of American courts as
a necessary measure to prevent Swiss banks from exploiting Swiss laws or
delaying and blocking action on claims. Id.
250. See Holocaust Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Reply.
1-2. Looted assets are further defined as
See Friedman Compl.
251.
property:
that was illegally taken from the ownership or control, of an individual,
organization or entity, by means including but not limited to, theft, forced
transfer and exploitation, during the period of 1933 through 1946 by any
person, organization or entity acting on behalf of or in furtherance of the
acts of, the Nazi regime, its officials of related entities, in connection with
crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes against peace, genocide, or
any other violations of fundamental human rights.
ICd 9.

Cloaked assets are defined as:
any and all capital and/or assets owned by, controlled by or held for the

benefit of, any German corporation doing business from 1933-46 and the
identity of which was disguised in the bank of any neutral country, which

capital or assets include the profits of entities which were engaged in the
use of force or slave labor during this period.
Id. 110.
Deposited assets are defined as "any and all assets deposited in Swiss
banks... by persons who were persecuted for religious, racial or political reasons
by the Nazi regime." Id. 12.
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Connecting the Holocaust Plaintiffs to

As of March 1998, the federal court had not ruled on
Defendants' motions to dismiss. It is therefore unclear whether
the lawsuits will go forward and whether New York or Swiss law
will govern the Holocaust Plaintiffs' claims.
The Holocaust
Plaintiffs allege that defendants have a nexus with New York.
Several pages of the complaint contain allegations that, "[e]ither
as a result of their concerns about the safety of looted assets in
Switzerland and/or a mere desire to move these assets outside of
Switzerland, Swiss banks transferred the looted assets into
concealed accounts in the State of New York."25 2 The Eizenstat
Report has also noted that among "additional unresolved issues[,]
. . . one which has arisen recently concerns the disposition of
heirless assets in United States banks, and indeed, whether there
may have been looted Nazi assets in United States banks2 53
including the American affiliates of Swiss-owned banks."
Furthermore, New York courts may conclude that, as an
international financial center and the residence of many plaintiffs,
the United States has a great interest in this dispute and thus
25 4
New York law will govern.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs have formulated novel theories of
collective or joint liability because the they have had difficulties
matching individual plaintiffs with banks. These theories stem
from the notion of the Swiss banking industry's collective
facilitation of cloaking, looting, and obstructing access to German
assets and bank account records. In an attempt to bridge the
gap, the Holocaust Plaintiffs espouse two arguments. First, they
assert that defendants engaged in "a conspiracy . . . to, at a
minimum, deny, block, and/or obstruct access to, or knowledge
concerning, deposited and looted assets and profits derived from
slave labor."2 55 Second, and more interesting, is the Holocaust

252. Id. 97. Plaintiffs cite Treasury Department documents concerning
SBC and Swiss banks generally stating that they held securities and funds in New
York without revealing the identity of the true owner in violation of an Executive
Order. See id.
98-101.
253. EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at xi.
254. Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Sherman
Act to a Japanese corporation's price-fixing activities which took place
entirely in Japan. See U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (Ist
Cir. 1997).
255. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing, Failure to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can be

Granted, Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, and Motion to Strike Punitive
Damages at 5, Consolidated Holocaust Plaintiffs Cases CV-96-4849 (filed July 30,
1997) [hereinafter Holocaust Plaintiffs' Opp. Memo I].
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Plaintiffs' other basis for joining the three defendants-alternative
or "market share" liability. Alternative liability is based upon a
notion of collective liability. Under New York law, plaintiffs must
assert:
(1) that problems unique to the case make it
impracticable to prove which defendant caused the injury; (2) that
all defendants engaged in tortious conduct; (3) that the problems
of proof are related to the conduct itself; and (4) the absence of
2 S6
another effective remedy.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs further contend that the level of
specificity necessary with respect to their claims is reduced by
virtue of alternative liability.
In support of this, they cite
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, in which a New York court held that "liability
is based here in the overall risk produced and not on causation in
a single case."2 5 7
The Holocaust Plaintiffs argue that it is
exceedingly difficult to determine which Swiss banks accepted
cloaked or looted assets. Furthermore, the Holocaust Plaintiffs
allege that the problems of proof are related directly to defendant
banks' actions because they "negligently failed to maintain and/or
purposefully concealed proofs which exist or may have existed
25 8
and affirmatively obstructed access to such proofs."
Defendants have two main responses to the Holocaust
Plaintiffs' theory of collective liability. First, they argue that
alternative or collective liability merely eases plaintiffs' burden of
proof. Defendant banks assert that the Holocaust Plaintiffs must
still offer tangible evidence that each defendant was engaged in
the alleged wrongdoing. 25 9 Their main argument is that courts
have only applied collective liability a "handful of times" and only
in product liability actions. 26 0 Furthermore, defendant banks
note that, in order to seek disgorgement of assets due to unjust
enrichment, plaintiffs must be able to trace assets directly that
relate to their injuries and connect their claims to individual
defendant banks. The Holocaust Plaintiffs' response is that, since
Nazi assets were often commingled, there is no way to extricate
the identification of individual property owners. Instead, they
argue that "[tlhere is no question ... that the amount and value
of the total property that was looted and disposed of by the banks

256.
257.

See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1329 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
73 N.Y.2d 487, 512 (1989).

258. Holocaust Plaintiffs' Opp. Memo. I, at 10.
259. See Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants; Partial
Motion to Dismiss Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, In re
Holocaust Assets Litigation (CV-96-4849), at 15 [hereinafter Defendants' Common
Law Reply]; see also Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants
Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing to Sue, In re Holocaust Assets
Litigation (CV-96-4849), at 7-11 [hereinafter Defendants' Standing Reply].

260.

Defendants state that most cases that have proceeded on grounds of

collective liability are DES cases. See Defendants' Common Law Reply, at 15
n.45.
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[] can be
identified quantified and traced from its origins to the
26

banks." 1
262
Collective liability is indeed a controversial theory.
Nonetheless, the Holocaust Plaintiffs' assertion of this theory in
the context of a very historically situated case may provide new
avenues for its use. The Holocaust Plaintiffs are using a collective
action theory primarily because of the difficulty of matching
plaintiffs with specific banks.
According to the Holocaust
Plaintiffs, the three defendant banks, UBS, CS, and SBC,
represent between seventy-five and eighty percent of the market
share. 2 63 Consequently, these banks may retain the largest share
of assets connected to the dispute. Defendant banks contest this
figure. They state that the ICEP's current audit has shown that
other banks including cantonal, regional, and private banks held
two-thirds of Swiss banking system liabilities in 1939 and about
sixty-one percent in 1946. Defendant banks argue that, since
deposits are the typical source of bank liabilities, defendant banks
held only between thirty-three percent and thirty-nine percent of
the deposit-related liabilities during the period between 1939 and
1946.264
The most direct evidence of negligent or active concealment
relates to the dormant accounts.
Defendant banks have
repeatedly found new dormant accounts when subject to renewed
pressure.
Consequently, one could argue that their own
negligence or intentional disinterest has impeded the Holocaust
Plaintiffs' access to necessary facts.
The requirement, for
example, that relatives of deceased account holders produce

death certificates for persons killed in concentration camps might
possibly be characterized as willful obstruction.
With the publication of the most recent list of dormant

accounts, plaintiffs may at least be able to show that these three
banks, UBS, SBC and CS, are connected to a significant portion

261. Holocaust Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (CV-96-4849), at 12 [hereinafter Holocaust
Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memo.].
262. See, e.g., Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.S.2d at 520 (describing collective liability
as a "radical departure from fundamental tenets of tort law.") (Mollen J.,
concurring and dissenting).
263. See Holocaust Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memo., at 12. Holocaust
Plaintiffs claim that "defendant banks, being the largest of the private banks,
disposed of more than 75% of such loot." Id. at 12. This figure is derived on the
basis of the size of the Defendant banks, not the number of banks which they
subsequently acquired. Based on this approximation, plaintiffs claim that the
Defendants held approximately 75% of private deposits during the period in
question. Holocaust Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Reply, at 5.
264. In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litigation, Defendants' Post Hearing
Replies to Plaintiffs' Submissions, at 12, No. CV-96-4989 (filed Nov. 10, 1997)
(citing letter from ICEP Chairperson Paul Volcker to the court dated October 30,
1997).
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of heirless or dormant accounts. 26 5 Plaintiffs may need to
further establish that this activity occurred at the other two
banking institutions or at the defunct Swiss banks that they have
acquired.
2. Cloak and Dagger
Cloaking refers to the hiding or masking of property that
belongs to another-in essence concealing the identity of the true
beneficial owner. The Holocaust Plaintiffs assert in the Friedman
and WCOJC complaints that defendant Swiss banks engaged in
cloaking for many German companies who wished to shield and
protect their assets during World War Two. 2 65 Additionally, the
Holocaust Plaintiffs state in the Friedman, WCOJC, Sonabend,
and Trilling-Gotch complaints that defendant banks accepted
deposits from German companies that used slave labor in their
factories and workshops. Furthermore, the Holocaust Plaintiffs
assert that the Swiss have never revealed the true identity of the
or the amount of assets deposited as a result
owners of accounts
2 67
of slave labor.
In general, the Holocaust Plaintiffs assert that the Swiss
banks "knew that the Nazi regime, its representatives and agents
a
were depositing capital in disguised accounts in Switzerland,
26 8
portion of which was composed of profits of slave labor."
Furthermore, the same banks supposedly "knowingly hid,
cloaked, liquidated and laundered such funds and items, falsified
records pertaining to such funds and items and illegally
channeled such funds and items to third parties on behalf of the
26
Nazi regime?

9

The factual allegations in the complaint are numerous. This
section will focus on a few examples as illustrative of plaintiffs'
claims. 2 70 According to the Holocaust Plaintiffs, in 1945, the U.S.
Foreign Economic Administration cited that SBC, CS, UBS, and
several other banks engaged in cloaking German assets. 2 7 1 SBC,

265. See Swiss Banks Commence Global Claims Process to Identify
Owners of Dormant World War HEraAccounts, supra note 206, at A12.
266. See, e.g., Friedman Compl. 9 156-99.
267. See id. 9 122-42.
268. Id. T 211.
269. Id. 212.
270. The Friedman Complaint contains background information on various
German companies that used slave labor. See id. 99 122-42.
271. Id. 138 (citing Foreign Economic Administration document based on
intercepts by Otto Flesicher on Safe Haven and Other FinancialWarfare Objectives
in Switzerland (Jan. 27, 1945)). Plaintiffs further allege: "It was also noted that
there were instances of misconduct of Swiss firms in the United States concerning
cloaking by Swiss insurance and pharmaceutical companies and agencies of
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in particular, is alleged to have cloaked assets for German
companies. The Holocaust Plaintiffs cite a report prepared during
World War Two by the U.S. Treasury Department which states:
"[SBC] of Basel, with assets of approximately $385,000,000, is the
Its directors and
largest joint stock bank in Switzerland.
managers have for many years maintained intimate connections
with German industry. Of the 24 officers of the [SBC], at least 15
are known to have such affiliation at present ....

those listed as having accepted located gold."2 72
continues:

[sic] is among

The report

it should be borne in mind that the business affiliations and

political sympathies of these individuals (the Board of Directors)
are of the utmost importance. . . . [SBC] has consistently
maintained an impenetrable secrecy with respect to the deposits of
alien nationals and corporations. The quality of its management is
therefore a vital clue to its policy. Affiliations should indicate the

attitude of the Bank toward acceptance of German property and
the sheltering of German subsidiaries. . . The integrity of bank
officials has been the sole guarantee of any dubious
2 73

transaction.

The Holocaust Plaintiffs provide further evidence that specific

German industrialists, who were convicted at Nuremberg,
deposited their profits in Swiss banks. Alfried Krupp, notorious
businessman who produced armaments for Hitler, was convicted

at Nuremberg and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment and
the forfeiture of his property. 27 4 Krupp supposedly amassed his
fortune through the use of slave labor and deposited these funds
in Swiss bank accounts.2 7 5 In 1959, Krupp agreed to pay $2.38
million in restitution to former Jewish slave laborers.2 7 6 This
evidence establishes a rudimentary link between the Swiss banks
and German industrialists who reaped the benefits of illegal slave
labor.

139 (citing undated document from the U.S. State
Swiss banks."
Id.
Department's Swiss Accord Negotiation Book, 1946).
272.
Id. 62 (citing U.S. Treasury Report Summary: Swiss Bank Corp., Basel
Switzerland, undated (p. 1 of summary)).
273.
Id.
63 (citing U.S. Treasury Report at 3-4). The Friedman Complaint
also claims that 15 of the 24 officers of SBC were known to have abetted the
German strategy of avoiding confiscation of their property through fictitious sale
to a Swiss holding company. See id. 64. The complaint also lists the name of
several SBC directors who served on the board of German companies or their
Swiss subsidiaries. See id. 65.
274. United States v. Alfried Krupp, IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL at 1327 (1949). His property was restored to him,
however, after two years. Id.
Friedman Compl. 54.
275.
276.
See id.
132 (citing BENJAMIN FERENEZ, LESS THAN SLAvEs 100, 210
(1979)).
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The Holocaust Plaintiffs seek an accounting of all accounts
that have contained, between 1933 and the present, the cloaked
assets of the Nazi regime, and also details of which may contain
profits derived from slave labor. The Holocaust Plaintiffs also
seek a constructive trust and disgorgement of those same funds if
2 77
the bank is still in possession of them.
Furthermore, the Holocaust Plaintiffs assert that the Swiss
have never fully accounted for stolen or looted property that was
channeled into Swiss banks by the Nazis. In 1945, the United
States reported that:
The Swiss indicated that they propose to leave the matter [of looted
property] entirely to a case by case juridical determination and the
Swiss stolen property procedure is singularly inappropriate. This,

in effect, means that the Swiss have taken no measures whatsoever
to fulfill the pledge given by them on March 8 [date of the
Washington Accord] to enact such legislation as necessary to
2 78
assure the return of this property to the legitimate owners.

Further accounts mentioned that Germany purchased gold
from Switzerland during the 1930s in exchange for assets that
had been forcibly taken from German citizens. 2 79 The Holocaust
Plaintiffs, therefore, seek an accounting of all looted assets that
were deposited in, liquidated by, or laundered through Swiss

banks from 1933 to 1945 and also a constructive trust and

disgorgement of any looted assets still retained by plaintiffs. 28 0
In addition to claims arising from Swiss banks' receipt of
looted or cloaked assets, the third class of plaintiffs are Holocaust
survivors and descendants of Holocaust survivors, who deposited
their money in Switzerland from 1933 to 1945 and who were
subject to "racial, religious or political persecution by the Nazi
regime."28 1 Moreover, the Holocaust Plaintiffs seek an accounting
of all existing dormant accounts that were opened between 1933
and 1946.
3. Reclaiming the Past
Are any looted and cloaked assets still in Swiss vaults? This
is perhaps the most difficult question to answer and presents a
large obstacle for the Holocaust Plaintiffs. As the Holocaust

277.
278.

Friedman Compl., Prayer for Relief,
Id.
161.

F.

279.
SIDNEY ZABLUDOFF, INST. OF WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS, MOVEMENTS
OF NAZI GOLD:
UNCOVERING THE TRIAL 12 (1997) (Policy Study No. 10).

Zabludoff is a retired CIA and White House Economist. For a summary of the
report, see <http://www.wjc.org.il/polstudyl0.htm> (visited Apr. 5, 1998)
(World Jewish Congress website).
280.
Friedman Compl. 105.
281. Id. 144.
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Plaintiffs explain, "[s]ince the Swiss banks have never disclosed
which accounts reflected cloaked assets, nor accounted for what
portion of those cloaked assets are directly attributable to the use
of slave labor, there are no presently available, accurate estimates
of the amount of cloaked assets."282 Swiss bank secrecy may
have created a knowledge barrier with respect to the very factual

questions that plaintiffs need to prove.
Nonetheless, there are indications that the Swiss government
and Swiss banks retained German assets after the war. In
February 1945, French, British, and American negotiators were
dispatched to Switzerland in an attempt to negotiate with the
Swiss about ceasing activities with the Germans. The head of the
delegation was Lauchlin Currie, Assistant to the U.S. President
and former FEA Deputy Administrator. 28 3 The Swiss, in reaction
to the proposed visit, passed two decrees. The Swiss agreed to
block the assets of Axis powers and satellite governments and to
facilitate the return of looted property to its true owners. The
Swiss decrees also made the cloaking of German assets illegal and
required banks to investigate ownership of numbered accounts
28 4
and to turn such information over to the Swiss government.
There was some question at first as to whether the Swiss
would comply with their own decrees. 2 8 5
While the Swiss
government had prohibited the cloaking of German assets in
March 1945, the government was not empowered to violate bank

282.

Id.

57.

283.
See EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 31.
284.
Id. at 32-33.
285.
Ambassador Currie noted in a letter to Secretary
Morgenthau:

of Treasury

The action taken by the Swiss to date represents a formal gesture to
satisfy the U.S. which by itself has some value. However, it carries no

guarantee that German assets in Switzerland will in fact be frozen.
Germans in Switzerland are permitted by the decree to freely dispose of
their assets for "normal" professional and personal transactions, and no
authorization is required, among other things for "normal administration"
of German assets.... Unless the Swiss are strict in their interpretation of
"normal" and vigorous in their investigation of ostensibly innocent

professional, personal and commercial transactions, agents in Switzerland
will be able to freely use German assets to further Nazi underground
activities.
The decree delegated to the appropriate Swiss officials authority to request
information from banking institutions, with respect to the ownership of
accounts within Switzerland. Much will depend here again, on how
vigorously this authority is exercised to remove German assets from the
Swiss protective law.
Letter from Ambassador Currie, to Secretary Morgenthau, Feb. 21, 1945, cited in
Friedman Compl. 166.
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secrecy laws. 2 8 6 Thus, the Swiss government could not compel
the release of customer information from Swiss banks.
Consequently, the decree was a self-enforcing law that relied on
the candor and cooperation of the banking industry.
the Senate
surrendered in 1945,
Germany
Before

Subcommittee on Military Affairs, chaired by Senator Harley
Kilgore of Tennessee, launched an investigation concerning the
role of Swiss banks and bank secrecy laws in cloaking the
financial activities of the Third Reich. Senator Kilgore testified
that the Swiss were able to violate their agreement with the Allies
and banking officials
"by the willingness of the Swiss government
2 87
to make a secret deal with the Nazis."
...
As stated above, the Swiss initially wanted to use blocked
German assets to satisfy their reparation claims against
The United States and the Allied Powers took a
Germany.
contrary view-that this action would violate Switzerland's
neutrality. As part of the Washington Accord, the Swiss agreed to
the
turn over fifty percent of German assets (after liquidation) to 28
8
Allied Reparation Agency. This agreement was never fulfilled.

The bank secrecy laws
286.
ascertaining the identity of German
The Swiss Government issued
assets. In reaction to the report,
commented:

even prevented the Swiss government from
depositors during World War Two.
an interim report concerning the blocking of
a U.S. Treasury representative, James Mann

[Tihe Swiss have furnished the [American] Legation with an interim report
on the progress being made under the blocking and census decrees which
is a joke (and which to me clearly proves, if any proof is needed, that the
Swiss have no intention of really doing anything in connection with the
discovery and immobilization of German assets except to stall as long as
they possibly can).

Letter from James Mann, U.S. Treasury representative, to Harry White,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Oct. 10, 1945), cited in Friedman
184.
Compl.
AN ExPos8 OF THE NAZI
287.
CHARLES HIGHAM, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY:
AMERICAN MONEY PLOT 1933-1949, at 218 (1983) (citing a statement by Senator
Kilgore).
288. The Eizenstat Report notes:
IT]he other part of the Accord, the liquidation of hundreds of millions of
dollars in German assets, was neither promptly nor ever fully implemented
[O]ver a six-year period before the final 1952 settlement, the Swiss
government had made only a token 20 million Swiss franc advance ($4.7
million then or $31 million today) for resettlement of stateless victims.
Finally, in 1952, after a lengthy and frustrating effort, Switzerland and the
Allies agreed to a total payment of $28 million-far less than the agreed 50
percent of the value of German assets in their country. The amount of
German assets in Switzerland after the War ranged between press
accounts of $750 million, U.S. and Allied estimates of $250 - $500 million,
and Swiss estimates of around $250 million.
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It was, however, renegotiated. The Swiss, therefore, have
technically fulfilled their legal obligations under their treaties with
the Allies with respect to any German assets retained at the end
of World War Two.
4. Maneuvers: Bankers as Joint Venturers under the Alien Tort
Claims Act

a. Background: The Alien Tort Claims Act
Swiss bank secrecy can form a general impediment to parties'
bringing law suits. It is difficult for the Holocaust Plaintiffs to
plead with particularity, when Swiss law prevents plaintiffs from
obtaining factual information needed to support such pleadings.
At present, the legal claims of the dormant holders seem much
stronger than the claims of the slave labor and looted assets
plaintiffs.
This Article focuses on the Holocaust Plaintiffs' international
law claims, as they are perhaps the most contentious and farreaching in terms of extending notions of human rights to banks
and commercial actors. As stated previously, the other major

branch of the litigation involves common and civil law claims
pertaining to dormant accounts.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs are bringing their human rights
claims under the ATCA, as well as under international law
generally. 28 9 The ATCA has become a powerful tool whereby

plaintiffs who have suffered human rights violations can seek
redress within a U.S. federal court. 290

Originating in 1789, the

EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at vii.
289. ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, gives a non-U.S. citizen the right to seek
redress in U.S. courts for certain violations of international law. A separate issue
remains as to whether U.S. citizens can bring claims for the same violations
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a federal question. This issue hinges, to some
extent, on whether a legal dispute arising under international law has the status
under federal common law to create a right of action under § 1331. Previous
courts, such as the Second Circuit in Kadic v. Karadfic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995) and Filartigav. Pena-Irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), have evaded the
issue because the plaintiffs were aliens and thus could invoke § 1350
jurisdiction. In this case, many of the Holocaust Plaintiffs are naturalized U.S.
citizens. The Author does not address the issue of § 1331 jurisdiction here, but
instead focuses on the threshold question that must first be answered before
preceding to a § 1331 analysis-Do any of the Swiss banks' alleged activities rise
to the level of violating customary international law?
290. The statute reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.
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ATCA permits an alien to sue in federal court for a "tort"
committed "in violation of the law of nations."2 9 1 The violation of
international law must amount to a violation of 'well-established
universally recognized norms of international law." 29 2 The ATCA
has its origin in Section Nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789.293 At
that time, Congress appeared to believe that it was part of the
new American Republic's duty as a member of the community of
nations to provide remedies in federal court for aliens who had
law. 2 94
of international
by violations
victimized
been
Furthermore, civil forfeiture had long applied to individuals who
95
violate international law.2

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993) (enacted 1948).
291. The term "law of nations," used at the time the ATCA was enacted, has
been replaced by the term "international law". RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. The ATCA confers jurisdiction when (1) an alien sues
(2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations. Kadic,70 F.3d at 237

(citing Flartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 887). There is some debate about whether a
plaintiff must allege a violation of a common law or municipal tort that also
constitutes a violation of the law of nations, or if some actions meld together to
create a category of "international torts". In Forti v. Suarez-Mason, for example,
the court stated that "[tihe Court thus interprets 28 U.S.C. § 1350 to provide not
merely jurisdiction but a cause of action, with the federal cause of action arising
by recognition of certain 'international torts' through the vehicle of§ 1350. 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987). One commentator has criticized the U.S.
Court of Appeals discussion of the ATCA elements in Filartiga,which blended
together the tort and international law requirements to create an "international
tort." Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over InternationalLaw Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statutes, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 32 (1985).
Randall notes that, "[u]nder the first element of the Alien Tort Statute, plaintiff
can allege any municipal tort, so long as plaintiff also alleges a violation of the
law of nations or a treaty." Id. at 35. Randall labels this the minority view. By
contrast, the majority view, as expressed in Filartiga,requires a violation of the
law of nations as the basis for § 1350 jurisdiction. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887.
292. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 888.
293. For a discussion of the historical origins of the ATCA, see William R.
Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdictionover Torts Committed in Violation
of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REv. 467, 488-510 (1986); see also William S.
Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists",19 HASTINGS INT' & COmP L. REV. 221,225-37 (1996).
294. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 475-80 (1989).
295. See Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence, supra note 42, at 587.
Stephens notes that "the law of prize, for example, not only details the rules
governing the legality of enemy and neutral ships, but also provides for
compensation for damage to individuals or property during the capture." Id. at
n.43 (citing Dodge, supra note 293, at 243-44, 246). Stephens also states, "In
general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has been exercised in the
criminal law, but international law does not produce the application of noncriminal law on this basis, for example, by providing a remedy in tort or
restitution for victims of piracy." Id. at 587.
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Some courts now accept as a well-settled principle that the
law of nations is part of U.S. federal common law. 2 96 The ATCA
remained in a state of near dormancy until the 1980s. At that
time, there seemed to emerge in the United States a growing
protecting human rights, and human rights plaintiffs'
This trend began with the

interest in

actions revived the statute. 2 97

2 98
landmark case Filartigav. Pena-frala.

Dr. Joel Filartiga and his

daughter Dolly, Paraguayan nationals who resided in the United
States, sued the alleged torturer of Dr. Filartiga's son in a U.S.

court. 29 9

The court considered on appeal whether the ATCA

provided a basis for jurisdiction of the case. The court held that
the ATCA did authorize a claim for violations of accepted norms of

international law and stated that "deliberate torture perpetuated
under color of official authority violates universally accepted
300
Thus, the
forms of the international law of human rights."
transformation of international law and the ATCA occurred in

3s

1980 in Filartiga_
The ATCA, however, is not without its critics.
criticism

common

questions

the

legitimacy

of

The most

U.S.

courts'

redressing foreign human rights violations when personal
jurisdiction over the defendant is based solely on the subsequent
302

of the defendant within the United States.
presence
Furthermore, there continues to be debate over what constitutes
"the law of nations" and whether federal courts are competent to
determine the scope of such law and of international law
303

generally.

Other critics of the ATCA question the validity of using a
1789 statute as the basis for adjudicating international human
In 1985, the D.C. Circuit, for
rights cases in U.S. courts.
example, dismissed claims brought by survivors of victims

296.
In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th
Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Estate I] (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)
and United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820)).
See, e.g., Filartiga,630 F.2d 876; In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25
297.
F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Estate II].
298.
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
299.
For a detailed analysis of the manner in which Filartigachanged the
manner in which U.S. courts approaches human rights violations occurring
abroad, see Jeffery M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over
International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INTL L.J. 53 (1981).
300.
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
301.
Id.; see Steven Fogelson, The Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 885 (1990) (stating that Filartiga
exemplifies the post-Nuremberg transformation of international law).
302.
See Steinhardt, supra note 11, at 70-72 (discussing criticisms of

subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA).
303.
See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823-27 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Robb, J., concurring).
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murdered in a Palestinian Liberation Organization attack on a
civilian bus in Israel. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic is cited as
a case that questions the validity of a broad interpretation of
Section 1350.3 04 The three judges, Judge Edwards, Judge Bork,
and Senior Judge Robb, each authored concurrences providing
different reasons for their dismissal of the claims. Judge Edwards
expressed concern over the use of international law to determine
standards of liability under the ATCA. He dismissed the claims
because the PLO was not a state actor and thus could not be held
accountable under international law.30 5 Judge Bork's opinion
rejects the premise of Filartigaoutright and states that the ATCA
gave plaintiffs no right to sue.30 6 He also criticizes expansive
ATCA jurisdiction as violating separation of powers. Judge Robb
For some
dismissed plaintiffs' claims as nonjusticiable.
commentators, it seems misplaced to use civil tort-based litigation
30 7
for a gross violation of international human rights.

Nonetheless, international law has never prohibited a state's
decision to provide a civil tort remedy for conduct that is
classified as an international crime.
As stated above, the Holocaust Plaintiffs must allege that
defendant banks committed a tort, which is also a violation of the
law of nations. In the Friedman complaint, where the Holocaust
Plaintiffs merged their international law and common law claims,
plaintiffs alleged that defendant banks were liable for negligence,
Of these torts,
breach of a special duty, and conversion.
conversion is the most directly linked to the plaintiffs'
international claims, which involve the use and concealment of
30 8
assets plundered by Nazis from Holocaust victims.
In the Friedman complaint, the Holocaust Plaintiffs state:
"Defendants Swiss banks received property belonging to plaintiffs
from the Nazi Regime as a result of the illegal activities of the Nazi
Regime . . . including the looting of assets and the use of slave
labor."3 0 9 The banks' acts, they allege, constitute conversion
because they "amount to an unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the right of ownership over the goods belonging to

Id.
304.
Id. at 775-98 (Edwards, J., concurring).
305.
Id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring).
306.
307.
See, e.g., Farooq Hassan, Panaceaor Mirage?Domestic Enforcement
of InternationalHuman Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13, 3133 (1981).

308. In essence, conversion relates more directly to the allegations
concerning looted and plundered property. Interestingly, the tort of conversion
was used as a legal claim in the Republic of Haiti's suit against Jean-Claude
Duvalier in a civil suit to recover $5.5 million deposited by Duvalier in a New York
City bank account See Torts: HaitiEstablished Case of Conversion, N.Y. L.J., May
12, 1995, at 25.
309. Friedman Compl. 238.
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others" and defendants "intended to deal[ ] with the subject
3 10
property in a way which is inconsistent with plaintiffs' rights."
Conversion is defined under the Restatement of Torts (Second) as
"an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it

that the actor may be1 justly required to pay the other the full

31
value of the chattel."
The Holocaust Plaintiffs claim that the Swiss banks have

violated international law because they:
knowingly aided and abetted the Nazi regime by providing them

with the financing necessary to continue World War II for at
least a year longer than it otherwise might have lasted; that the
banks knowingly engaged in transactions with the Nazi regime
that furthered criminal activities; that the banks knowingly
accepted and disposed of assets they knew, or should have
known, were the result of looting, plunder and slave labor
engaged in by or on behalf of the Nazi regime; and that the
banks knowingly took advantage of the chaos during and after
the war to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the
very victims to whom they held out their institutions as safe
havens.
These claims sufficiently state a violation of
international law principles against knowingly aiding, abetting
and assisting genocide, slave labor, discriminatory treatment
based on race and the plundering of public and private
3 12
property

The Holocaust Plaintiffs allege that the Swiss banks' cloaking and
looting violated "numerous international treaties, customary
international laws, and fundamental human rights laws

prohibiting genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
crimes against peace, slavery, slave and forced labor and slave

trade...." 3 13 The Holocaust Plaintiffs state that defendant banks
violated the law of nations:

310. Id.
240-41.
311. 18 AM. JUR. 2d Conversion § 1 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 222A).

312.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions

to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim
under International Law, at 49 (No. CV-96-4849) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Holocaust Plaintiffs' Int'l Law Reply].
313. Friedman Compl.
215. Plaintiffs cite the following treaties and
conventions:
The Genocide Convention; the United Nations Charter; the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the Geneva Convention of 1929; the
supplemental Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Non-Combatants
During War Time; the Nuremberg Principles; the Slavery Convention of
1926; the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery; the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; the International
Labor Conventions and Recommendations; the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Political Rights; and the Hague Convention of 1907.
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In essence, the alien plaintiffs charge defendants with Holocaust
victims remaining in Switzerland; participating in, aiding and
abetting and complicity in, the Nazi Regime's illegal war of
aggression; committing crimes against humanity; and looting
civilian assets, as well as independent post-war looting of assets of
3 14
Holocaust victims remaining in Switzerland.

In the amended Sonabend Complaint, the Holocaust Plaintiffs
further allege that the defendant banks "knowingly assumed" the
role of "fence" for assets looted by the Nazi regime and laundered
these funds and assets for large profits.3 1 5 Specifically, defendant
banks allegedly "were paid substantial commissions by the Nazis
for knowingly laundering and depositing vast quantities of assets
looted from targets of Nazi persecution with full knowledge that
the assets had been acquired in violation of customary
3 16
international law."
The Holocaust Plaintiffs state that this creates a cause of
action because the defendant banks, when "trafficking in and
hiding the assets looted from targets of Nazi persecution with
knowledge that the assets had been obtained pursuant to
systematic persecution and murder... [,] violated... customary
international law."3 17 Additionally, the Holocaust Plaintiffs claim
that defendant banks "by trafficking in goods produced by Nazi
slave labor and exchanging and/or hiding the profits of slave
labor with knowledge that the goods and profits had been

215.
314. Plaintiffs assert that the following constitute compensable tortious
conduct:
Id.

Count I: Knowingly facilitating the conversion and disposal of assets looted
by the Nazi regime from Jews and other target racial or political groups
into hard currency and knowingly facilitating transactions involving profits
derived from Nazi-Regime related parties from slave labor.
Counts II, III and VII: Converting assets deposited with defendants for
safekeeping by victims of Nazi persecution and obstructing the return of
such assets to their rightful owners.
Counts X: Conspiracy to convert deposited and looted assets and to

obstruct claims of rightful owners.
Counts XI and XI: Fraudulent Misrepresentations regarding the status of
deposited, looted and cloaked assets in order to induce class members to
abandon their potential claims.
Holocaust Plaintiffs' Intl Law Reply, supranote 208, at 23.
36-37.
315. Sonabend Am. Compl.
316. Holocaust Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memo. at 7-8 (citing to amended
complaints). The Holocaust Plaintiffs also allege: "The defendant banks and their
predecessor entities, having knowingly laundered the looted assets of targets of
persecution, then knowingly provided Nazi Germany with foreign currency in
return for goods produced by Jewish slave labor and knowingly accepted the
profits of slave labor as deposits to the accounts of the companies exploiting such
labor." Id, at 8.
317. Id. 43.
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produced under conditions that constituted violations of
318
international law, violated... customary international law."
The Holocaust Plaintiffs' claims have evoked criticismspecifically as to the characterization of bankers as collaborators.
Walter J. Rockler, an American prosecutor at Nuremburg, was
responsible for prosecuting the two German bankers, Karl Rasche
and Emil Puhl, who were tried before the tribunal.
Rockler
states:
The charge that Swiss banks accepted moneys looted by the
Nazis is probably true. So did French banks, Italian banks,
Swedish banks. and so would any other banks, including American
and British banks, were these countries not at war with the Nazis.
A substantial aspect of the business of banking for profit is
acceptance of deposits without regard to the history of the money
being deposited.
Swiss bankers are not unusual in this
practice....
[I]n the matter of the claims or survivors to deposits of the
murdered persons in Swiss banks, the Swiss bankers seem to have
behaved badly, but like bankers. They would not part with the
money except upon strict proofs-proofs that of course were not
available anywhere. As to many of these accounts, there were and

are no claimants and that undoubtedly has pleased the
bankers.... [H]ave they been insensitive and glad to profit?
3 19
course. Why would anyone expect otherwise.

Of

Rockler's comments are insightful and emphasize the problem of
line drawing with respect to the activities of a commercial bank.
It remains debatable, however, whether knowingly participating in
the finance of war crimes or accepting looted assets of Holocaust
victims might constitute a violation of international law.
b. Don't Look Back
Plaintiffs' ATCA claims focus primarily on the argument that
defendant banks' actions are violations of customary international
law.3 20 Defendant banks' primary objection to plaintiffs' ATCA

318.
Sonabend Am. Compl. 44.
319. Walter J. Rockler, Bankers Not Collaborators,WASH. POST, July
22, 1997, at A15; see also Walter J. Rockler, Les Suisse N'Ont PasAgi Plus
Mal Que Les Autres, LE NOVEAU QUOTIDIEN, July 24, 1997, reprinted at
Switzerland
Task
Force
on
Holocaust
Assets
website
<http://www.switzerland.taskforce.ch/doc/Rocklerf.htm>
(stating that
Swiss banks acted no differently than other banks with respect to
accepting deposits from the Nazis and also discussing the neutrality of the
Swiss).
320.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
Plaintiffs also contend that customary international law is part of U.S. federal
common law, citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246 (It is a "settled proposition that federal
common law incorporates international law"); Estate I, 978 F.2d at 502 ("It is...
well settled that the law of nations is part of federal common law."). As such,
plaintiffs assert their claims arise under the laws of the United States as well as
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and international law claims is that the banks did not violate any
norm of customary international law in place in the 1930s or
1940s. Thus, the main issues are: (1) what was the status of
international law during World War Two and (2) did defendant
banks' activities as bankers constitute violations of customary
international law?
According to the doctrine of intertemporality, courts should
apply the international law that was in force at the time the
alleged violations occurred. This doctrine applies specifically
to
321
international criminal law rather than to civil lawsuits.
Nonetheless, as a matter of interpretation, a court that was
hearing a case arising under the ATCA might look to the status of
international law at the time the alleged tort occurred. 32 2 Thus,
the plaintiffs in the Holocaust victims' litigation find themselves
stepping back in time to examine customary international law
before and during World War Two. This leads to an examination
primarily of the Nuremberg Principles and the trials of war
criminals before both the International Military Tribunals (IMT)
and U.S. Military Tribunal (USMT).

under the ATCA. Furthermore, because of this doctrine, courts are obliged to
enforce customary international law. Holocaust Plaintiffs' Intl Law Reply, at 2627.
As Professor Louis Henkin states:
International law is not merely binding on the U.S. internationally, but it is
also incorporated into U.S. law. It is "self-executing" and is applied by
courts in the U.S. without any need for it to be annexed or implemented
by Congress, and the principles of that law are determined by judges for
application in cases before them, customary international law has often
been characterized as 'federal common law" and has been lumped with
authentic federal common law....
Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1561 (1984).
321. Aff. of Holocaust Plaintiffs International Law Expert, Professor John M.
Van Dyke, at 7, Consolidated Holocaust Plaintiffs cases (Master Doc. No. CV-964849) [hereinafter Van Dyke Aff.]; see also Article 11(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (stating "No one shall be held guilty of any penal
offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal
offence, under national or international law, at the time it was committed"). 3
U.N. GAOR, C.3 Annex, Agenda Item 58, at 535, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948).
322. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Pursuant to the ATCA, plaintiffs sued a former Argentine general on behalf of
themselves and their relatives for his alleged acts of torture, murder, and
prolonged arbitrary detention during Argentina's so-called "Dirty War" in the
1970s. The District Court noted in a footnote that, "in the opinion of the Court,
the international law to be considered is that on which a consensus existed at the
time of the alleged violations." Id. at 1540 n.5. It is unclear whether the court
mentioned this in an effort to state that international law must be analyzed in a
more modern context or whether it was limiting its analysis to norms in place
between 1977 and 1984, the period during which plaintiffs alleged that the
human rights violations had occurred.
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In the summer of 1945, representatives from the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Provisional Government of
France, and the Soviet Union met in the United Kingdom to
establish procedures for dealing with Nazi war criminals. The
result of the conference was the Protocol for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, which
included in an annex the Charter of the International Military

Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter).3 23 Together, the Protocol and the
Nuremberg Charter are referred to as the Charter of London or
the London Agreement. The Nuremberg Charter set forth four
counts under which accused war criminals would be indicted: (1)
crimes against the peace, (2) war crimes, (3) crimes against
humanity, and (4) common plan or conspiracy.3 24 The subject

matter jurisdiction of the IMT was drawn from the Hague

Conventions of 1888 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1925
and 1929,325 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.326 It is unclear

whether these conventions embodied customary international law

at the time of the Nuremberg trials.3 2 7

323.
Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of
Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INTL L. 57, 63 (1995)
(citing Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
59 Stat. 1544 (1945)).
324.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 14, 3
BEVANS 1239, 1241-42.
325.
See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacterial Methods for Warfare, June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 2 BEVANS 932
[hereinafter Geneva Convention].
326.
Chaney, supra note 323, at 63.
327. Today, there is greater agreement that these conventions are evidence
of customary international law. As Theodor Meron notes:
That "part of conventional international humanitarian law which has
beyond doubt become part of customary international law," according to
the Secretary General [of the United Nations], is the law of armed conflict
embodied in the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of
Augusts 12, 1949, the Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and annexed Regulations of October 18, 1907;
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of December 9, 1948; and the Charter of the international
Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945. The Geneva Conventions constitute
the "core of the customary law applicable in international armed conflicts."
Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International
Law, 88 AMi. J. INTL L. 78, 79 (1994) (quoting Report of the Secretary General U.N.
SC Res. 808, paras. 2, U.N. Doc S/25704 and Annex (1993), reprintedin 32 I.L.M.
1159, 1170 (paras. 35 & 37) (1993)). German legal scholars have raised concerns
about the application by the Tribunal of ex post facto law. This line of reasoning

states that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus or the nullification of binding

treaties due to circumstances applied to Germany during World War Tvo. Thus,
the Hague Conventions of 1800 and 1907, and the Geneva Conventions of 1925
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The law of human rights at the time of Nuremberg was not
clearly defined according to some scholars and historians. After
World War Two, articulated principles of international human
rights became more readily apparent.3 28 In the aftermath of
World War Two, a series of declarations were issued concerning
international human rights.3 2 9
Filartiga advised courts
construing the ATCA to apply the "law of nations" not as it existed
at any particular time in the past, but "as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today." 330 This is helpful to
the Holocaust Plaintiffs only insofar as defendant banks'
continuing actions after World War Two amount to violations of
international law.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs' international law claims rest in
many respects on the fate of two bankers who were tried at
Nuremberg, Karl Rasche and Emil Puhl.3 3 1 Both the Holocaust

Plaintiffs and defendant banks have found themselves parsing
historical texts and trying to impart significance to each line of
various decisions.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs invoke the Nuremberg Principles as a
chief source of customary law.3 3 2 The Nuremberg Principles to
which the Holocaust Plaintiffs refer are the principles drafted by

and 1929 would have ceased to bind Germany once it was at war with the other
signatories to these. Chaney, supranote 323, at 71.
328.
See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law,
in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 4-5 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d
ed. 1992).
329.
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 8, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 165, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
330.
See also Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentina Republic, 830 F.2d
421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that "[tlhe evolving standards of international law
govern who is within the [Alien Tort] statute's jurisdictional grant as clearly as
they govern what conduct creates a jurisdiction") rev'd on other grounds, 109 S.

Ct. 683 (1989).
331.
For a personal account of the prosecutions of Rasche and Puhl, see
Walter J. Rockier, ProsecutingBloodless War Crimes, 18 LITIG. VOL. 2, 18-21, 5960 (1992). Rockier prosecuted both Rasche and Puhl at Nuremburg.
332.
For a discussion of the definition of customary international law, see,
for example, The Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (courts
must look to the "customs and usages of civilized nations, and as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators"); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881
(relying on declarations and treaties as evidence of the existence of customary
international law prohibiting torture). Customary international law is derived from
numerous sources including international treaties, the customs and usages of
civilized nations, individual nation court decisions, U.N. General Assembly

Resolutions, international pronouncements that reflect the actual practice of
states, international declarations, and the work of scholars and jurists wellacquainted with international law.
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the International Law Commission that restated a formulation of
the international legal principles, recognized in the Nuremberg
Charter as well as in the judgments of the IMT that prosecuted
Nazi war criminals.
The Nuremberg Principles are widely
considered to encapsulate principles of customary international
3 33
law.
Plaintiffs invoke Nuremberg Principles VI and VII.
Nuremberg Principle VI states:
The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under
international law:
a. Crimes against peace:
(I) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances;
(II) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (I).
b. War crimes
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are
not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation of slave-labor,
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied

territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war of persons on
the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property,
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity.
c. Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other
inhuman acts done against any civilian population or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds, when such persecutions
are carried on in execution of or in connection [sic] with any crime
of peace of any war crime.

Nuremberg Principle VII states: "Complicity in the commission of
a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity
334
as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law."
Based on Principles VI and VII, the Holocaust Plaintiffs assert
that Swiss banks aided and abetted the commission of war crimes
and crimes against humanity. The Holocaust Plaintiffs also urge
that the Nuremberg Charter and Nuremberg Trials codified and
applied the essential underlying principle that: "perpetrators and
aiders and abettors would be held criminally responsible for their
acts."

33 5

333.
See Fogelson, supra note 301, at 868. The Nuremberg Principles
crystallized the preexisting international condemnation of persecution and
enslavement of civilians on the basis of race or religious belief and indicated that
certain fundamental rights may never be transgressed. Id.
334.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Vol.
6, Supp. No. 12, at 11-14, U.N. Doc. A/ 1316 (1950).
335.
Holocaust Plaintiffs' Int'l Law Reply, at 31.
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The Status of Banks under International

The Swiss banks are described as the "principal means of the
liquidation, disposal and conversion of that wealth into currencies
usable by Nazi Germany to purchase its necessary war materials
and conduct its extermination of Jews." 3 3 6 Thus, the Holocaust
Plaintiffs characterize defendant banks' conduct as an essential
3 37
and material part of the Nazi war machinery.
One of the criticisms levied with respect to ATCA claims is
that international law does not provide a basis for claims against
private non-state actors. This argument is based upon the notion
that private non-state actors do not have obligations under
international law (as contrasted with states). Thus, some courts
have dismissed ATCA cases where the defendants were non-state
actors.3 3 8
The issue of private individuals becomes more
pronounced in the Holocaust assets litigation because the
defendant banks are corporate entities rather than individual
actors.
Furthermore, to the extent that defendant banks are
allegedly guilty of collective or "group" activity, the use of the

336. Id.
337. At oral argument on Defendant Swiss Banks' Motion to Dismiss,
Professor Burt Neuborne of the New York University School of Law, an ex.pert for
the plaintiffs, characterized plaintiffs' claims as follows:
What we have alleged and what we are prepared to prove is the banks
knowingly acted as the receiver of looted property, knowing that the
property had been obtained under circumstances that sink to the level of
war crimes ....

[Swiss banks] were the entity that permitted the final

consummation of the plunder. The purpose of the plunder wasn't to
take .... the goods just to take the goods. The goods had to be converted
into foreign currency so that they could be used to buy war material. If
the banks knowing that this plunder had been taken under conditions
that sink to the level of war crimes, collaborated with the criminals and
essentially fenced the assets, yes, I think that the least that we can
request is that they have to disgorge the profits that they earned from
knowingly participating in the consummation of what were found to be
war crimes.
Holocaust Assets Oral Argument, at 201.
338. See, e.g., Sanchez Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (dismissing plaintiffs' claims of torture and rape against Nicaraguan
contras because court was "aware of no treaty that purports to make the activities
here at issue unlawful when conducted by private individuals. As for the law of
nations--so called 'customary international law'. . . we conclude that this also
does not reach private, non-state conduct of this sort"); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791
(Edwards, J, concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (stating that
Palestine Liberation Organization being a non-state actor and not recognized as
member of community of nations had at most obscure violations of international
law); Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541 ("Of course purely private torture will not
normally implicate the law of nations, since there is currently no international
consensus regarding torture practiced by non-state actors.").
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Anglo-American legal theory of conspiracy at Nuremberg has been
33 9
strongly criticized by scholars and commentators.
Defendants argue that granting subject matter jurisdiction
under the ATCA would create a slippery slope. Their expert on

public international law, Professor John Norton Moore of the
University of Virginia, asks: "[A]re Swedish steel interests to be
liable in U.S. courts for the extensive transfer of iron ore from
Swedish mines in Kiruna to the Germans during World War II,

despite Sweden's neutrality, also in a climate of coercion?"3 4°
Moore further queries:
More broadly, if Plaintiffs' Complaints are entertained in this case,
what might the future liability of commercial banks or other
businesses, doing business with, including accepting deposits
from, the former Soviet Union, China, Japan, Germany, the former
Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea, Turkey or other
Nations whose Governments have in the past contributed to
massive "democide" in the Twentieth Century-not to mention the
lesser human rights violators? ....
Given the overvhelming need for developing more effective
international enforcement mechanisms against governments which
engage in genocide or other human rights violations, are such more
effective mechanisms more or less likely if the applicable
underlying norms are broadened to include banking and other
341
commercial transactions?

Perhaps the time has come to view certain types of banking
activities-such as the use of bank secrecy to aid a war criminalas a violation of international human rights. There must, of
course, be a threshold.
A difference exists between merely
opening a bank account for a dictator or criminal and taking
affirmative steps to aid him in shielding his assets. Furthermore,
the issue of redress for human rights victims is directly linked to
the existence of bank secrecy jurisdictions. Leaders such as
Duvalier, Ceaucescu, and Marcos have all deposited funds in
Switzerland.
These leaders have also been identified as
perpetrators or orchestrators of human rights violations that
occurred under their leadership.
(i) The Non-State Actor under the ATCA
One of the major questions examined by courts in recent
litigation under the ATCA is the extent to which private actors

339. See Chaney, supra note 323, at 70. Not surprisingly, German legal
scholars have raised the broadest criticism. Other critics include English and

American historians.
340. Affidavit of Professor John Norton Moore in support of Defendants
Motions,

341.

39, CV-96-4849 (submitted May 15, 1997) [hereinafter Moore Aff.].

Id.
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may be held accountable for violations of international law.3 42 A
recent Second Circuit decision, Kadic v. Karadad, 34 3 establishes
precedent for trying private individuals under the ATCA for
certain violations of international law.34 4 In Kadic, plaintiffs Jane

Doe I and Jane Doe II alleged specific incidents of human rights
abuse by Bosnian-Serb forces. The class of plaintiffs included "all
women and men who suffered rape, summary execution, other
torture or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment inflicted
by Bosnian-Serb military forces under the command and control
3 45
of defendant [Karadid] between April 1992 and the present."
The Kadic court noted that Karadiid was the President of
"Srpska," the "self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb Republic within
Bosnia-Herzegovina."34 6 Reversing the district court, the Second
Circuit stated that private non-state actors may be sued for
violations of customary international law.3 47 Specifically, the
court held that Karadiid "may be found liable for genocide, war
3 48
crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity."
Furthermore, the court concluded that other "alleged atrocities"
constituted valid ATCA claims either "to the extent they were

342. For discussion of how a private entity might be civilly liable for breach
of customary law pursuant to an action "in delict," see D.J. Devine, International
Customary Law as a Possible Source of Actions in Delict, 106 S. AFR. L.J., 309,
309-18 (1989). The term "delict" refers generally to a state's breach of a duty
under international law owed to other states. Devine argues that if the rule of
customary law appears to be one to be observed by individual actors and is
reasonably capable of being observed by them then it would be reasonable to
infer a duty to observe the rule "and a breach of it could then lead to a delictual
remedy against them at the instance of aggrieved parties." Id. at 314-15.
343. 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996). This
action was a consolidation of two class action lawsuits originally filed during the

spring of 1993 in the U.S. District Court for the Southem District of New York.
Doe v. Karadvik and K. v. Karadii6, respectively. Plaintiffs "Doe I" and "Doe II"did
not use their real names at the time the action was filed. Plaintiff "K" initially
used only that initial due to safety concerns. The initial "K" represents the name
"Kadic" which was used on appeal.
344. For a general discussion of the claims raised in Kadi see Michele
Brandt, Doe v. Karadicd: Redressing Non-State Actors of Gender Specific Abuse
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1413, 1413-14 (1995) (citing P1.
Doe's Compl.).
345. Yolanda S. Wu, GenocidalRape in Bosnia: Redress in U.S. Courts Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act; 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 101, 107 (1993). Karadlid is
alleged by plaintiffs to have controlled large amounts of territory within BosniaHerzegovina and to have had command authority over Sprska's military forces. Id.
Plaintiffs asserted that Karadtid directed the groups under his command to
engage in "a pattern of systematic human rights violations" either as President of
Srpska or in collaboration with the government of the former Yugoslavia (Le.,
Serbia and Montenegro). Id.
346. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237.
347. See Doe v. Karaddie, 866 F. Supp. 734, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd sub
norn., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 2524 (1996).
348. Kadic,70 F.3d at 236.
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committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes"3 4 9 or "to the
350
extent Karadiid is shown to be state actor."
This holding accords with precedents established in the
Nuremberg Trials, which "clearly established that private nonstate actors can be held responsible for war crimes under
international law."3 5 1 In an amicus brief filed in the Kadic case,
the International Human Rights Law Group and a group of
prominent professors of international law and human rights
stated:
The United States and its wartime allies indicted 43 German
industrialists and financiers for committing war crimes and crimes

against humanity before and during World War HI.These private
individuals were charged with such crimes as forced deportation of
concentration camp inmates and prisoners of war to toil under
inhuman conditions and enslavement and mistreatment of
prisoners of war, deportees and concentration camp inmates....
The Nuremberg Tribunal resoundingly rejected the argument that
private individuals acting in their private capacity could not be
indicted for war crimes or crimes against humanity .... 352

The Kadic court agreed with many of these arguments. First,

the court recognized that private individuals might also be held

accountable for violations of international law:
[W]e hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations

whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state
or only as private individuals. An early example of the application

349. Id at 244.
350. I.
351. See Brief of Amici Curiae, the International Human Rights Law Group
and Professors Deborah Anker, David Bederman, Richard Falk, Joan Fitzpatrick,
Paul Kahn, Cynthia Lichtenstein, Richard Lillich, Oscar Shachter, Anne-Marie
Slaughter, and Henry Steiner, at 9, Doe v. Karadii, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (No. Civ-93-0878) [hereinafter IHRLG Amicus].
352. Id. at 9-10 (citing U.S. v. Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS [hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS] at 303
(indictment of steel magnate and five principal associates); U.S. v. Krupp, IX
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 307 (indictment of private industrialist and eleven top
aides); U.S. v. Carl Krauch, VII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 313 (indictment of 24
directors and officers of I.G. Farben-Industrie A.G.); U.S. v. Weizaecker, XII TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 319, 331 (indictment of prominent ministers, including Karl
Rasche, chairman of the Dresden Bank for his actions as a private banker)).
The Amici also note:
The precedent for charging private non-state individuals with war crimes
extends at least as far back as World War I. After that War prominent
Saar industrialists Hermann and Robert Roechling and several associates
were convicted by a French military tribunal of violating the laws of war by
plundering French property. The convictions were overturned on a
technicality, and the defendants were never retried.
IHRLG Amicus, at 9 n.6.
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of the law of nations to the acts of private individuals is the
353
prohibition against piracy.

The court further noted that "[tihe liability of private individuals
War I
for committing war crimes has been recognized since World
4
and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World War I."35
The Kadic decision has paved the way for a greater
recognition that non-state actors may be sued under the ATCA for
war crimes and acts of genocide. Nonetheless, the debate still
continues as to the historical purposes of the ATCA and whether
3 55
its scope can be expanded to encompass private individuals.
Even more controversial is the question of whether commercial
entities may be held liable under international law and the ATCA.
(ii) Unocal: The Commercial Entity as Joint Venturer
As Professor Moore's comments suggest, one rarely thinks of
a corporation as an actor capable of human rights violations.
Recent litigation, however, has established the viability of
asserting ATCA claims against individuals and multinational
enterprises. These actors are allegedly implicated in human
rights violations through their role in foreign direct investment,
which may encourage governments to institute forced labor,

torture, and other human rights abuses. Jennie Green, a lawyer
for the Center for Constitutional Rights, which handles ATCA
"[Hiuman rights law doesn't only apply to
cases, states:
government and individuals. Multinational corporations also
must be 6held accountable "when they violate such fundamental
35

rights."

Defense attorneys object strenuously to corporate liability
under ATCA. Corporations would be denied a fair trial, they
argue, if they were held liable simply through membership or
association with a government that may have a problematic
human rights record.3 5 7 To date, no U.S. court has awarded
damages against a multinational corporation for human rights

353. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238. Other jurisdictions have adopted the Second
Circuit's approach with respect to private rights of action. See, e.g., Clemente v.
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Abebe-Jora v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844,
847 (11th Cir. 1996); Paulv. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
354. Kadi4 70 F.3d at 243.
355. See Charles F. Marshall, Development in Immigration Law: Re-Framing
the Alien TortAct After Kadic v. Karad~i6, 21 N.C.J. INTIL L. & COM. REG. 591 (1996)
(stating that a clear legislative pronouncement rather than use of the antiquated
ATCA statute is necessary in order for U.S. courts to provide a forum for aliens to
obtain relief for offenses such as war crimes and genocide).
356. Pratap Chatterjee, Shell Faces Lawsuit for Nigerian Activities, IPS, Nov.
8, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
357.

See ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 455-57 (1983).

1998]

SWISS BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

violations. This era may, however, be about to end.35 8

403

Recently,

a federal district court judge in California held that Burmese
plaintiffs could sue Unocal, a California corporation, under the
ATCA.3 5 9
The Unocal plaintiffs contend that Unocal's joint venture with

Burmese government enterprises, involving construction of a gas

pipeline, caused plaintiffs to suffer death of family members,
assault, rape, torture, forced labor, and the loss of their homes
and property in violation of federal and state law, as wel

as

customary international law.3 60
Plaintiffs seek injunctive,
declaratory, and compensatory relief including damages stemming
from forced labor and the loss of property.3 6 1 The President of
Unocal, John Imle, and the Chief Executive Officer of Unocal,
Roger C. Beach, are both named as defendants. Both of them are
alleged to have:
participated in, directed and/or authorized the tortious conduct
resulting from the unlawful conspiracy between Unocal, Total,
[Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise] (MOGE) and [Burmese State

358.
Other current litigation includes a lawsuit against Texaco for
environmental pollution during oil exploration in Ecuador and another against
Freeport McMoran for environmental and human rights abuses on the western
half of the island of New Guinea. See Chatterjee, supranote 356.
359.
The UnocalPlaintiffs' complaint alleged the following:

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis, allege, that at all
times herein material each of the defendants was the agent, employee
and/or joint venturer, or working in concert with his/her co-defendants
and was acting within the court and scope of such agency, employment
and/or joint venture or concerted activity ....
See Plaintiffs' Compl. for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, Doe v. Unocal Corp., (C.D. Cal. 1996) (Civ. 96-6959) [hereinafter
Unocal Compl.].
Plaintiffs' complaints sought relief for the following:
Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act, Forced Labor, Crimes Against

Humanity,

Torture,

Violence

Against Women,

Arbitrary

Arrest

and

Detention, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, Wrongful Death,
Battery, False Imprisonment, Assault, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligence Per Se,
Conversion, Negligent Hiring, Negligent Supervision, Violation of Business
and Professions Code Section 1720.
See Yindee Lertcharoenchok, U.S.
Court to Hear Yadana Rights Abuses Claim, EMERGING MARKETS DATAFILE,
Apr. 23, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
360.
See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
361.
With respect to injunctive relief, plaintiffs seek "an order
directing defendants to cease payment to SLORC, and order directing
defendants to cease their participation in the joint enterprise until the
resulting human rights violations in the Tenassari region cease." Id. at
883; Karen Loew, Lawsuit Targets Companies Benefiting from Alleged Abuse
in Burma, Agence France Presse, Oct. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, AFP File.
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Law and Order Restoration Council] (SLORC) alleged herein, or he
specifically knew or reasonably should have known that some
hazardous condition or activity under his control could injure
plaintiffs and negligently failed to take or order appropriate action
to avoid the harm.... [His actions] violated international, federal
and state law and are outside the scope of his duties as an officer

of the corporation.

3 62

A second suit was filed against Unocal in September 1996 by
the self-proclaimed government in exile and the Federation of
Trade Unions of Burma. 36 3 The second Unocal case is part of a
grass-roots effort by supporters of opposition leader Nobel
Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, whose government was elected in
1992 but was prevented from taking office by military rulers who
had seized control of the country several years before. Unocal
3 64
recently moved to dismiss this action as well.
In its motion to dismiss, Unocal argued it is not subject to
the ATCA because it is not a state actor. The court concluded
that "to the extent a state action requirement is incorporated into
the ATCA, courts look to the standards developed under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, " 365 a federal civil rights statute that regulates
discriminatory conduct of state actors. The court cited Kadic for
the proposition that "[a] private individual acts under color of law
within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with
3 66
state officials or with significant state aid."
One of the approaches that the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken with respect to state action is the "joint action"
approach.3 67 In Unocal, the court elaborated on the notion of

362. Unocal Compl., at
15-16.
363. Unocar Recent Court Ruling on Burma Not Significant, Apr. 18, 1997,
PLAT'S OILGRAM NEWs, at 6, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
364. H-Rights suit Hits Unocal, POWER INASIA, Sept. 16, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, PASHA File. Boston attorney John Bonifaz who represents
plaintiffs is also representing a group of Amazon Indians and settlers in a class
action suit against Texaco accusing the corporation of damaging the environment
in the Amazon region. Bonifaz stated that Unocal, through its joint venture, is
liable for human rights violations committed during the construction of the
pipeline. He also stated that the corporation has violated the U.S. federal money
laundering statute by working with a regime that has profited from forced labor.
Eleven Irritant, Dissidents of Myanmar File Rights Suit Against Unocal Energy; They
accused the firm of Violations, Money Laundering Through the PipelineProject, L.A.
TI'FS, Sept. 4, 1996, at D2.

The same article quotes Robert Benson, a professor at Loyola Marymount
University and a specialist in human rights and environmental law, as follows:
"The case is not only about Unocal and Burma ....
The bigger question is, is
corporate capital going to be responsible for the human rights consequences in
the countries where it is going to invest?' Id.
365. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 890 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245).
366. Id.
367. Id. (citing George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227,
1230 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 374 (1997)).
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"joint action," finding that "where there is a substantial degree of
cooperative action between the state and private actors in
effecting the deprivation of rights, state action is present."3 68
The court also contended that "private actors might be liable
3 69
for violations of international law even absent state action
asserting that "[the] recent decision . . . in Kadic provides a
reasoned analysis of the scope of a private individual's liability for
violations of international law. . . . [P]articipation in the slave
trade "violates the law of nations whether undertaken by those
acting under the auspices of a state or only as private

individuals.

3 70

Consequently, the court concluded that a

corporation could be held liable under the ATCA either under a
theory of joint action or as an individual actor that engaged in

slave trade or forced labor:
The allegations of forced labor in this case are sufficient to
constitute an allegation of participation in slave trading. Although
there is no allegation that SLORC is physically selling Burmese
citizens to the private defendants, plaintiffs allege that, despite
their knowledge of SLORC's practice of forced labor, both in general
and with respect to the pipeline project, the private defendants
have paid and continue to pay SLORC to provide labor and security
for the pipeline, essentially treating SLORC as an overseer,
accepting the benefit of and approving the use of forced labor.

368.
Id. at 891 (citing Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d
1142, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995)). The Unocal court also stated:
Under the joint action approach, private actors can be state actors if they
are %illful participant[s] in joint action with the state or its agents.'
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
An agreement between
government and private party can create joint action. See, e.g., Fonda v.
Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 437 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A private party may be
considered to have acted under color of state law when it engages in a
conspiracy or acts in concer[t] with state agents to deprive one's
constitutional rights."). 91 F.3d at 1231; see also Burton v. Wldmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (where state "insinuates" itself
into position of interdependence with private party, it is joint participant in
challenged activity); Carmichaelv. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109,
113-14 (5th Cir. 1988) (assuming, without deciding, that ATCA confers
jurisdiction over private parties who conspire in, or aid and abet, official
acts of torture by one nation against the citizens of another nation);
Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27 ("Private person, jointly engaged with state officials

in the challenged action, are acting

['] under color' of law for purposes of §

1983 actions").
Id. at 890-91.
369.
Id. at 891 (citing Estate I, 978 F.2d at 501 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)
(rejecting notion that purely private actors have responsibilities under
international law)).
370. Id. at 892 (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239).
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establish subject-matter

Unocal also argued that adjudicating the case would interfere
with congressional and presidential efforts to pressure Burma to
reform its human rights practices. 37 2 The court felt that its
adjudication would not undermine the coordinate branches'
efforts with respect to Burmese human rights violations.
Furthermore, the court recognized that plaintiffs contend that
"Unocal, rather than encouraging reform through investment, is
knowingly taking advantage of and profiting from SLORC's

practice of using forced labor and forced relocation, in concert
with other human right violations... to further the interests of

the Yadana gas pipeline project."3 73 Plaintiffs' contentions thus
provide a basis for moving forward under a joint action theory.

Unocal claimed that it had nothing more than a business
relationship with MOGE and SLORC, and that plaintiffs had failed
to state a claim against Unocal.
The court rejected this
argument, writing:
First, plaintiffs allege that Unocal and its officials knew or
should have known about SLORC's practices of forced labor and
relocationwhen they agreed to invest in the Yadana gas pipeline
project, and that, despite this knowledge, they agreed that
SLORC would provide labor for the joint venture .

.

.

.

In

addition, plaintiffs assert that Unocal and its officers "were
aware of and benefited from . . . the use of forced labor to

support the Yadana gas pipeline project." Plaintiffs also allege
that Unocal knew that SLORC "committed human rights

371. Id. at 891. As a result of having subject-matter jurisdiction under the
ATCA, the court also found jurisdiction over plaintiff's supplemental law claims.
Id.
372. Id. Unocal states:
While vigorously attempting to encourage democratic reform and respect
for human rights, Congress and the President have refrained from taling
precipitous steps, such as prohibiting all American investment, that might
serve only to isolate the Burmese government (i.e., SLORC) and actually

hinder efforts toward reform. This careful approach is reflected in the that
fact, after a spirited debate, Congress recently granted the President
conditional authority to prohibit only "new investment" in Burma, and
even then only if the President certifies that Burma is once again
committing certain serious human rights abuses. .. . Against this
backdrop, this lawsuit represents an unprecedented attempt to enmesh
the federal courts in setting American foreign and economic policy toward
Burma.
Id. at 895 (citing Unocal Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion to Dismiss at 1).
373. Id. at 895 (citing Unocal Compl. 51).
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abuses, including forced labor and forced relocation, in
374
connection with the Yadana gas pipeline project."
Consequently, the court concluded, "plaintiffs could conceivably
prove facts to support their allegations and thereby demonstrate
the very connection between Unocal and SLORC that Unocal
denies, namely that Unocal and SLORC have either conspired or
acted as joint participants to deprive plaintiffs of international
human rights in order to further their financial interests ... ."3S
On October 29, 1997, a federal district court upheld the
second suit filed against Unocal by the National Coalition
Government of the Union of Burma and the Federation of Trade
Unions.3 76 As in the previous Unocal case, the court applied to a
joint venture theory of liability, noting that
the allegations of forced labor in this case may be sufficient to state
a claim for participation in slave trading. Although plaintiffs do not
allege that SLORC is physically selling Burmese citizens to the
private defendants, plaintiffs allege that [ ] Unocal [ ] has knowingly
accepted the benefit of and approved the use of forced labor in
37 7
connection the [p]roject.

Commentators suggest the court may have created a "conscious
avoidance standard" whereby Unocal may be held liable even if it
looked the other way while the Burmese/Myanmar government
used slave labor on the pipeline project.37 8
Shell Oil faces a similar lawsuit in New York City for its
alleged
complicity
in the
hanging
of nine
Nigerian
environmentalists. Two of the plaintiffs in the Shell suit are
Owens Wiwa and Ken Wiwa, the brother and son of Ken SaroWiwa, the writer and environmental activist who was hanged on
November 10, 1995, after a Nigerian military tribunal convicted
him of assisting in the murder of four Nigerian elders.
Environmental activists believe that Saro-Wiwa was executed
because he led a grassroots environmental campaign to prevent
devastation of the Ogoni region through oil exploration.3 79 Part of
the Shell lawsuit rests on the notion of "joint action" with respect
to human rights violations by the Nigerian governmentspecifically that Shell quietly assisted the Nigerian police.3 8 0

374.
375.

376.
96-6112,
377.
378.
24.
379.

380.

Id. at 896 (citing Unocal Compl.
Id.

52) (emphasis added).

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, CV
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 0975.
Id.
Gregory J. Wallance, Linked to Slavery, LEGAL

TIMES,

Dec. 1, 1997, at

See Chatteijee, supranote 356.

As onejournalist notes:

[in recent months, evidence that Shell was quietly helping the Nigerian
police has come to light Official company documents obtained by the IPS
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Explaining the suit, Judith Chomsky, a lawyer for the plaintiffs,
states: "Companies that profit from crimes against humanity
3 81
should not get to do business as usual in the United States."
(iii) Are Swiss Banks Joint Venturers?
At first glance, the Unocal decision seems to bode well for the
Holocaust Plaintiffs. The claims asserted by the Holocaust victim
plaintiffs are strikingly similar to those in Unocal. The Holocaust
Plaintiffs assert that the Swiss banks knowingly aided the Third
Reich in using slave labor and assisting them in disguising their
ill-gotten gains. The Unocal court seemed to apply a standard of
This also helps the
constructive knowledge to defendants.
Friedman plaintiffs, as their pleadings assert that the Swiss
banks either knew or should have known that the assets and

deposits they were receiving were not lawfully obtained.
Swiss banks might be agents in two capacities. First, they
have retained war victims' assets deposited in Switzerland for
safekeeping. Second, they safeguarded assets of the Nazi regime,
money that included the spoils of war and illegally seized
382
valuables.

show that Shell imported Beretta handguns and ammunition to supply the
Nigerian police through a company called Humanitex Nigeria.
The Britain-based Observer newspaper recently quoted Shell spokesmen
as acknowledging the purchase of handguns on behalf of the Nigerian
police who guard Shell's facilities.
"But once imported, the arms remain the property of the Nigerian police,
who store, guard, and use them," the Shell officials were quoted as saying.
The newspaper also revealed a May 1994 memorandum from the
Nigerian Chairman of Internal Security, Major Paul Okuntimo, to the
Military Administrator of Rivers State (which includes Ogoni territory).

The memo reads: "Shell operations still impossible unless ruthless military
operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to commence."

Id.
381. Id.
382. As Ambassador Eizenstat stated in his testimony before the House
Banking Committee:
Permit me to review now what we mean by "Nazi assets" because there is
confusion over the term "Nazi gold."

In fact.., there are three main categories:
The first is monetary gold which was looted by the Nazis from the central
banks of those countries they occupied, was recovered, at least in part, by
the Allies, distributed by the tripartite Gold Commission of the United
States, the United Kingdom and France, to 10 claimant countries.
Second is other private German and Nazi property which was blocked in
Switzerland by the U.S. Government and others at the end of the war,

which includes assets looted from victims--individual victims-of Nazis.
This includes everything from personal jewelry, life insurance accounts,
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Some suggest that Swiss banks played a more knowing role
in retaining Jewish assets seized by the Nazis. For example, the
Eizenstat Report notes that German authorities obtained large
sums of foreign exchange by extorting ransom from Jews who
wanted to emigrate from occupied territories.3 8 3 "The victims, or
their friends and relatives abroad, were instructed to pay the
ransom into accounts in Swiss or Dutch banks."38 4 The U.S.
Legation in Bern identified UBS in Zurich as one of the possible
sites for ransom deposits but "warned that it was difficult to gain
information regarding the names of the banks that were used,
and thus it had not been possible to identify the individual
accounts into which the ransom sums were paid." 38s As stated
previously, there is preliminary evidence concerning the knowing
role that the banks played in cloaking the assets of German
financiers-some of whom used slave labor in their factories and
plants.
The Unocal litigation involves the activities of a multinational
oil company in the 1990s. The Swiss banks, however, are being

sued for their conduct during World War Two-more than fifty
years ago. Theories of state action were not developed at that
point in time.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs state that Unocal is relevant insofar
as the court ruled that the ATCA lawsuit could proceed against
the two private companies because plaintiffs had alleged that the
private companies "are jointly engaged with the state officials" of
the pipeline project.3 8 6 Nonetheless, the joint venturing theory
posited in Unocal is one that is dependent upon a relatively recent
civil rights doctrine concerning private non-state actors who
engage in collective activity with state actors.
The only "organizations" that were tried at Nuremberg before
the IMT, as opposed to the USMT, were Nazi organizations that
were part of the Nazi's larger plan to carry out criminal activities
on a grand scale. The six institutions that were charged by the
IMT were the SS or Elite Guard,38 7 the Gestapo,3 8 8 the SA,3 8 9 the

and most ghoulish, even the teeth of those who were killed in the death
camps.
Third is heirless and unclaimed assets of Holocaust victims. At the
moment, we are focusing on those which were deposited in Swiss banks
between 1933 and 1945, in which there has been no action on that
account for at least 10 years. We call these dormant accounts....
Eizenstat Testimony, supranote 113, at 27-28.
383. See EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 12.
384. Id.

385.

Id. (citing Dispatch from Bern, Oct. 28, 1942, 862.5151/2387).

386. Van Dyke Aff., 14.
387. In German, Schutzstaffel Sicherheitsdienst. Otto Kranzbuhler, The
Nuremberg War-Crimes Trial, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 335 (1965).
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Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, and the
General Staff and High Command of the Nazi Party.3 9 0 These
organizations were not excused because their activities were
state-sanctioned. 3 9 1 Upon a finding of organizational guilt,
persons who were members of the organization became liable and
punishable without proof of their individual acts in furtherance of
the organization.3 92 Thus, the charges against Nazi organizations
and the related offense of membership in a criminal organization
were akin to a charge of conspiracy. Commentators have noted
that the declaration of an organization as criminal was
unprecedented under international law.3 9 3

Thus, the more

limited notion of organizational complicity was itself controversial
at Nuremberg. This seems to be one of the Holocaust Plaintiffs'
largest obstacles with respect to ATCA jurisdiction-the problem
of holding a commercial entity liable as a non-state actor under
international law as it existed prior to and during World War
Two.

394

The other way in which collective liability was expressed at
Nuremberg involved the conviction of individuals who collectively
engaged in conspiracy to commit crimes against peace. Again,
the Holocaust Plaintiffs allege that defendant banks have
breached customary international law by acting as a fence for the
Nazis, and by collaborating with them. This type of language

388. The Gestapo was also referred to as the Secret State Police. Id.
389. The S.A. were the German Storm-Troopers (Sturmabteilung). Id.
390. Arguments were made and evidence was taken with respect to each of
these accused organizations. See 42 IMT 1, 1153 (1949). Each of the
organizations also had defense counsel.
See CHARTER OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL [hereinafter I.M.T.
391.
CHARTER], arts. 7 & 8, XV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, 10, 12 (1949).
See id. arts. 9 & 10; Allied Control Council Law No. 10 [hereinafter
392.
Control Council Law No. 10] art. II, l(d) & 2(e), in XV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 23,
24-25.
393.
ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21011 (1962); see also Kranzbuhler, supra note 387, at 355-56 (Kranzbuhler was
Chief Counsel for Friedrich Frick, Nazi Interior Minister, at the Nuremberg
International War Crimes Trials) (noting that the International Tribunal refused to
depict the S.A. as a criminal organization because many members were not
engaged in criminal plans for waging war; similarly, the tribunal refused to
declare the German cabinet, the General Staff and the High Command criminal
organizations).
At best, the Swiss banks' conduct might be viewed as an ongoing
394.
pattern of obstruction and obfuscation. Their activity with respect to dormant
accounts, and cloaked and looted assets, continues to this day. Thus, it may also
be possible to analyze some of their conduct according to more contemporary
principles of international law. Our own jurisprudence for state action and the
notion of joint action or acting under the color of law has become more fully
developed. Thus, one could possibly assess the conduct of the Defendant banks

as joint venturers who have continued to benefit from their roles.
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implies some form of common plan or conspiracy on the part of
the banks.
The use of conspiracy as a basis for liability was narrowly
tailored at Nuremberg.
The IMT adopted a narrow test for
conspiracy, which required a knowing agreement or concrete plan
The subsequent proceedings
to wage an aggressive war.3 9 5
narrowed the scope of liability for conspiracy even further, and
judges were reluctant to find guilt on membership counts.3 96 One
of the principal objections to the use of Anglo-American criminal

395. United States v. Krauch, in VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1127 (1952).
The origins of the use of Anglo-American common law conspiracy came from
Colonel Murray Bemays, a member of the personnel branch of the U.S. Army
General branch and a New York lawyer working for the War Department. Bemays
proposed the use of conspiracy doctrine as a way to punish German prewar
crimes and also as a procedure for dealing with "hundreds of thousands of
members of the SS and other Nazi organizations implicated in Nazi atrocities."
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, 35-36 (1992). Bernays
suggested that the Anglo-American law of criminal conspiracy be used to charge
Nazi organizations and their leading members "not merely with atrocious
violations of the laws of war, but with conspiring... to commit such violations."
Thus, as Telford Taylor notes:
In Anglo-American law, criminal conspiracy consists of an agreement by
two or more persons to engage in unlawful conduct. Bemays reasoned,
therefore, that if members of the Nazi organizations had agreed among
themselves prior to the war to commit violations of the laws of war when
war came, their preparatory conduct before the war would be punishable
as a part of the conspiracy to commit the wartime atrocities.
Id. at 36.
Taylor also notes that the "Tribunal crushed Bernays's intended use of
'conspiracy' by interpreting the Charter so as to confine its use to 'crimes against
peace'." Id. at 637. Eight defendants were convicted under Count One for
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace. Id. at 687-38. Taylor was then
assigned to the American prosecution staff under Justice Robert H. Jackson and
occupied a significant role in both the international trial of major war criminals
and the subsequent trials in the American occupied zone.
One of the confusions about whether conspiracy to commit war crimes and
crimes against humanity arose from the Nuremberg Charter itself. As Taylor
explains:
The availability of conspiracy was provided for only in Article 6(a) of the
Charter, dealing with crimes against peace, and not in Articles 6(b) and
6(c). The paragraph following Article 6(c) referred to "conspiracy to commit
any of the foregoing crimes," but the only "foregoing" conspiratorial crime
remained conspiracy to commit crimes against peace.
Id. at 582.
396.
See, e.g., United States v. Flick, VI TRILS OF WAR CRIMINALS 25, 1223
(1952) (finding that only defendant Steinbrinck was guilty of membership in the

s.s.).
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conspiracy doctrine was that this doctrine was not part of
3 97
European civil legal systems.
As stated above, while private individuals were found liable at
Nuremberg, the notion of corporate complicity was not addressed.
The only organizations that fell under the ambit of the IMT were
criminal organizations. Thus, while the facts presented in the
Holocaust assets litigation might be treated differently today if the
case involved a bank or company aiding war criminals, the
argument with respect to Nuremberg is more tenuous.
Thus, the Unocal and Kadic decisions may pave the way for
an evolving theory of corporate complicity under international law
If commercial banks
for grave violations of human rights.
knowingly aid and abet war crimes or violations of other
universally recognized norms, the Unocal standards may provide a
basis for ATCA jurisdiction. The Unocal case, and the Marcos case
discussed below, suggest that, in contemporary society,
commercial enterprises that knowingly profit from violations of
human rights may be held accountable as agents or accomplices.
Furthermore, conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity may now be recognized as a violation of
customary international law. Article 7(1) of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is more specific
with respect to individual responsibility for any person who
"planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of one of the
enumerated offenses.3 9 8 More generally, the concept of common
plan or conspiracy has been included in many multinational

397.
See TAYLOR, supranote 395, at 36; WOETZEL, supranote 393, at 20617; Hans Erhard, The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War Criminals and
InternationalLaw, 43 AM. J. INTL L. 223, 227 (1949) (stating that Anglo-American
concepts of conspiracy were unknown in continental law and that the concept of
common plan was unknown even in Anglo-Saxon law). Erhard was MinisterPresident of Bavaria after World War Two. Carl Haensel, The Nuremberg Trial
Revisited, 13 DEPAUL L. REV. 248, 254-55 (discussing use of conspiracy at U.S.
Military Tribunal recordings under Control Council Law No. 10). Haensel was

Chief Counsel for the SS and the SD at Nuremberg.
U.S. Prosecutor Taylor has recently explained in his book Anatomy of the
Nuremberg Trials that the omission of conspiracy for crimes against war and
humanity from the Nuremberg Charter may have been more a matter of
inadvertence and hasty draftsmanship than a conscious policy to limit conspiracy
to crimes against peace. TAYLOR, supranote 395, at 116. Taylor also notes that

prosecutors indicted defendants with conspiracy to commit war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Id. The Tribunal, however, found itself constrained by
the Charter.
398.

M. SHARIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 340 (1996); Howard S. Levie, The
Statute of the InternationalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparisonwith
the Past and a Look at the Future, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 11 n.60
(1995).
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conventions since Nuremberg, including the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which serves
as a source of subject matter jurisdiction for the Yugoslavia
Tribunal.3 9 9
d. A Tale of Two Bankers
Beyond the threshold issue of whether commercial banks could
be subject to customary international law during World War Two is
the issue of whether their actions themselves constitute breaches of a
universally recognized norm of international law. The Holocaust
Plaintiffs point to the trial of two bankers and many industrialists as
the source for liability for actions which, while commercial in nature,
nonetheless aided the Nazis in committing genocide and in
concealing the profits made therefrom.
The USMT tried the German bankers and industrialists. After
the major war crimes trials at Nuremberg, eaclh of the Allies assumed
responsibility for trying prisoners it held within the zone it
occupied. 4° ° The Allied Powers adopted Control Council Law No. 10
in December 1945 "in order to establish a uniform legal basis in
Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar
4 o1
offenders."
The Holocaust Plaintiffs allege that defendant banks assisted the
Nazis in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against
peace. These categories of alleged acts are certainly violations of
international law. 4°
Subsidiary
actions also would properly be
4 °3
characterized as such offenses.

399.
See Chaney, supranote 323.
400.
See Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946
(Document LXIII) in Report of Robert H. Jackson, Representative to the
International Conference on Military Trials 246, 436 (1945).
401.
Control Council Law No. 10. The Nuremberg Charter was made an
integral part of Control Council Law No. 10, and incorporated crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Id. art. II.
402.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987).

403.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 702, which describes
customary international law of human rights, states that:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages or condones:
(a)
genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment br
punishment,
(e)
prolonged arbitrary detention,
(I)
systematic racial discrimination, [and]
(g)
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
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As one scholar acknowledges, the problem with jurisdiction
under the ATCA is not in "identifying the core, but in defining the
margins."404
The Holocaust Plaintiffs' ATCA claims attempt to
define the margins-they are revisiting the issue of banking and
commercial activity as performed by non-state actors whose
assistance may have facilitated war crimes, crimes of peace, and
crimes against humanity.
(i) Karl Rasche
Karl Rasche was the Chairman of Dresdner Bank, a private
bank in Germany that served in many respects as the bank for
the Third Reich. 40 5 Rasche was the only private banker to be
tried under the Nuremberg Charter. 40 6 Rasche has also been
40 7
characterized as a high ranking Nazi official.
Rasche was tried on four counts: (1) war
crimes
and
crimes against humanity; (2) war crime and crimes against
humanity relating to looting; (3) war crimes and crimes against
humanity related to slavery; and (4) membership in the SS. 40 8
Rasche was convicted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity relating to looting and also for membership in the SS.
It is Rasche's role as a banker and his role in looting which form
the basis for the Holocaust Plaintiffs' invocation of Rasche's trial.
Rasche was an "Untersturmbannfuerhrer" in the SS and a
close associate of Himmler. 40 9 The USMT noted that, as a board
member of Dresdner, Rasche was intimately involved in loaning
"large sums of money to various SS enterprises which employed
large numbers of inmates of concentration camps, and also to
Reich enterprises and agencies engaged in the so-called
4 10
resettlement programs."

human rights.
Id.

This list is not exhaustive and does not foreclose the evolution of additional
customary norms of human rights; however, what makes these human rights
norms similar is that no state openly asserts a legal prerogative to violate them.
Steinhardt, supranote 11, at 81.
404. Id. at 82 (citing Philip Alston, ConjuringUp New Human Rights:A Proposal

for Quality Contro4 78 Am. J. INTL L. 607 (1984)).
405. See United States v. Weizsaecker (Ministries Case), XIV TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 621-22 (Rasche and Emil Puhl, discussed infra, were tried jointly with
19 other defendants).
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 621, 772, 852, 863.
409. Id. at 863. "Untersturmbannfuerhrer" is the SS equivalent to a colonel
rank.

410.

Id. at 621.

1998]

SWISS BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

415

The USMT concluded that Rasche had knowledge as to the
purposes for which loans were sought.4 1 ' Ultimately, the USMT
concluded that, despite having such knowledge, Rasche's granting
of loans was not a violation of international law.
The real question is, is it a crime to make a loan, knowing or
having good reason to believe that the borrower will us[e] the funds
in financing enterprises which are employed in using labor in
violation of either national or international law? Does he stand in
any different position than one who sells supplies or raw materials
to a builder building a house, knowing that the structure will be
used for an unlawful purpose? A bank sells money or credit in the
same manner as the merchandiser of any other commodity. It does
not become a partner in enterprise, and the interest charged is

merely the gross profit which the bank realizes from the
transaction, out of which it must deduct its business costs, and
from which it hopes to realize a net profit. Loans or sale of
commodities to be used in an unlawful enterprise may well be
condemned from a moral standpoint and reflect no credit on the
part of the lender or seller in either case, but the transaction can
hardly be said to be a crime. Our duty is to try and punish those
guilty of violating international law, and we are not prepared to
state that such loans constitute a violation of that law, nor has our
4 12
attention been drawn to any ruling to the contrary.

Rasche was convicted of looting and spoliation in
contravention of Article II, paragraph l(b) of War Crimes Control
Council Law No. 10. 4 13 This provision prohibited "atrocities or
offenses against persons or property constituting violations of the
laws or customs of war, including, but not limited to ... plunder
of public or private property .... "414
Rasche, in particular, was indicted for plunder of public and
private property in Czechoslovalda. 4 1S It was alleged that he took
control of several financial institutions and absorbed various
branch banks into the Dresdner empire. He also was alleged to
have "further participated in, facilitated and sought advantages
from, the program of Aryanization introduced into countries
occupied by Germany, designed to expel Jews from economic life
and involving threats, pressures and coercion to force Jews to
4 16
transfer their properties to Germans."
It was adduced at trial that Rasche knew of and condoned
the process whereby Jews were given exit visas only after

transferring their properties to German banks. 4 17 Additionally,

411. Id. at 622.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 784. This was the document governing the principles of
international law under which the USMT tried defendants.
414. Id. at 682.
415. Id. at 772.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 776.
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he was said to have financed the spoliation agencies in eastern
occupied territories. 4 18 Rasche was eventually found guilty of
participating in spoliation in Bohemia-Moravia. 4 19 One of the
grounds for his conviction was Rasche's use of "coercive policestate measures, including the use of threats" and coercive
4 20
holdings.
Furthermore, Rasche was charged with slave labor. 4 2 1 This
charge resulted from his approval of loans used to finance slave
labor. Again, the USMT noted: "We cannot go so far as to
enunciate the proposition that the official of a loaning bank is
chargeable with the illegal operations alleged to have resulted
from loans or which may have been contemplated by the
42 2
borrower."
Not surprisingly, defendant banks in the Holocaust victims'
litigation place great emphasis on Rasche's acquittal for lending
money for slave labor. 4 23 This, defendant banks claim, is "directly
relevant" to the Holocaust victims' litigation because it
demonstrates that the "'[sale of] money or credit'-did not violate
customary international law, even where the financial institution
knew that the recipient of these services was utilizing the services
42 4
as part of an ongoing war crime or crime against humanity."
When analyzing the conduct of Swiss banks, a federal court
might well reach the same conclusion as the USMT, specifically
because Rasche was acquitted for his financing activities. Thus,
the USMT drew a distinction between providing capital and
actively participating in Nazi looting efforts. A different result
might obtain today. If, for example, a commercial bank knowingly
financed the building of an internment camp today, might that
bank be considered a joint venturer and thus in breach of
international law?
The Holocaust Plaintiffs, however, do not focus on the Swiss
banks' role as lenders. Rather, they focus on the active role that
Swiss banks played in masking the spoils of war and the profits of
slave labor as the basis for violations of international law. The
Rasche trial provides a tentative basis for the Holocaust Plaintiffs'
assertions in that Rasche was convicted for his active
participation in looting and plundering. A threshold question
remains, however, with respect to the Swiss banks' activities.

418.
419.
420.

Id.at 772.
Id.at 784.
Id. at 774.

421.

Id. at 852.

422.
Id. at 854.
423.
Defendants' Reply Memo, in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
the Intl Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, at 19-30, In re Holocaust Victim

Assets (No. CV-96-4849) [hereinafter Defendants' Intl Law Reply].
424.

Id. at 26.
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Swiss bankers did not work actively in the field to seize the assets
of Jews and other citizens of occupied nations. Rather, their
conduct falls into a gray area. Through the use of the pen rather
than the sword, they were able to secrete assets that men like
Rasche acquired. Thus, their liability for spoliation is at best
derivative.
(ii) Emil Puhl
The Holocaust Plaintiffs base their claims in part upon the
conviction of Emil Puhl, deputy to the President of the German
Reichsbank, who had extended dealings with the Swiss banks
during World War Two. The German Reichsbank engaged in the
systematic plundering of the nations it occupied and took
valuable items from Jewish victims. 425 Puhl's job was to arrange
for gold, jewelry, and foreign currency from Nazi victims to be
deposited at the Reichsbank and for gold teeth and crowns to be
recast into gold ingots. 4 26 Some of these ingots were sold to
Switzerland. 42 7 Puhl testified that it was Reichsbank practice to
resmelt all of the gold it received, which made it impossible to
trace the original owner. 428 The resmelting and renumberingoften with a pre-war date stamp--meant that a bank in a neutral
country could claim to have received no 'tainted' gold." 42 9 By
1943, however, the Allies were aware that Germany had sold more
gold than the country had possessed in 1939, leading to the
conclusion that all purchases Germany made were with looted
gold. 43 0 uPuhl's role in arranging for the receipt, classification,
deposit, conversion and disposal of properties taken by the SS
from victims exterminated in concentration camps" formed the
basis for his prosecution before the USMT of Nuremberg. He was
subsequently sentenced to five years imprisonment. 43
The
tribunal noted, however, that:
[Puhl's] part in this transaction was not that of mere messenger or
businessman. He went beyond the ordinary range of his duties to
give directions that the matter be handled secretly by the
appropriate departments of the bank. It is to be said in his favor
that he neither originated the matter and that it was probably
43 2
repugnant to him.

425.

Weizsaeeker, XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 160.

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 160.
BOWER, supranote 7, at 82-83.
Weizsaecker, XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 163.
Id.
EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 114, at 5.

431.

Weizsaecker, XIV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 169.

432.

Id. at 620-21.
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The Holocaust Plaintiffs point out an important passage in
Puhl's conviction, which states:
It would be a strange doctrine indeed, if, where part of the plan and
one of the objectives of murder was to obtain the property of the
victim, even to the extent of using the hair from his head and the

gold of his mouth, he who knowingly took part in disposing of the
loot must be exonerated and held not guilty as a participant in the
murder plan. Without doubt all such acts are crimes against
humanity and he who participates or plays a consenting part
4 3
therein is guilty of a crime against humanity.

Puhl's conviction arguably might form the basis for the conviction
of a banker who knowingly facilitated the disposal of assets

obtained from victims of the Holocaust.
The Puhl conviction still raises questions as to whether there
is a threshold of liability. Puhl directed a Nazi program of
spoliation and transfer of assets. The Swiss did not direct such a
program, but did willingly accept the shipments that were
presented to them. Puhl also was the primary Reichsbank
contact with the Swiss government and banking community. He
arranged for looted gold to be sold in Switzerland.
Puhl
negotiated with the Swiss when they blocked German accounts,
and was able to circumvent Swiss exchange controls. Thus,
Swiss banks performed core functions for Puhl and as such may
have been part of his infrastructure.
There remain open
questions as to the level of knowledge possessed by the Swiss
banks.
As for the role of the Swiss banks with respect to Nazi assets
and the gold transferred by Puhl and his accomplices, the
Eizenstat Report offers conflicting evidence. With respect to gold
looted from occupied countries, the Report notes:
Clearly, the evidence presented in this report is incontrovertible:
the Swiss National Bank and private Swiss bankers knew, as the
(w)ar progressed, that the Reichsbank's' own coffers had been
depleted, and that the Swiss were handling vast sums of looted

gold. The Swiss were aware of the Nazi gold heists from France of
434
Belgian gold as well as from other countries.

As stated previously, with respect to victim gold, however, the
Eizenstat Report states that "there is no evidence that Switzerland
or other neutral countries knowingly accepted victim gold." 4 35
Senator D'Amato has reported that the Nazis allegedly placed
sympathizers inside Swiss banks during the war to ferret out
account numbers and information. The Nazis supposedly used

433.
434.
435.

Id. at 621.
EIZENSTAT REPoRT, supranote 114, at vi-vii.
Id. at ix.
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this information to extort money from Jews and other account
holders in Germany. 4 36
A major conclusion reached by the Eizenstat Report is:

[T]he massive and systematic plundering of gold and other assets
from conquered nations and Nazi victims was no rogue operation.
It was essential to the financing of the German war machine The
Reichsbank itself-the central bank of the German State-was a
knowing and integral participant. It was the Reichsbank that
knowingly incorporated into its gold reserves looted monetary gold
from the governments of countries occupied by the Nazis. Judging
by the German reserves at the beginning of the War, the majority of
gold was looted from central banks It is also evident from the documents we have uncovered and reviewed that some amount was
confiscated from individual civilians, including victims of Nazi
atrocities, and incorporated into Reichsbank gold stocks. It was
the Reichsbank that assisted in converting victim gold coins,
jewelry and gold fillings into assets for the SS "Melmer account."
The Reichsbank organized the sale or pawning of this
concentration camp loot, and the resmelting of a portion of this
gold into gold ingots-with their origins often disguised and
therefore indistinguishable by appearance from that looted from
7
banks.

4 3

The Allies examined German bank records and interrogated
former Reichsbank officials to discover how loot had been
converted into "more orthodox financial assets."4 8 Albert Thorns,
Chief of the Precious Metals Department and a Reichsbank official
for the Nazi party, explained that booty seized by the Wehrmacht
went to the Treasury, and loot seized by the SS went to the

Reichsbank where it was placed in a holding account with the
9
name of "Melmer."3
The

Puhl

and

Rasche

convictions

create

an

uncertain

framework with respect to the role of Swiss banks. Plaintiffs rely
on Puhl as the basis for their international law claims. Defendant

banks rely on Rasche as the reason the Holocaust Plaintiffs'
claims should be dismissed.
Questions remain as to the
knowledge and role of Swiss banks in facilitating Nazi activities.
The cases, however, require a seemingly high level of knowledge

436. See Frontline Chronology, supra note 121, at 2-3. The Eizenstat Report
also states that, "[a]s U.S. officials received reports that in the early 1930s the
Germans had placed French-speaking Nazis in leading Swiss banks, they grew
increasingly concerned that Nazi elements [might] have infiltrated the Swiss
banking system."

EIZENSTAT REPoRT, supra note 114, at 5 (citing Letter from

Harold Glasser, Assistant Director, Monetary Research, U.S. Treasury
Department, to James Mann, U.S. Treasury Representative, U.S. Consulate
General, Zurich, May 28, 1945, U.S. Treasury Document).
437.

EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 113, at iv.

438. Nazi Gold: Information from the British Archives, HISTORY NOTES, (2d.
ed. Jan. 1997), available at <http://britain.nyc.ny.us/bis/misc/nazigold.txt>.
439. Id.
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with respect to the collection, conversion, and disposal of looted
assets taken from Jewish victims of the Holocaust.
e. The Industrialists
The Nuremberg trials of German industrialists are perhaps
4 40
more relevant when analyzing the claims of Holocaust victims.
The treatment of industrialists involves further inquiry into the
issue of whether systematic and continuous cloaking, looting, and
retention of assets amounts to a violation of international law.
These cases are therefore instructive with respect to the role of
property crimes in international law, especially property and
profits reaped as a result of atrocities and war crimes.
(i) Friedrich Flick
Friedrich Flick was a German industrialist who owned steel
plants in Germany. According to the IMT, "at the height of his
career ...

he had voting control of a dozen companies, employing

at least 120,000 persons engaged in mining coal and iron, making
steel and building machinery and other products which required
steel as raw material."44 1 During World War Two, Flick was a
member of the advisory council of the Economic Group of the Iron
Producing Industry. 44 2
Flick was convicted of war crimes and crimes against
humanity because he had knowledge of and approved of certain
unlawful activities of his deputy Bernhard Weiss. Weiss actively
participated in the "solicitation of increased freight car production
quota for the Linke-Hofmann Werke, a plant in the Flick
Concern."4 43 Weiss also "took an active and leading part in
securing an allocation of Russian prisoners of war for the use in
the work of manufacturing such increased quotas." 4 " Flick was
also convicted of spoliation and plunder of occupied territories.
Specifically, Flick took control of a French cement plant in
Lorraine in 1940.44 In this regard, the IMT noted:
Charles Laurent as a witness testified that he was expelled from
Lorraine in 1940 and that the Flick administration had nothing to
do therewith.... A corporation called Rombacher Huettenwerke,

440. For a detailed account of the various Allies trials of industrialists, see
Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The "Other
Schindlers,' 9 TEMP. INT'L. & COmP. L.J. 173 (1995) (discussing, among others,
trials of Friedrich Flick and members of I.G. Farben).
441. Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 1192.
442. Id. at 1194.
443. Id. at 1198.
444.

Id.

445.

See id. at 1206.
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G.m.b.H., was organized by Flick to operate the plant. Operations
continued from March 1941 until the Allied invasion about 1
September 1944.
All the profits were invested in repairs,
improvements, and new installations.
As the Allied armies
approached Rombach, the German military authorities gave orders
to destroy the plants which were disobeyed by the officials of the
trustee [Flick]. When the French management returned, the plants
were intact.... The evidence satisfied us that the trustee left the
4
properties in better condition then when they were taken over. "
The IMT also stated:
Flick saw the possibilities resulting from the [Nazi] invasion and
sought to add the Rombach property to his concern.
But
governmental policy was otherwise. It does not appear upon what
grounds this decision was based. There may have been thought of
the Hague Regulations under which private property must be
respected and cannot be confiscated. But we recall no hint in the
evidence that Flick or his associates gave any thought to the
international law affecting the transaction. The Flick management
of Rombach was conservative, not, however, with the intent of
benefiting the French owners ....
His expectation of ownership
caused him to plow back into the physical property the profits of
operation. This policy ultimately resulted to the advantage of the
owners. In all of this we find no exploitation either for Flick's
present personal advantage effort or to fulfill the aims of
4 47
Goering.
The IMT noted that, "[w]hile the original seizure may not have
been unlawful, its subsequent detention from the rightful owners
was wrongful."" 8 The IMT cited Hague Regulation 46, which
provides that private property in an occupied territory must be
respected, and noted that Flick's actions were not the
"systematic" plunder Hitler conceived. 44 9 Flick was nonetheless
found "guilty in respect to the Rombach matter" although the IMT
took "fully into consideration in fixing his punishment all the
4 0
circumstances under which he acted."
Flick also was convicted of contributing funds and influence
to support Himmler and the SS with knowledge of their criminal
1
activities. Flick was sentenced to seven years for his offenses.45

446. Id.
447. Id. at 1207.
448. Id. Article 46 of the Hague Convention obligates an occupying power
to protect the family, honor, rights and lives of civilians. Convention (No. IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, 36
Stat. 2277, 2306-07, 1 T.S. 631, 651 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. Other
articles that relate to private property include Articles 47 (forbidding pillage), 53
(forbidding appropriation of property of private individuals) and 55 (occupying
power must safeguard public buildings, real estates. forests and agricultural
estates). 36 Stat. 2306-09, 1 T.S. 651-53.
449. Id.
450. Flick VI TRiALs OF WAR CRIMINALs, at 1208.
451. Id. at 1223.
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Although Flick was convicted for his approval of Weiss's
recruitment of Russian slave labor, he was acquitted, based on a
45 2
defense of necessity, for using slave labor in his factories.
Defendants cite U.S. v. Flick for the proposition that crimes
against humanity did not encompass the taking of property.
Defendant banks quote from one portion of the IMT's decision
which states that such taking does not amount to a crime against
humanity:
Under the basic law of many states the taking of property by the
sovereign, without just compensation, is forbidden, but usually it is
not considered a crime. A sale compelled by pressure or duress
may be questioned in a court of equity, but, so far as we are
informed, such use of pressure, even on racial or religious
grounds, has never been thought to be a crime against humanity.
The "atrocities and offenses" listed [in Control Council Law No. 10
and the Numberg Charter] "murder, extermination," etc. are all
offenses against the person. Property is not mentioned ....
Compulsory taking of industrial property, however reprehensible,
45 3
is not in that category.

Defendants are correct with respect to Flick's conviction for
property crimes. The IMT did not equate these with crimes
against humanity. The IMT did, however, find that Flick had

violated the Hague Regulations by retaining the property of a
civilian in occupied territory. His seizure and continued operation
of the Rombach factory and was a violation of international law.
Flick's activities were in many respects akin to ordinary
commercial operations. He operated the mill for profit, and, as
the IMT noted, preserved and enhanced the property. Flick's
conviction for the unlawful retention of property is instructive to
the Holocaust Plaintiffs. First, Flick initially neither seized the
factory nor expelled its owner forcefully. Other German officials
did this. Rather, Flick accepted and then continued to manage
plundered property. This is analogous to the role of Swiss
bankers "who merely accepted German assets and then retained
Second, Flick was not involved in
and managed them."45 4
systematic pillage or plunder. In comparison, the Swiss banks'
conduct might be characterized as more egregious.

452. Id. at 1196-1202.
453. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss the International Law Claims in Friedmanand WCOJC for Failure to State
a Claim, at 45 (No. CV-96-4849) (quoting Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at
1214) [hereinafter Defendants' Intl Law Memo].
454. Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 1206-07.
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(ii) The I.G. Farben Trials
Defendants assert that "international law has not-and does
not-impose responsibility on corporate entities for the offenses at
issue in this case." 4s5 What defendant banks overlook, however,
is that the trial of corporate officers from the German company
I.G. Farben can be viewed as the first attempt to impose liability
upon a group of persons responsible for the management and
oversight of a corporate entity. Although the law of the modem or
multinational corporation did not exist in 1945, the USMT
explored the role that a corporation could have in assisting the
Nazi war effort. Twenty-three directors and officers of a German

company were tried together before the USMT.45 6 Of those tried,
twelve defendants were convicted of either spoliation and plunder
or slave labor charges. 45 7 A single defendant was found guilty
under both counts and the other defendants were acquitted.
I.G. Farben was a major German chemical
and
pharmaceutical manufacturer. The defendants in the Farben
case were prosecuted for "acting through the instrumentality of
Farben." 45 8 The defendants were eventually convicted of plunder
and spoliation. The USMT's decision, however, bases much of its
factual findings on the role of Farben as a corporate entity or
corporate personality. For example, the USMT notes:
While the Farben organization, as a corporation, is not charged
under the indictment, with committing a crime and is not the
subject of prosecution in this case, it is the theory of the
prosecution that the defendants individually and collectively used
the Farben organization as an instrument by and through which
45 9
they committed the crimes enumerated in the indictment.

The indictment also charges that Farben, "through its foreign
economic policy, participated in weakening Germany's potential
enemies and that Farben carried on propaganda intelligence and
espionage activities for the benefit of the Reich."460

455. Defendants specifically state that the Unocal decision is not consistent
with other international law authority. Defendants' Intl Law Memo, at 36.
456. See Krauch,VII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at iii.
457. See Krauch, VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 1081, 1205-09.
458. Krauch, VII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 14.
459. Id. at 1108.
460. Id. at 1122. In another portion of the decision, the Tribunal notes:

The indictment further charges: "Farben marched with the Wehrmacht
and played a major role in Germany's program for acquisition by
conquest. It used its expert technical knowledge and resources to
plunder and exploit the chemical and related industries of Europe, to
enrich itself from unlawful acquisitions, to strengthen the German war
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Farben officials were convicted as accessories to the Nazi
program of spoliation and plunder. As noted in the Farben
decision:
Where private individuals . ..

proceed to exploit ...

military

occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and
consent of the former owner, such action .

.

. is in violation of

international law. The payment of a price or other adequate
consideration does not ... relieve the act of its unlawful character.
Similarly, where a private individual or juristic person becomes a
party to unlawful confiscation of public or private property by
planning and executing a well-defined design to acquire such
property permanently, acquisition under such circumstances
subsequent to the confiscation
constitutes conduct in violation of
461
the Hague Regulations.

Defendants were required either to have participated in the
spoliation or to have knowingly authorized or approved of these
acts in order to be found guilty of these offenses.462 Furthermore,
company officials were not charged with constructive knowledge
of all corporate activity. Thus, defendants were not criminally
culpable for appropriation of funds or approving activities unless
3
they knew the program was criminal in nature.4
Defendants in the Holocaust assets litigation argue that
plaintiffs would have to sue individuals rather than a corporation
for violations of international law.
Thus, under defendants'
reasoning, plaintiffs would have to charge the individual Swiss
bankers who might have participated in looting, cloaking, or
unlawful retention of property.
Swiss secrecy laws, and the
passage of time, however, make it difficult to ascertain the
identities of these individuals. Moreover, many are now deceased.
These problems suggest courts should hold corporations liable for
the acts of their agents.
5. Spoliation and Plunder as a Matter of Customary International
Law
The tribunal in the Flick case found that spoliation and
plunder constituted war crimes but not crimes against
humanity." 4
Such cases establish a framework for

machine and to assure the subjugation of the conquered countries to
the German economy."
Id. at 1128-29.
461. Id. at 1132-33.
462. Id. at 1153.
463. Id
464. See Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 1203. The tribunal stated:
"No crimes against humanity are here involved. Nor are war crimes except as
may be embodied in the Hague Regulations." Id. For a useful discussion of the
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understanding property crimes under international law. The
Nuremberg tribunals used the terms spoliation, plunder, and
exploitation interchangeably in their decisions.465 These terms
refer to the "widespread and systematic acts of dispossession and
acquisition of property in violation of the rights of the owners,
which took place in territories under the belligerent
occupation or
" 6
control of Nazi Germany during World War

1I.

4

Generally, the Nuremberg tribunals were reluctant to
categorize property crimes as crimes against humanity. Under
certain circumstances, however, property crimes may rise to the
level of crimes against humanity. The Flick tribunal made a
distinction between "industrial property and the dwellings,
household furnishings, and food supplies of a persecuted
people. "46 7 Schwerin von Krogsigk, German Minister of Finance
in the Third Reich, levied special revenue assessments on Jewish
businesses in Germany. These revenues were used to finance the
German war effort. Judge Leon Powers dissented in the von
Krogsigk case and stated that his acts could not be viewed as a
crime against humanity because "merely depriving people of their
property is not such a crime. There must be some mistreatment
of the person. . . ."46

The Israeli district court in the trial of

Eichman also analyzed the status of property crimes:
IT]he plunder of property may only be considered an inhumane act
within the meaning of the definition of "crime against humanity", if
it is committed by pressure of mass terror against a civilian
population, or if it is linked to any of the other acts of violence
defined by the Law as a crime against humanity or as a result of
any of those acts . . . murder, extermination, starvation, or
deportation of any civilian population, so that the plunder is ...
4 69
part of a general process.

The threshold issue thus rests on whether the Swiss banks'
acknowledgment that the funds they received were derived from
genocidal activity would create liability for their role in the
disposal or conversion of such assets.
At one level, the
Nuremberg decisions can be interpreted to state that actors must
themselves engage in heinous activity.

A more systematic analysis of the IMT and USMT decisions
indicates that, for the majority of cases, spoliation was considered
status of property crimes under international law as a result of Nuremberg
tribunals, see Matthew Lippman, Anniversary Essay: Ffty Years after Auschwitz:
Prosecution of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 199, 260-62

(1996).
465.

See Lippman, supranote 464, at 262.

466.
467.

Krauch, VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 1133.
Flick, VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 1214.

468.
469.
1961).

See Lippman, supranote 440, at 264.
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 241 (D.C. of Jm.

426

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:325

a war crime when it involved a systematic program of plunder.
Nonetheless, Flick's conviction supports the theory that legal
prosecution may be predicated on the unlawful retention of
illegally seized property. Furthermore, the Holocaust assets
litigation is a civil action, so the factual predicate for defendants'
liability need not be as substantial as a criminal case.
Flick's conviction, therefore, may form a stronger predicate
for the Holocaust Plaintiffs' international law claims. The Swiss
banks, as the Holocaust Plaintiffs allege, not only accepted looted
property; they continued to retain and safeguard it. Thus, their
actions are analogous to Flick's. Even if defendant banks' actions
did constitute spoliation, a crucial question must be answeredcan a neutral commercial bank be held liable for a violation of the
Hague Regulations (which apply more directly to belligerents)?
6. Neutrality and the Hague Regulations
Defendant banks argue that the Hague Regulations apply
solely to belligerents during a war and not to neutral nations or
their citizens. 470 The Hague Convention Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Power and Persons in Case of War on Land
states at the outset that the provisions contained in the
Regulations "do not apply except between Contracting Powers,
47 1
and then only if all belligerents are parties to the Convention."
One might argue, however, that the banks in their capacity as
agents of Germany were not neutrals but agents of a belligerent
engaged in spoliation.
As defendants note, The Hague Convention Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of the
War on Land provides that neutrals are not acting in favor of a
belligerent for "supplies furnished or loans made to one of the
belligerents, provided that the person who furnishes the supplies
or who makes the loans lives neither in the territory of the other
party nor in the territory occupied by him and that the supplies

470.

Defendants' expert, Professor Moore, states:

The law of war defines the rights and duties of belligerent parties and
their armies during wartime and other armed hostilities.

Hague

Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land... was
relied on by the International Military Tribunal as evidence of the

prevailing customary international law rules of the law of war. Hague IV is
by its terms applicable to the conduct of belligerents ....
I am not aware
of any instance in which the law of war has been applied to hold that the
commercial acts of neutral nationals on neutral territory were war crimes.
Moore Aff., 99(a).
471. Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 128, 36 Stat. 2310
[hereinafter Hague V1.
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do not come from those territories." 472 A neutral, however, can
lose its neutrality for acts committed in favor of a belligerent. 4 73
Detlev Vagts has recently considered Switzerland's role as a
neutral country during World War Two with respect to the

allegations currently being levied against it.4 74

Vagts's main

argument is that Switzerland substantially complied with then
applicable principles of international law with respect to the
status of a neutral nation. As Vagts notes, "[O]f course, to reach
a judgment that the behavior of Switzerland was compatible with
the rules of international law then in effect does not dispose of
issues of humanity and morality. But it does contribute to
explaining Swiss behavior, particularly since the Government in
Bern was quite legalistic in its approach to the questions of the
time."

475

As part of his analysis, Vagts examines the role of the Swiss
with respect to financial matters. Vagts states:
During the war, the Swiss Government, the Swiss national bank
and private institutions entered into dealings with the German
Government and German individuals.
There was nothing
inconsistent with the status of neutrality in those activities per se.
However, the origins of the German assets transferred to
Switzerland were in some cases of such a shadowy character as to
raise questions.
For one thing, there were movements to
Switzerland of the monetary gold reserves of the governments and
central banks of states that had come under Nazi control in 1940.
This practice has evoked many expressions of shock in recent
47 6
discussions of "looted gold" and Switzerland's behavior.

Vagts points out that the "illegality under the rules then in
place" for Switzerland's acquisition of looted gold or other Nazi
assets "is not that clear."4 77 Those rules in place were stated in
the Hague Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention on
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. 478
For example,
Switzerland might have relied on Article 53 of the Hague
Regulations, which says that "[an army of occupation can only
take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which
are strictly the property of the State." 47 9 In effect, Switzerland

472. Id. at 18.
473. Id. art. 17.
474. Detlev F. Vagts, Switzerland, InternationalLaw and World War I, 91 AM.
J. INT'L L. 466 (1997).
475. Id.
476. Id. at 473.
477. Id.
478. Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1997, 36 Stat. 2777, 1 BEvANs 631.
479. Vagts, supranote 474, at 473.
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would be8 0relying on the traditional "to the victor belong the spoils"
4

notion.
On the other hand, Vagts also points out that Article 46 of
the Hague Regulations prohibits the confiscation of private

property. There is some room for debate over whether the central
bank holdings seized by the Nazis in each country of occupation
were "strictly the property of the State" (Article 53) or were private
(Article 46).481
Vagts also suggests that there is "some possible argument"
that Swiss [asset] seizures violated Article 55 of the Hague
Regulations. This provision limited occupying states in their use
of the wealth of defeated countries to that of a usufructuary or
lifetime tenancy. Thus, as Vagts suggests, "[t]aking the wealth of
it permanently of
an occupied country in such a way as to deprive
48 2
provision."
that
violate
might
these resources
Vagts' reasoning is similar to the assessment of Flick's
liability in Nuremberg violating Article 46 of the Hague
Regulations. Flick was found to have engaged in spoliation and
In
the wrongful seizure and possession of private party.
particular, Flick's wrongdoing included his unlawful retention of a
factory with the intention to retain ownership indefinitely. Thus,
Swiss liability might similarly rest on their possession and
retention of private assets. As Vagts points out, however:
Swiss responsibility would be derivative of the German. Although
the law of involvement in international wrongs by states that in
municipal legal systems might be categorized as co-conspirators,
joint tortfeasors, aiders and abettors, or receivers of stolen property
was not well developed in the 1940s (and is not far advanced
today), it could be argued that Switzerland did incur such

responsibility.

4 83

Switzerland, however, might still be able to claim as a valid
defense that it had acted in good faith and did not know the
48 4
precise origins of the looted gold.

Even if the Swiss did violate the Hague Regulations with
respect to their retention of looted gold, Vagts notes that as a
matter of "strict international law," such questions became moot
when the Swiss and the Allies negotiated the Washington Accord
in 1946. At that time, the Swiss settled their gold claims with the
Allies, collected German assets located in Switzerland, and gave

480.
481.

Id.
Id.

Id.
482.
Id.
483.
484. Vagts also points out that the Swiss bankers had obtained an opinion
in 1944 about legal questions from an eminent Swiss international lawyer,
Dietrich Schindler. They obtained a second expert legal opinion in 1946 in
preparation for negotiations with the Allies. Id.
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qualification to this, he notes that

429

Vagts does suggest one

[w]e have recently learned that there was a postwar agreement
between Switzerland and Poland transferring Polish assets in
Switzerland to the Swiss Government, which used them to
compensate Swiss citizens whose assets in Poland had been
expropriated ....
Unlike the Washington Accord this agreement

was secret and acknowledgment of its existence had to be wrung
4 85
out of the Berne government inch by inch.

Vagts states fleetingly that perhaps the Washington Accord
might be invalid under international law because the Allies
entered the agreement under fraud or mistake (i.e., with
ignorance of the Washington Accord). 4 86
Vagts's analysis
underscores the problems with trying to categorize neatly the
actions of Swiss banks during World War Two. Their actions in
many respects parallel those of the industrialists and bankers
who were tried at Nuremberg. Furthermore, their activities in
furtherance of the Nazis' campaign of spoliation and plunder may
constitute a violation of the Hague Regulations. Nonetheless,
questions remain as to the status of conspirators or aiders and
abettors during the war. While in hindsight the Swiss banks'
activities seem problematic, they may still have strictly complied
with international law at the time of the actions.
Notwithstanding these objections international law has
evolved. If similar activity occurred today, as in Unocal, more
contemporary notions of derivative liability, and a greater
understanding, of how commercial entities can assist spoliation
would create a different backdrop for an analysis of the banks'
actions.
A parsing of the trials of the bankers and industrialists

provides some indication that knowing assistance in genociderelated spoliation, plunder, and conversion can rise to the level of
a cognizable claim in certain circumstances. Encompassing the
activities of the Swiss banks within that liability, however, is
troublesome. In fact, German scholars are critical of the trials of
the industrialists with respect to allegations and convictions for
spoliation. They criticize the Flick conviction because Flick was
found guilty of spoliation despite having improved the property he
acquired and despite the fact that his acquisition of the property

485.

Id. at 474.

486.

Vagts states that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets up

several reasons for invalidating treaties including the parallel defenses to the

municipal law doctrines of coercion, fraud and mistake. There is little authority
on "fraud" or "mistake" under international law Id.
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48 7
initially could be justified on the grounds of necessity.

Similarly, the I.G. Farben decisions have been criticized for
extending the crime of spoliation to include contractually acquired
property, because Farben often acquired property through
contractual purchase from German officials 48or8 by dealing directly
with business enterprises in occupied areas.
V. THE MARCOS HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION:
SWISS BANKS As AGENTS OF A DICTATOR

The Marcos human rights litigation also illustrates the
intersection between bank secrecy and human rights. Recently,
attorneys for human rights plaintiffs have alleged that Swiss
banks acted as agents for Marcos by aiding and abetting his
efforts to hide his illegally amassed fortune. Unlike the Holocaust
Plaintiffs, the Marcos Plaintiffs did not initially name the Swiss
banks as defendants. Rather, they sued Marcos himself under
the ATCA. After obtaining a judgment against the Marcos estate,
plaintiffs sought a worldwide injunction on the disposition of
Marcos' assets. The Swiss banks were the subject of this
injunction as part of an interpleader action. At this point, they
were named by the court as agents of the Marcos estate. The
Marcos litigation does not contain voluminous accounts of the
role of the Swiss banks because the banks were not initially
named as defendants. The litigation is instructive nonetheless
because it is the first to characterize Swiss banks as agents and
facilitators in an ATCA lawsuit.
A. Background: The Deposed Dictatorand His PurloinedRiches
Marcos was sued not for his political corruption but for his

supervision of human rights violations. Marcos came to power as
President of the Philippines in 1965.489 By the early 1970s,
during his last term of his presidency under the Philippine
Constitution, Marcos had declared martial law and suspended the

Hellmuth Dix, Judgments in the Nuremberg Trials of Economists, in
(Wilboum Benton &
George Grimm eds., 1955).
488. Id. at 172. For example, Dix mentions that the Tribunal refused to
exonerate defendants despite their having paid adequate consideration for
property acquired in occupied areas. Dix states: "This standpoint of the Tribunal
exceeds both the concept of spoliation generally prevailing in the Nuremberg trials
and that of extortion prevailing not alone in Germany, since there is no
enrichment of the perpetrator." Id.
487.

NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS OF THE WAR TRIALs 160, 168-69

489.

STERLING SEAGRAVE, THE MARcos DYNASTY 180 (1988).
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constitution. 490 He continued to rule until he was ousted in
1986. During Marcos's time in office, he apparently accomplished
one of the greatest thefts of the twentieth century. 4 9 1 Documents
found in his abandoned palace indicate he smuggled vast
4 92
amounts of money and other valuables into Switzerland.
Marcos and his wife Imelda used the pseudonyms William
Saunders and Jane Ryan for their accounts. 493 Marcos is alleged
to have opened accounts with Swiss banks in Zurich, Geneva,
Fribourg, Lucerne, and Lausanne. 4 94
Additionally, several
Liechtenstein Foundations were created to shield Marcos assets.
The use of these shell corporations provided the Marcoses with
further confidentiality; the beneficial owners of the accounts were
the corporations, with boards of directors often consisting of
attorneys or other professionals.
During his self-declared martial rule, Marcos had control of
the Philippine Treasury.495
He also created government
monopolies for most commercial activities. Furthermore, there is
evidence that Marcos transferred government money to his
personal bank accounts. 4 96
It was difficult for the Philippine
government to estimate with accuracy how much money Marcos

490. Id. at 243-46.
491. Id. at 194-95.
492. See Hoets & Zwart, supra note 27, at 82; see also Pursuing the Assets
of Former Dictators, 1987 AM. SOCY INTL L. PROc. 394; Maria Shao et al., Hot on
the Trail of the Marcos Billions, Bus. WK., Aug. 17, 1987, at 52 (detailing list of
Marcos's wealth as traced by Philippines Commission on Good Government); Eliot
Brenner, Washington News, U.P.I., Mar. 22, 1986, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File. Brenner details the contents of documents found in Marcos's
palace:
The foot-high stack of documents Ferdinand Marcos carried out of Manila
suggests he stashed millions of dollars in Swiss banks as long as 12 years
ago and used business fronts to shunt money to and from his palace. The
nearly 2,100 pages of papers-some as trivial as gas slips and others as
potentially damning as bank accounts .

.

. included letters to Marcos

accompanying negotiable cashier's checks, stock certificates, and checks
from businessmen, with interest, in return for sugar sale quotas ....
Id.
493. Hoets & Zwart, supra note 27, at 82 (citing Progress Reported on
Marcos Swiss Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1986, at 6).
494. Id.
495. See SEAGRAVE, supranote 489, at 194-95.
496. Hoets & Zwart, supra note 27, at 83. The authors state: "There are
also instances of direct transfers from the Philippine treasury of money
earmarked for official purposes such as the Intelligence Fund, to Marcos's
personal secret bank accounts in Switzerland." Id.
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had secreted abroad. 49 7 Bank secrecy, in particular, impeded a
498
full accounting of his estate.
At the same time that Marcos was fleeing the Philippines, his
agents had attempted to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars
deposited in CS out of Switzerland. 4 9 9 In response, the Swiss
Federal Council ordered a freeze on all Marcos's assets, including
those of his family and other persons or organizations closely
affiliated with him.5 0 0
The freeze initially worried the Swiss
government because it had taken this measure prior to receiving a
formal request for assistance.5 0 1 Furthermore, Marcos had not
yet been charged with a crime.
The Swiss government found itself in a difficult position. It
wanted to act quickly after being alerted that a Marcos cohort was
trying to remove funds from Switzerland.5 0 2 Its response seemed
to be a reaction to worldwide public opinion supporting Corazon
Aquino rather than a specific request for assistance from the
Philippine government, Some commentators viewed the decision
as one that stripped Swiss banks of any independence. Finally,
the Swiss authorities acknowledged that at least initially, it was
difficult to ascertain which bank accounts belonged to Marcos
503
and his relatives or associates.
On April 7, 1986, the Philippine government requested that
the freeze be maintained.5 0 4 This request was made through the

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). President

Corazon Aquino created the PCGG on February 28, 1986, and

497.
Thomas Netter, Swiss Bank Accounts Keeping 1 of Marcos' Biggest
Secrets, CHIcAGO TRIB., Mar. 1, 1987, at 16.
498.
Id.
499.
Hoets & Zwart, supranote 27, at 80.
500.
Id. (citing Glynn, Is Time Running Outfor Bank Secrecy, INST. INVESTOR,
Nov. 1986, at 97). It is interesting to note that the Swiss also froze the assets of
the deposed President of Haiti, Jean-Claude Duvalier, less than a month later.
This freeze occurred in response to an official request from Haiti. Specifically, the
Haitian government sent a telex and asked that the accounts of eight individuals
including Duvalier, his family, and some other relatives be frozen. The Haitian
government also informed the Swiss authorities that Duvalier would be formally
charged with criminal embezzlement. See James Sterngold, Swiss Worried About
Freeze on MarcosAssets, N.Y. "IMES, Apr. 21, 1986, at D10.
501.
See Sterngold, supra note 500, at D10.
502.
See John Parry, Swiss Freeze Marcos' Bank Accounts, Citing Withdrawal
Attempt Monday, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1986, at A27. Records indicate that
Marcos's close associates also engaged in Swiss banking. Id. For example,
Glyceria R. Tantoco, wife of the former Philippine Ambassador to the Vatican was
alleged by U.S. and Philippine investigators to be a "front" for Imelda Marcos and
transferred $3.2 million from August to January 1986 to an account at Credit
Suisse from a New York bank account. Id.
503.
Id.
504.
Hoets & Zwart, supranote 27, at 80.
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vested it with the task of searching for assets illegally acquired
50 s
and misappropriated by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.
On April 18, 1986, the Philippine Embassy in Bern filed a
request pursuant to the IMAC for judicial assistance.5 0 6 The
Philippines requested that Switzerland freeze and disclose all of
the Marcos assets held in Swiss banks.5 0 7 On April 25, 1986, the
Philippines provided supplementary evidence obtained from
Marcos's palace and a memorandum drafted by Swiss
attorneys.5 0 8 Moreover, the Philippines stated that they would
soon charge Marcos with criminal and civil offenses in a court
that had been created by Marcos for trying public officials on
charges of corruption and graft.5 0 9
By 1992, the Philippine government had won a request for a

preliminary injunction prohibiting the transfer or disposition of
Marcos assets located around the globe.
The Philippine
government had previously learned that Marcos had deposited at
least $375 million in Swiss banks, which has since grown to more
than $475 million.5 1 0
B. Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Swiss Banks as Agents
In January 1995, U.S. District Court Judge Manuel Real
awarded the Marcos human rights plaintiffs $1.9 billion in
damages.5 1 1
Swiss banks were not defendants in the initial
litigation. Evidence introduced at trial, however, showed that the
banks held an estimated $475 million in Marcos-connected funds
under the names of shell Liechtenstein corporations, Marcos

505. Id. at 95. Mr. Jovito Salonga was appointed the Chairman of the
PCGG. Id.
506. Id. at 96.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. Pursuant to Article 2 of the IMAC, the Philippines are required to
provide Marcos with a trial that meets the procedural requirements of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of November 4, 1950. IMAC, supra note 59, art. 2. To date, Marcos
has not been put on trial. Marcos' attorneys have mounted legal battles in
Switzerland stating that the freeze on the Marcos assets is both procedurally and
substantively unfair. The Swiss Supreme Court agreed to lift the injunction in
January 1998 and funds are supposed to be transferred into an escrow account
in the Philippines while the Philippines government reaches an agreement with
various parties as to how to distribute the proceeds. See infra notes 556-73 and
accompanying text.
510. Henry Weinstein, Judge to Order To Swiss Banks to Release Marcos
Millions, L.A. IMES, Dec. 9, 1995, at A14.

511.

DictatorsBeware: Torture Victims May Finally See Money From the

Marcos Vaults, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 13, 1995, at 48.
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cronies, and aliases used by Marcos and his wife Imelda.5 12 The
Marcos Plaintiffs' evidence of complicity was a letter from SBC to
President Marcos from May 1983. Marcos was ill and hospitalized
at that time after a kidney transplant. The letter, which includes
information about dummy corporations that had been set up to
shelter the Marcos fortune states:
Dear Excellency:
First of all I hope that you and your family are keeping well. It is a
long time since I had a chance to communicate with you and take
the opportunity of the presence in Geneva of our mutual friend to
remit this letter and enclosures under a sealed letter for a strictly
private delivery to you....
As we had hardly possibilities in the past to contact you with
sufficient discretion, we took the decisions of some basic changes
in order to protect you and your family in the best way possible.
Therefore, following the changes in the Swiss banking law, the two
attorneys of your companies, associated with the Bank [name

omitted and myself] Java resigned and we appointed in our stead
for the Liechtenstein company a lawyer in Geneva, [name omitted],
who is enjoying our full confidence and, for the Bahamian company
(ARMELA), [name omitted] and two of his partners. Anyway, I keep
on controlling all operations for the companies. In this manner, we
have the best arrangement we can namely:
- An independent lawyer offering the additional protection of his
professional secrecy
5 13
- Control by the delegates of the Bank, as originally planned.

In July 1995, Judge Real awarded the Marcos assets in Swiss
bank accounts.5 14 In November 1995, the defendant banks and
the plaintiffs' attorney held negotiations in Hong Kong concerning
the possibility of reaching a settlement regarding the $475 million
of Marcos funds on deposit in Switzerland.5 15
In December 1996, Judge Real ordered UBS and CS to hand
over the Marcos accounts in partial satisfaction of the $1.9 billion
5 16
judgment against the Marcos estate by a federal jury in Hawaii.
The funds were to be used to resolve conflicting claims made by
the torture victims as well as other claimants. The Swiss
government protested Judge Real's order concerning the $475
million located in Swiss banks. The Swiss filed diplomatic letters
as part of legal briefs lodged with the Ninth Circuit when

512. Michael Miller, Swiss Banks Plan Talks on Marcos Cash, REUTER WORLD
SERV., Nov. 27, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
513. Letter from Officer, SBC to President Marcos (May 19, 1983)
(submitted as part of Marcos litigation) (copy on file with Author). The chart in
Appendix A diagrams how the Marcoses' were able to shield and disguise their
wealth with the assistance of Swiss bankers.
514. See Miller, supranote 512.
515. Id.
516. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1470,
1473 (D. Haw. 1995).
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defendants appealed Real's injunction., 1 7 The U.S. State and
Justice Departments also supported the Swiss government and
opposed Real's order stating that it undermined the sovereign
interests of Switzerland.5 1 8
Judge Real did not provide extensive legal analysis of his
decision that the Swiss banks were agents and aiders and
abettors of the Marcos regime.
In issuing the permanent
injunction, however, "[tihe MOL Court found the Swiss banks to
be agents and representatives of the Marcos Estate and
authorized a Permanent Injunction and Judicial Assignment as to
the assets held by the Swiss Banks. "5 1 9
The injunction
restrained the Marcos Estate, its agents, representatives, and
alders and abettors from transferring or otherwise conveying any
funds or assets held for or on behalf of Marcos. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit also acknowledged that Judge Real had
5 20
characterized the Swiss banks as agents of Marcos.
The Swiss banks responded by appealing Judge Real's order
in the Ninth Circuit. They argued that the U.S. court's attempt to
enforce the injunction would conflict with Swiss sovereignty,
52 1
international law, and Swiss criminal law.
The Swiss government had previously frozen all Marcos's
assets in 1986 in response to a request from the Philippine
government after Ferdinand Marcos fled the country. The Swiss
banks argued that complying with the U.S. court order might
subject them to liability in Switzerland.
The U.S. State
Department agreed with the Swiss government's concerns about
Judge Real's order, stating that the order "improperly threatens
important interests
of the U.S., Switzerland and the
"5 22
Philippines.

After a victory against the Marcos estate, plaintiffs sought to
enforce the judgment against two Swiss banks where Marcos
allegedly maintains accounts.5 23
Plaintiffs served a writ of

517.
See Henry Weinstein, Swiss Threaten Retaliation over L.A., Judge's
Order in Marcos Case; Courts: U.S. Seeks to Pacify Individuals Who Complained
About Ruling That They Should Turn Over $475 Million Linked to Dictator, L.A.
TiMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at A3.
518. Id.
519. Plaintiffs/Real Parties in Interest Response in Opposition to
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Prohibition and/or Other
Extraordinary Relief at 1, Credit Suisse v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist. Of
Calif., 130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-70193).
520.
See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 95 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1996).
521.
Weinstein, supranote 517.
522. Id.
523. As one report noted:
[I]t is hardly surprising that, for foreigners with money to hide, the Swiss
remain the bankers of choice. One such foreigner was the late Ferdinand
Marcos, president of the Philippines: he is thought to have stashed $475
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execution upon the California branches of SBC and CS.524 Both
banks appealed the writs, stating that their California branches
contained no Marcos deposits. The Ninth Circuit vacated Judge
Real's order, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 69(a),
which requires that the execution of a judgment be in accordance
with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district
5 25
court is located.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit looked to California law,
which requires that in levying upon a deposit account, "the
levying officer shall personally serve a copy of the writ of
execution ... on the financial institution with which the deposit
account is maintained."5 2 6 In this instance, the Marcos accounts
the
are in Switzerland. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, ruled that
5 27
notice of levy upon the California branches was ineffective.
The Court of Appeals noted that Judge Real should have
granted the defendants' previous motions to vacate the notices of
levy.5 2 8 The court also agreed with plaintiffs' statement that the
district court had found defendants to be "agents and
representatives" of the Marcos. 5 2 9 The Ninth Circuit noted:
"Even if this finding presents an 'exceptional circumstance,' it is
outweighed by the fact that the Banks were not parties before the
court in this case in which such a finding was made."5 30 They
disagreed, however, the Marcos Plaintiffs' assertion that the
defendant banks were helping the Marcos Estate consummate
agreements with the Philippine government concerning the
division of the bank account assets.
After failing to execute their judgment in California, plaintiffs
served SBC and CS with garnishment summonses on their
Defendants moved to
branch offices in Chicago, Illinois. 5 3
quash, vacate, and dismiss the summonses in federal district
court in Illinois,5 3 2 stating the Chicago branches did not hold any
Marcos funds.5 3 3 The court thus had to decide whether the

million in two banks, Credit Suisse and Swiss Bank Corporation [two of
the banks being sued in the Holocaust Victims Asset Litigation.] But other
foreigners are less keen on Swiss traditions. The two banks are fighting a
legal action brought by thousands of Filipinos who are claiming
compensation for persecution under Marcos's rule.
Banking Secrecy. Keeping Mum, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 1996, at 71.
524. Hilao, 95 F.3d 848 at 850.
525. Hilao, 1997 WL 428544 *1 (N.D. ill.).
526. Hilao, 95 F.3d at 851 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. § 700.140(a)).
Id. at 853-54.
527.
528.
Id. at 854.
529.
Id. at 855.
Id.
530.
531.
Hilao, 1997 WL 428544, *1.
532.
Id.
Id.
533.
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garnishment summonses served on Chicago branches could reach
assets held in the main offices in Switzerland.
In Illinois, intangible property such as debts does not need to
be located within the state for a court to have jurisdiction over the
garnishee. In Park v. Towson & Alexander, Inc.,53 4 an Illinois
Appellate Court stated that a debt is "intangible and jurisdiction
does not depend on the situs of the debt. Instead, a foreign
corporation having property and transacting business here may
be garnished in our courts for a debt, regardless of the situs of
35
the debt."5
Plaintiffs relied on Park and stated that they could lawfully
garnish the defendants' assets located in Switzerland by serving
their summonses upon the Chicago branches. s 3 6
Plaintiffs
reasoned that because bank accounts and deposits are "debts,"
they constitute intangible debts, have no situs, and are subject to
garnishment anywhere.
The district court disagreed with plaintiffs' reasoning. 53 7 The
court noted that a similar case, Fidelity Partners,Inc. v. Philippine
Export and ForeignLoan Guarantee Corp.,5 3 s had been considered
recently in federal district court in New York City. In Fidelity
Partners, plaintiff filed an action in a New York court seeking a
post-judgment attachment and execution against bank accounts
of the defendant located at the Philippine Nation Bank (PNB).
Defendant was an agency of the Philippine government. PNB had
a New York branch linked to a system that allowed money
deposits to be withdrawn instantly from an automatic teller
machine located in the Philippines. Plaintiffs argued that because
a bank account is a debt and because PNB had a New York
location, the accounts were subject to attachment in New York.
In other words, the debt did not have a specific situs, and the
PNB branch presence made New York an appropriate place for
garnishment.
The Fidelity Partnerscourt rejected plaintiffs' argument:
By characterizing the accounts as PNB's debt rather than as
[defendant's] assets, [plaintiff] apparently believes it can avoid an

analysis of the location of the accounts under the principles of
sovereign immunity discussed above. However, the weakness in
[plaintiff's] argument is that any right to execute on debts owing to
[defendant] from debtors located in the United States is but the flip

534. 679 N.E. 2d 107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
535. Id. at 109 (holding that Illinois court had jurisdiction in garnishment
action against corporation headquartered in Illinois over accounts payable by an
out-of-state corporate branch to an out-of-state debtor).
536.
In re: Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Litigation, 1997 WL 528544, *1 (N.D.
m. 1997).
537.
Id. at *2.
538.
921 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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side of [plaintiff's] right to execute on [defendant's] assets in the
United States. [Plaintiff] cannot gain "additional" rights merely by
characterizing the same bank accounts as a "debt" rather than as
an "asset." Because a bank account is always the depositor's asset
as well as the bank's debt, [plaintiffis] motion for execution upon
PNB's "debt" must also be viewed as a motion for execution upon
539
[defendant's] "asset."

The Illinois district court stated that while "Marcos's bank
deposits can be described as debts of the [Defendants], they must
also be considered as assets of the Estate. Those assets are
tangible, are held outside of the United States, and are not
subject to garnishment here."-54
In most jurisdictions, branches of banks are treated as
separate legal entities for the purposes of attachment. This is
known as the "separate entity" or New York rule and was
541
articulated in a 1950 New York decision, Cronan v. Schilling.
Plaintiffs argued that the separate entity doctrine was not
followed in Illinois. To support this position, they cited a 1903
Illinois Appellate Court opinion, Bank of Montreal v. Clark.54 2 In
Bank of Montreal, plaintiff was able to serve a garnish summons
on a branch bank in Chicago to access funds located in another
bank account in Toronto, Canada. In this decision, the court held
one
that, despite the fact that two branches had no control over5 43
bank]."
[main
the
of
agencies
"but
were
they
another's affairs,
The Illinois court ultimately refused to follow Illinois appellate
court's Bank of Montreal decision stating that an opinion was not
"binding on a federal court if the decision is not a good predictor
5
of what the state's highest court would do in a similar case." 4

539. Id at 1118.
540. In re: Marcos Litigation, 1997 WL 428544 at *3.
541.
100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (App. Div. 1950). The Cronan decision articulated
the following reason for the separate entity doctrine:
Unless each branch bank is treated as a separate entity for attachment
purposes, no branch could safely pay a check drawn by its depositor
without checking with all other branches and the main office to make sure
that no warrant of attachment had been served upon any of them. Each
time a warrant of attachment is served upon one branch, every other
branch and the main office would have to be notified. This would place an
intolerable burden upon banking and commerce, particularly where
branches are numerous, as is often the case.
Id. at 476.
542.
108 M1.App. 163 (Ill. Ct. App. 1903).
543. Id. at 167.
544. In re: Marcos Litigation, 1997 WL 428544 at *4. Judge Gettleman was
quick to distinguish Bank of Montrealfrom the Marcosgarnishment action:
The appellate court opinion... was very fact specific. Approximately onehalf hour after the defendant in the main action had been personally
served in Chicago, the Chicago branch of the Bank of Montreal was served
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The court reasoned that the Bank of Montrealdecision was limited

to the facts of that case. Additionally, the court noted that "the
court's implicit holding that the branch banks are agents of the
main bank for all purposes has been rejected generally by
numerous courts . . . ."4
The court dismissed plaintiffs'
summonses. It did, however, note some discomfort with the
notion that modem bank branches were truly "separate entities"
with the advent of modem technology:
The court recognized that most of the concerns of the Cronan court
that led to the adoption of the separate entity rule have been
eliminated by modern technology. In this age of the computer, it is
likely that any branch could immediately enter receipt of a
garnishment summons into its main computer file which could
then (theoretically, at least) prevent any branch from improperly or
unlawfully honoring a check. 946

Despite this recognition that multinational banks are
interconnected, the court stated that, because the Chicago
branches of the Swiss banks did not have access to the Marcos
5 47
accounts, they should be treated as separate entities.
After the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Real's order, human
rights victims filed a new lawsuit against the Swiss banks
directly, in an attempt to enforce the judgment that Judge Real
had handed down.
The new complaint seeks to obtain
"preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting
defendants from transferring or dissipating" the Marcos assets on
deposit at SBC and CS.5 48 Among other claims, plaintiffs alleged

that the "Swiss banks have laundered and invested the assets of
Ferdinand E. Marcos for decades."549

Plaintiffs further alleged

that:

as garnishee. The defendant had no account in that branch, but did have
an account in a branch in Toronto. He went immediately to Toronto and
withdrew his assets from that branch the following day. The court of
appeals, affirming the trial court, held that even though the branch in
Chicago had no relation to the branch in Chicago, the evidence showed
that the Chicago manager was aware of the defendant's accounts in
Toronto, and therefore, had a duty to notify the Toronto branch of the
garnishment in the shortest practicable time.
Id.
545. Id.
546. Id. at *5.
547. Id.
548.
[Proposed] Second Am. Compl. at 1, Tizon v. Credit Suisse (D.
Haw. 1997) (MDL No. 840; see also Marcos Victims File Complaintin U.S., UPI,
Sept. 14, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
549. Plaintiffs/Real Parties in Interest Response in Opposition to
Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1, Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for
Cent. Dist. of Calif. (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-70193).
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For a period of many years, defendants have acted as agents and
representatives of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and now his Estate and its
legal representatives. Marcos gave the banks the unlimited power
to effect, upon their sole judgment, all transactions with regard to
his assets, and this power survived his death.
The defendants played an active role in concealing and disguising
the assets, creating Liechtenstein foundations which they
controlled to prevent any creditor from gaining access thereto....
Defendants have acted and continue to act as agents and
representatives of the Estate and to hold hundreds of millions of
dollars on which they earn fees.
Unless preliminarily and permanently enjoined and restrained from
transferring the Estate's assets pending collection of the judgment,
it is believed that the defendants will transfer the assets to the
heirs and the family of Ferdinand E. Marcos or others, all to the
5s °
irreparable harm of the Plaintiff Class.

CS and SBC initially asked the district court to dismiss the
Rosales action under FRCP 12(b) on the ground that the
injunctive and declaratory relief that plaintiffs sought would
violate the Act of State doctrine. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss.551 Defendants CS and SBC
petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.5 5 2 They
claimed, essentially, that the current litigation is merely an
that a notice of
attempt by plaintiffs to sidestep the requirement
55 3
execution be levied on the banks in Switzerland.
On June 24, 1997, Imelda Marcos moved to dismiss a motion
by the Marcos Plaintiffs to enforce the two billion dollar judgment
in a Manila court. She asserted that the Manila court had no
jurisdiction to enforce the foreign judgment and that it conflicted
with Philippine law and jurisprudence.5 5 4 The Ninth Circuit also
dismissed the Marcos Plaintiffs' lawsuit against the Swiss banks

550.
551.

[Proposed] Second Am. Compl. at 10-11, Tizon (MDL No. 840).
As the Ninth Circuit noted:

The district court never issued an "order" refusing to dismiss the Rosales
action. Instead, the district court orally denied the Banks' motion to
dismiss, without specifying the grounds on which such denial was based.
To date, no signed order has been entered in this case indicating the
disposition of the Banks' motion to dismiss.
Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Calif., 130 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.5
(9th Cir. 1997).
552. A writ of mandamus is an order of a federal court to restrict a court to
a lawful exercise of its jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority. The
court "must be Tirmly convinced that the district court has erred and that the
petitioner's right to the writ is clear and indisputable." Id. at 1345 (quoting
Valenzeula-Gonzalez v. U.S. Dist. Court., 915 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1990)).
553. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4-5, Credit Suisse (No. 97-70193).
554. See Imelda Marcos Seeks to Dismiss motion of Rights Victims in Manila,
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA
File.
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on December 3, 1997.-5r The court ruled that the suit could not
proceed because it conflicted with action taken by Switzerland as
a sovereign nation with respect to the disputed funds. The Ninth
Circuit invoked the Act of State doctrine whereby "[e]very
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
55 6
its own territory."
In particular, the court pointed to the Swiss Executive Order
issued in 1986 that froze the Marcos bank accounts and the
subsequent actions of the cantonal governments pursuant to the
IMAC. The Ninth Circuit stated that the Swiss government's 1986
action forestalled any parallel U.S. litigation on the same issue:
"Any order from the [U.S.] district court compelling the Banks to
transfer or otherwise convey Estate assets would be in direct
contravention of the Swiss freeze orders. Subjecting Estate assets
held by the Banks to the district court's further orders would thus
allow a United States court to...
'declare invalid the official act

of a foreign sovereign'." 5 7 The court also noted that the District
Court's order to the Swiss banks to reveal information about the
Marcos accounts would violate Swiss bank secrecy laws.5 5 8 The
Marcos Plaintiffs were asked to challenge the Swiss order via the
Swiss judicial system.
The Philippine government stated that it would negotiate with
the 10,000 human rights victims involved in the litigation in an
attempt to reach a settlement when the Swiss government
releases the Marcos funds.5 5 9
Just several days later, on
December 12, 1997, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ordered
5 60
Swiss banks to return the Marcos assets to the Philippines.

555. See Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d at 1342; Court Deals Blow to Rights Victims
of Marcos'sReign, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1997, at A27; Henry Weinstein, Court Says
Judge Can't Seek Freeze on Marcos Ftnds, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1997, at B3.
Plaintiffs' attorney Robert Swift reacted to the decision: "It makes what has been a
difficult struggle for human rights victims a much longer and harder struggle. The
evidence shows a concerted pattern of the Swiss banks and the Marcoses
concealing assets over decades." Id.
556. Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 1268
U.S. 250, 252 (1987)).
557. Id. at 1347 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp. Intl, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)).
558. Id. at 1346.
559.
U.S. Court Ruling Benefit Philippine Government's Marcos Claim,
Agence France Presse, Dec. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP
File.

560.

Judgment By the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, lA.87/1997/err,

In re Federal Office for Police Matter v. District Attorney's Office IV for the
Canton of Zurich, Dec. 10. 1997 (English translation on fie with Author)
[hereinafter Swiss Supreme Court Judgment]. See Swiss Banks Must Return
Marcos Assets, Dec. 13, 1997, UPI, availablein LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
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The Swiss had previously asserted that they needed a binding
order from a Philippine court, essentially convicting Marcos of
criminal offenses relating to his theft of state funds. 5 6 1 This never
The Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters,
occurred.
International Mutual Assistance Division, and the Philippine
government asked for advanced surrender of the funds prior to a
The Swiss
final and binding judgment against Marcos.5 62
Supreme Court noted that Article 74a of the revised IMAC
permits a court to surrender restrained assets in advance of a
final judgment against the owner of the assets unless the rights of
The other
third parties demand retention of the assets.5 63
requirement is that the rights of third parties must not demand

5 64
retention of the assets.
The Swiss Supreme Court noted that, with respect to the

Marcos monies, "[t]he illegal origin of the restrained moneys
cannot be seriously doubted" and that the predominant share of

the money was "obviously tortious in origin."5 65 Consequently,
the court granted the advance release of the Marcos funds "under
the condition that the Philippines assures that a decision on the

forfeiture or restitution to the entitled parties will be reached only

561. See IMAC, Principle 67, supra note 5; see also Swiss Supreme Court
Judgment, at 3-4 (summarizing Swiss rulings concerning Marcos and Philippines
request under IMAC).
562. Swiss Supreme Court Judgment, at 6-8.
563. Id. at 13-14. The Swiss Supreme Court noted:
Art. 74a, Par. 3 IMAC demands the presence of a final and enforceable
ruling by the requesting state only as a rule. Thus, the law allows the
authority applying the law to disregard the requirement in certain cases,
whereby the advance surrender must remain the exception and may not
become the rule.
Id. at 14. The court also pointed out that the revision of the IMAC meant that the
forfeiture or restitution need not be effected by a criminal court. Rather, Article
74a requires that the forfeiture relate to tortiously acquired objects and that the
order come from a court. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Philippines to resolve
the forfeiture and distribution of Marcos assets in a civil case. Id. at 28-29.
564. Article 74a, para. 4 of Revised IMAC states that objects or assets can
be withheld if.
(a) the injured party has his habitual residence in Switzerland and they
are to be restored to him;
(b) an authority assets rights to them;
(c) a person not involved in the punishable act whose rights are not
safeguarded by the requesting state substantiates that he acquired, in
good faith, the rights to such objects or assets in Switzerland or, if her has
his habitual residence in Switzerland, abroad; or
(d) the objects or assets are needed for criminal proceedings that are
pending in Switzerland or are suitable for forfeiture in Switzerland.
IMAC, supranote 59, art. 74a.
565. Swiss Supreme Court Judgment, at 24-25.
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in judicial proceedings that satisfy the procedural principles set
out in the U.N. Convention 11 ...."566
The Swiss government wants the Philippine government to
apprise it of steps taken with respect to legal proceedings as well
as efforts to compensate the human rights victims. 5 67 The Swiss

Supreme Court recognized that the human rights claimants
should be taken into consideration as part of the mutual
assistance process because the "IMAC must be exercised with due
observance of the fundamental values of the IMAC and of the
Swiss legal regime and Switzerland's legal obligations.
This
includes specifically the safeguarding of human rights. ... 568
The Swiss Supreme Court also noted that both Switzerland and
the Philippines, as signatories to the U.N. International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, had obligations to "take
necessary steps ...

to lend effectiveness to the rights recognized

in the convention."5 6 9 While the court did not make the funds
absolutely contingent upon restitution to the Marcos Plaintiffs,
the court strongly suggested that this should take place because
"requested mutual assistance should make the Philippines which
is bound by international law to provide indemnification to the
victims, capable of deciding on the fate of the contested assets,
which are claimed by the victims on the basis of liability."5 7 0
Interestingly, while the Swiss banks argued in the United
States that their branch bank assets should be shielded due to
the Act of State doctrine, and also that the branches were entities
separate from the parent, they argued the converse in
Switzerland. As the Swiss Supreme Court summarized: "The
banks assert that if the assets are transferred to the Philippines
then they could be charged in the "USA with 'contempt of court'
and be punished with high fines."S7 1 The banks also claimed that
the victims could attempt to collect their claims from the U.S.
branches. 5 72 The court made reference to the Ninth Circuit's
previous dismissal of the Marcos Plaintiffs' claims against the
banks on December 3, 1997.
The court also noted that "[i]t is primarily the responsibility of
the legislature and ordinance-issuing bodies, and of the banks

and their professional organizations, to ensure that the head of

566.

Id. at 28.

567.

Cf. John Templeman, Marcos'sHoardHeads Home, BUS. WK., Dec. 29,

1997, at 66.
568. Swiss Supreme Court Judgment, at 36.
569. Id. at 38. The court noted that among the rights in the Convention
were the right to the prohibition of torture, cruel and inhumane or degrading
treatment or punishment and personal liberty. See id.
570.

Id. at 43.

571.

Id. at 44-45.

572. Id.
at 45.
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state of dictatorial regimes cannot-as in this case-deposit

573
millions of obviously dishonest origin in Swiss bank accounts."

The court specifically mentioned that both parties were also
signatories to the U.N. Accord on Torture, and other Cruel,
Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December

10, 1984. s 74 Based on these provisions, the court concluded that

"victims of serious human rights violations

are entitled to

compensation and a fair trial,
in which they can assert their
5 75
claims for compensation."
The court noted that while the procedural rights of human
rights victims were guaranteed under Philippine law (thus
presupposing that they could have sued Marcos in the
Philippines), "the Philippine judiciary is reputed to be ponderous
and susceptible to corruption and political influence."5 7 6 This is

the first release of funds that have been frozen after a political
leader has been deposed. One hundred million dollars of the five
hundred million dollars in Marcos assets is due to be released

initially. The human rights plaintiffs led by spokeswoman Marie
Hilao-Enriquez have made a public plea against splitting the
5 77
assets between the government and the Marcos family.
This is because the parties have not fully explored the issue
of agency or aider-and-abettor liability. Why? Because the Swiss
banks have been opposing plaintiffs' attempts to enforce their
judgment on purely procedural grounds. The litigation is
nonetheless significant. It represents the first time that a U.S.
court has recognized a Swiss bank as an agent or partner of a
dictator who has engaged in serious human rights violations.
The Marcos Plaintiffs have followed the path of the Holocaust
Plaintiffs. They have sued the defendants directly and in doing so
have begun to assert fuller theories of joint action and
collaboration. As stated above, the theories and claims espoused
in the Holocaust assets and Marcos human rights litigation may
5 78
prove instructive for contemporary litigation.

573. Id. at 23.
574. Id. at 39 (citing U.N. Accord on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane
and Degrading Treatment of Dec. 10, 1984 (SR.0.105)).
575. Id. at 30.
576. Id. at 42. The court also noted that criminal prosecutors' offices were
understaffed, that delays in the justice system existed, and that many
perpetrators get off "scott free." Id.
577. Philppine Victims Call for Talks on Marcos Assets, Deutsche PresseAgentur, Dec. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA File. In March
1998, the Philippine government announced that it would attempt to arrive at a
formula sharing the $500 million with the human rights plaintiffs. See Philippines

to Share Marcos Wealth with Human Rights Victims, Deutsche Presse-Agentur,
Mar. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA File.
578. In a related action, plaintiffs' attorney filed a separate suit against the
Swiss banks seeking to recover millions of dollars in gold that Marcos purportedly
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VI. DRAINING THE COFFERS: SPOLIATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
As stated above, the Marcos and Holocaust assets cases both
implicate human rights violations in some fashion, rather than
political corruption alone. Are there situations where the draining
of a nation's treasury amounts to a violation of international law
and of citizens' human rights? Indigenous spoliation has been
defined by one scholar, Ndiva Kofele-Kale, as "destruction of a
state's endowment, the laying waste of the wealth and resources
belonging by right to her citizens, and the denial of their
"5 7 9
heritage.
Why should indigenous spoliation be considered a serious
and egregious violation of international human rights?
The
effects of indigenous spoliation are devastating. As Kofele-Kale
comments: "What has taken place in the last three decades is
planned, organized, and deliberate looting on a massive scale....

[It is an] unprecedented movement of national wealth from states
that can least afford such extensive financial hemorrhage into
private accounts in capital-rich states for safekeeping."5 8 0
Kofele-Kale suggests three other criteria for indigenous
spoliation. First, indigenous spoliation is characterized by a great
mobility in wealth and the ability of leaders to conceal and
disguise looted assets. s 81 Second, he points to the magnitude of
spoliation-often billions of dollars are stolen from a nation's

had stolen from the Philippine Central Bank and deposited in Swiss bank

accounts. Bank Julius Baer was implicated for alleged wrongdoing. Baer was
able to show that documents purportedly showing that Baer assisted Marcos with
respect to shielding and selling gold stolen from the Philippines were not genuine.
Marcos-Linked Lawsuit DroppedAgainst Swiss Bank, Agence France Presse, Nov.
14, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
579. Kofele-Kale, supra note 36, at 58; see also NDIVA KOEFLE-KALE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES

111-62

(1995)

(characterizing indigenous spoliation as a breach of international customary law
of fiduciary relations).
580. Koefle-Kale, supra note 36, at 116; see also Kwitny, supra note 8
(stating that Mobutu received huge kickbacks which were channeled into
European bank accounts and that "such thievery ... strips Third World countries
of needed money" and noting western complicity in corruption). As U.S.
Congressman Stephen Solarz has noted, dictators such as Haiti's Jean-Claude
Duvalier, Ferdinand Marcos, and Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko have ruined their
national economies, looted their treasuries and corrupted their political systems.
See Solarz, supranote 9, at 18.
581. See Kofele-Kale, supra note 36, at 58 (citing Pursuing the Assets of
FormerDictators,supranote 492, at 395 (remarks by Abram Chayes)).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

446

[Vol. 31:325

can be
Finally, the cost of current 5 8spoliation
coffers.5 8 2
3
devastating, especially for developing nations.
Michael Reisman emphasizes the international aspects of
Reisman states that spoliation is
indigenous spoliation.
international in terms of both means and consequences.
Misappropriated funds are channeled out of a nation into safe
Thus, the means for
offshore or bank secrecy havens.5 8 4
achieving misappropriation are international. The consequences
of spoliation are also international, as the burden of
reconstruction of spoliated economies falls on the international
community in the form of development assistance and
humanitarian aid. 585 Nonetheless, a tension still exists between
contemporary visions of international law and "persisting"
features of the classical state system including deference to the
finality of a governing leader's acts occurring within a nation's
own territory, and sovereign immunity in foreign judicial matters.
In fact, Reisman points out, bank secrecy jurisdictions are an
outgrowth of the classical state system:
Indeed, the autonomy of national jurisdiction and the rights of

states to choose their ovm form of economic organization have
been invoked in defense of states whose bank secrecy laws
have shielded spoliation. Some of these states insist that bank
secrecy laws, rather than shielding the guilty, generally benefit
persecuted peoples whose wealth is targeted for expropriation
by vicious governments. Even when spoliations that all would
condemn are taking place, the continuing crisis and

competition of the international political system inevitably
press other states to adjust the application of high principles to
The locus classicus is Franklin D.
current exigencies.
Roosevelt's cryptic comment on Anastasio Somoza: "He may be
5 86
an S.O.B., but he's our S.O.B."
Kofele-Kale states that indigenous spoliation violates the
rights of peoples in a nation to "dispose freely of their national
wealth and natural resources."5 8 7 This right, he argues, is
derivative of the right of permanent sovereignty and self-

determination.5 8 8

582.

Therefore, Kofele-Kale ultimately states that

See Kofele-Kale, supranote 36, at 59.

583. See id. "As resources are funneled into private bank accounts abroad,
governments, state enterprises, central banks and private-sector companies are
forced to borrow from foreign lenders." Id.
584. See Reisman, supranote 36, at 56.
585. See id. at 56-57.
586. Id. at 57-58.
587.

Id. at 75.

588.

Kofele-Kale argues that state leaders have a duty of loyalty, a fiduciary

duty, and a duty to preserve state resources held in public trust for the benefit of

the nation's citizens. See id. at 93-100. Kofele-Kale states that fiduciary
relationships have been used in the international sphere and points to the U.N.
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indigenous spoliation must be treated as more than a simple
property dispute. Rather, he suggests that indigenous spoliation
violates fundamental human rights because "[t]he right of a
people not to be dispossessed of their wealth and natural
resources is not just any ordinary human right, but the
fundamental human right.... A people's enjoyment of the other
rights within the pantheon of human rights is dependent on their
access to national wealth."58 9
Consequently, he states that
indigenous spoliation needs to be viewed as an extension of
Filartigaand elevated to the level of a human rights violation and
a breach of a universal norm such that any state can bring an
action against high-ranking officials who engage in acts of
spoliation:
Constitutionally responsible rulers should be held individually

accountable before the law of nations for their acts of spoliation.
Achieving this goal will require adopting the approach of the
Genocide Convention and the Nuremberg war crimes prosecutions.
This development would open the door for individual criminal
5 90
liability to attach to those who engage in the proscribed acts.

Peter Weiss, a human rights and civil rights attorney who
helped the Philippine government recover Marcos's loot under the
auspices of the Center for Constitutional Rights, also explains the
connection between human rights and spoliation with respect to
the Marcos situation:
Why did the Center take this case? Because we saw it as a
human rights case. What makes it a human rights case? The
fact that people have rights not only as individuals, but also as

peoples, or, if you prefer, as nations. This case, therefore,
which involves the rape of an entire nation, seemed to us ....
to be a logical extension of the Filartigaprinciple, which makes
egregious torts in
violation of international law justiciable in
591
domestic courts.

Reisman also states that previously a nation's sovereign or
head of state was able to alienate or liquidate parts of his or her
national coffers and "cache it in a convenient financial center
elsewhere in the world."5 92 As Reisman notes, however, "the
incorporation of democratic ideals into international law and into
transitional notions of political legitimacy, which has found its
most authoritative expression in the United Nations Charter,

Trusteeship System as an example of the public trust doctrine in international
relations. See id. at 100-02.
589.
590.
591.

Id. at 113.
Id. at 117.
Pursuing the Assets of Former Dictators, supra note 492, at 397

(remarks by Peter Weiss).
592. Reisman, supranote 36, at 57.
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changes, by necessary implication, the competence of national
593
officials to dispose of the assets of a nation-state."
Thus, as Reisman notes, "[o]ne of the anomalies of these
cross-currents has been confusion and paralysis about the status
of national funds spoliated by high government officials and
cached abroad." 9 4 Reisman argues that both the agents who
assist with spoliation (who are themselves nationals of the
country being plundered) and the foreign bank secrecy
jurisdiction that accepts the plunder violate international law.
Kofele-Kale argues that international actors are also complicit in
indigenous spoliation: "The destruction of national economies...
can therefore be attributed not only to the leaders who treat their
national treasuries as their personal accounts, but also to their
foreign backers and aid donors who overlook their excesses for
one reason or another."5 9 5 Moreover, much of the wealth that is
spoliated ends up in other nations, often ones that also give
5 96
leaders political asylum.
As Kofele-Kale and Reisman suggest, the treatment of
5 97
indigenous spoliation under international law is all but certain.
The magnitude of current spoliation and the frequency with which
it recurs, however, have given rise to a reexamination of the
practice of political plunder. To the extent that the international
community moves to condemn indigenous spoliation, bankers
who assist with the large-scale and systematic plunder of a
nation's resources might similarly be liable under the "joint
venturing" concept set forth in Unocal.
Furthermore, as discussed below, to the extent that
indigenous spoliation can be treated within an international
convention or mechanism, it should be considered alongside
situations where leaders engage in human rights violations that
are more universally acknowledged. Finally, to the extent that we
recognize spoliation, one must take into account the role of
bankers and other financial institutions who willingly serve as the
repositories for purloined funds.

593.
594.

Id.
Id. at 58.

595.
596.

Kofele-Kale, supranote 36, at 102.
See id. at 107.

597.

See Pursuing the Assets of Former Dictators, supra note 492, at 397

(remarks by Peter Weiss) (stating that no one is sure what principal of
international law is involved and that the idea of suing heads of government is
relatively new).
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VII. BANKING ON IT: LESSONS FROM THE MARCOS AND HOLOCAUST
ASSETS LITIGATION

The Holocaust assets and Marcos cases are important in that
they attempt to challenge the role that commercial banks play
with respect to international human rights. In both instances,
plaintiffs challenge the assertions that banks are always neutral
Ultimately,
actors engaged in purely commercial activities.
however, each case has problems that have made it difficult for
claimants to seek redress through civil litigation. These cases,
nonetheless, form the foundation for future efforts to challenge
the role of bank secrecy jurisdictions in their relationships with
clients who have violated the law of nations. Furthermore, the
existence of bank secrecy is what has encouraged criminals to

deposit their funds in Switzerland and other secrecy jurisdictions.
Evidence suggests that banks have been able to act without
much accountability previously, because their actions have often
been cloaked by secrecy. Until recently, the active duty to report
suspicious transactions or customers was voluntary. Thus, while
a duty to cooperate eventually arises if a criminal is exposed (as
in the case of Marcos), the ability of Switzerland and other bank
secrecy nations to accept the deposits and to profit from such
transactions could still take place without any negative
repercussions.
The Holocaust Plaintiffs may have difficulty proceeding with
their international law claims because they are predicated upon
notions of conspiracy to commit violations of international law.
Conspiracy was recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunals only for
limited actions pertaining to crimes against peace. Moreover, the
notion of enterprise liability or corporate complicity had not been
fully developed. The Nuremberg trials, however, provide useful
factual guidance with respect to banking activities that constitute
violations of customary international law. To the extent that
bankers actively work to help war criminals conceal and dispose
of looted, confiscated, and otherwise plundered property, they
may be liable for spoliation. Thus, if a bank can be categorized as
a "joint venturer" or co-conspirator under a more contemporary
legal analysis, the Holocaust assets litigation helps fashion a
theory of liability for banks with respect to international human
rights.
The Marcos litigation is different from the Holocaust Assets
litigation because the Marcos Plaintiffs did not initially sue the
Swiss banks.
Nonetheless, both the district court and the
appellate courts in categorizing the banks as "agents" of the
Marcos Estate acknowledged that the banks played a role in

shielding the Marcos plunder.

Judge Real's decisions did not
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provide a legal rationale for his description of the banks. His
actions, however, provide an important precedent. His decision to
subject the banks to the worldwide injunction and to vest title
with the bank accounts in the Marcos Plaintiffs' attorneys
demonstrates a view that the banks were not just repositories of
wealth, but entities that had played a more active role for their
client.
Furthermore, the Marcos litigation illustrates the conflict
inherent in the current bilateral mutual assistance program that
Switzerland uses to trace the assets of deposed leaders. To the
extent that a state has a competing claim to a dictator's loot,
human rights claimants will be unable to enforce a civil judgment
against the leader. Under the Act of State doctrine, Switzerland's
negotiations with the sovereign state will always trump
subsequent civil judgments. Thus, it is unclear whether victims
will ever receive compensation or relief. Even if a Swiss bank
actively assisted a leader to conceal his or her wealth,
Switzerland's mutual assistance efforts would shield the bank
from turning over assets to claimants. If the Marcos Plaintiffs
had not brought their ATCA suit, one wonders whether
Switzerland would have imposed a requirement that the
Philippine government settle with the human rights claimants as
a precondition to release of the Marcos funds.
The Marcos and Holocaust assets cases underscore the need
for additional mechanisms for resolving such human rights
claims. This would eliminate the uncertainty created by bank
secrecy laws which makes it difficult to stop the transfer of
illegally obtained wealth and to trace the existence of such assets
with certainty
Human rights litigation against former heads of state is
likely to continue given the success that the Marcos Plaintiffs had
with their lawsuit. Thus, the issue of how to access funds in
Swiss bank vaults and bank secrecy jurisdictions will continue to
be an issue of concern-not only to successor governments but
also to individuals who suffered during these leaders' rule.5 9 8 The

598.

Steinhardt notes:

Four months after the exemplary damage award in Marcos, another court
held a former head of state liable in an action alleging similar violations;

similar suits will probably emerge from the crises in Bosnia, Rwanda,
Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan, among others. Paramilitary groups
operating under color of state authority may face similar liability in
accordance with the expansion in the class of defendants of choice.
Steinhardt, supra note 11, at 100-01. Steinhardt refers to the case of Paul v.
Avril, No. 91-399-CIV (S.D. Fla. 1994), a 1994 case where Judge WiUde Ferguson

awarded $41 million to six Haitians who alleged that they were tortured by
members of the military regime of former dictator Prosper Avril. Steinhardt, supra
note 11, at 101 n.158. He also refers to Balance v. Frontfor the Advancement of
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Holocaust assets and Marcos human rights cases provide an
important first step in recognizing the nexus between bank
secrecy and human rights violations. The cases provide a public
forum whereby the legal and moral actions of Swiss banks may be
examined and evaluated under common law principles and, more
importantly, under international law principles.
Civil litigation also achieves other goals for human rights
victims. Lawsuits such as the Marcos human rights litigation,
and perhaps the current Holocaust assets litigation, provide for
"investigation leading to identification of those responsible,
punishment of the wrongdoers and compensation for their

injuries."5 99

The role of Swiss banks and the trail of funds

shielded in Switzerland are part of the story in both the Marcos
and Holocaust assets cases. To this extent, civil lawsuits provide
plaintiffs with an accounting of facts and also with compensation
for their injuries. As human rights lawyer and scholar Beth
Stephens notes:
[T]he fact that civil litigation is a private remedy provides some
advantages to the plaintiffs, because they control the timing and
direction of the case. They need not interest public prosecutors or
diplomats in their demands, but can file a lawsuit on their own
terms. Even where a money judgment is not immediately collected,
the victims may feel some satisfaction from the judicial proceeding,
the opportunity to tell their story in a formal setting and the finding
60
of liability. "

Steinhardt noted that the Marcos litigation is the "first class
action to view human rights abuses in effect as mass torts, in
which plaintiffs establish that they are victims of a single
orchestrated and illegal policy."6 0 ' The Holocaust assets litigation
can be classified as a similar type of lawsuit-aimed at identifying
an orchestrated policy of Swiss banks to assist the Third Reich
with financing its war efforts and acts of genocide.
Steinhardt, in his analysis of the Marcos litigation, concludes
6°2
that there are problems with human rights class actions.
Some of these problems are already apparent with the Holocaust
assets litigation.
Steinhardt advocates the creation of an
international convention for the redress of human rights
violations. Steinhardt states that
[s]uch a multilateral document might specify what gross human

rights violations are actionable in the domestic courts of

Progress in Haiti, No. 94-CIV-2619 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 1994); and Mushikiwabo v.
Barayagwiza, No. 94-CIV-3627 (S.D.N.Y., May 17, 1994) as examples of cases
filed against paramilitary groups. See Steinhardt, supranote 11, at 101 n.159.
599.
Stephens, supra note 43, at 604.
600.
Id. at 605.
601.
Steinhardt, supra note 11, at 68.
602. Id. at 101-03.
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signatories, the choice of law approach that should govern
particular issues in such actions, the calculus for determining
the availability and measure of compensatory and especially
punitive damages, and the obligation to enforce foreign
judgments against human rights violators wherever their assets
6 03
might be.

One of the reasons that Steinhardt advocates an international
approach is that, "[a]lthough the courts of the United States will
continue to have the power to conduct human rights litigation
consistently with the general standards of procedural and
remedial law, the resulting judgments will not necessarily
command the approval of other governments or secure foreign
6°4
cooperation in assuring compensation for victims."

While the Author agrees with Steinhardt's call for an
international solution to the problem of victim redress and
compensation, the Author differs slightly with his statement that
ATCA litigation will impede foreign cooperation. To some extent,
one might argue that the human rights victims in the Marcos case
would never have had any recognition by the Swiss government
when it released the funds in December had it not been for the
class action litigation. In addition to using a multilateral or
international convention and mechanisms for dealing with the
issue of leaders and others who violate the human rights of entire
classes of victims, the Author would suggest that such a
convention be expanded to include indigenous spoliation within
its scope.
In 1989, Reisman posed the question: Has not the time come
for the international community to address this issue directly?
He proposed that
as a first step,

an international declaration be drafted (1)

characterizing unequivocally, spoliations by

national officials as

breach of national trust and of international law; (2) imposing on
other governments an obligation of supplying information and
cooperation; and (3) characterizing the failure of other governments
to prevent such funds from being cached in their jurisdiction and

603. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
Steinhardt also comments that the
difficulties involved in a mass human rights tort trial include:

[c]onfusion of causation issues and the consequent impairment of the jury
function, profound extrapolation from the experience of nine victims to
that of ten thousand, distortion of the relationship between counsel and
client (especially when the attorney has taken the case on a contingency
fee), and overreaching by judges in pre-trial management and the coercion
of settlement. Designation of the class counsel as lead attorney in the trial
can also cause sharp disagreements about the fundamental trial strategy,
the admission and order of evidence, and the preparation of witnesses.
Id. at 93. In the Marcos litigation, the class mechanism became problematic
during the damage phase of the trial.
604. Id. at 101.

1998]

SWISS BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

453

to aid in their recapture as complicity, after the fact, and as itself
60 5
an international delict.

More than seven years have passed since Reisman made this
proposal. In that time, more national leaders have been deposed
or forced to leave their countries. They also appear to have taken
their countries' wealth with them. The Marcos litigation and the
Holocaust assets litigation illustrate very well the problem of
spoliation and the role played by outside agents and bank secrecy
jurisdictions as active participants in a larger process.
Reisman's proposal suggests that indigenous spoliation may
already constitute an international delict or violation of
international law. Reisman's proposal also touched more directly
upon the role of states which fail to prevent another nation's
leader from, or otherwise assist in, stealing the second state's
assets. It does not, however, directly address the role of non-state
actors such as banks who may sometimes be primary
participants in the spoliation process. As Reisman suggests,
agents of leaders who engage in spoliation are liable and the
banking jurisdiction's exercise of its secrecy laws to conceal funds
is an international delict.
When one combines those two factors, the issue remains

open as to what level of accountability financial institutions have
under international law. Weiss suggests that a convention on the
duty of states to make restitution of property purloined by heads

of state might assist nations in dealing with the problem of
indigenous spoliation. 60 6 Reisman states that
[t]he United Nations should consider forming an international high
commission for the retrieval of diverted national wealth. The
commission would be charged with responding to the requests of
member governments to identify the location of purloined funds
and to secure their return by negotiation or, where appropriate, by
judicial action.
The statute of the agency would grant it
international legal personality and authorize it to cover its
reasonable expenses from the funds regained. 6 0 7

0
605.
Reisman, supranote 35, at 58. Reisman states that the authority for
such an endeavor could be based in the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty,
the U.N. Charter, various human rights declarations, and Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding freedom of information. See id.
Other relevant human rights instruments include the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (especially Art. 1(2)) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp., No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (especially Art. 1(2)); see Reisman, supranote
35, at 58 n.5.
606. Interestingly, Weiss also calls for a greater confluence of economic
rights and human rights theory. See PursuingAssets of FormerDictators, supra
note 492, at 397 (remarks by Peter Weiss).
607. Reisman, supranote 36, at 58-59.
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The Author's final recommendation is that banks and
financial institutions be encompassed within any international or
multinational efforts to address the problems of war crimes and
human rights violations committed by high-ranking officials.
Bank secrecy jurisdictions are deeply involved in the economic
activities of such individuals and their actions have the potential
to rise to the level of active facilitation or complicity. The current
structure of bilateral mutual assistance provides for prolonged
negotiations between impoverished nations and the Swiss
government. These negotiations do not contemplate the inclusion
of human rights victims.
Bank secrecy provides too much
discretion to individual banks creating an inconsistent approach
to recovering purloined assets.
Thus, the Author urges that the international community
address problems of bank secrecy, bank complicity with human
rights violations, and the ability of human rights victims to
recover funds from a perpetrator whose assets are located in a
bank secrecy jurisdiction. That a bank's active assistance of the

actions of war criminals and dictators may create jurisdiction
under the ATCA or international human rights law would serve as
an effective deterrent to banks' assisting serious breaches of
human rights. Thus, the Holocaust assets and Marcos cases pave
the way for attributing legal responsibility to banks in two ways.
The cases suggest legal theories of derivative liability for banks
under the ATCA. While the liability under international law did
not clearly exist in 1945, one can look at the actions of banks
from that point onward and heightened legal responsibilities
placed on banks as indicia of how far international opinion has
changed on these topics. Moreover, the litigation underscores the
need for more clearly defined legal standards for those financial
institutions that assist criminal activity.
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APPENDIX B

Abbreviations Used in Article
ATCA
BIS
CS
FATF
FEA
FRCP
ICEC

Alien Tort Claims Act
Bank of International Settlements
Credit Suisse
Financial Action Task Force of Money Laundering
Foreign Economic Administration, U.S. Treasury
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Independent Commission of Experts (Bergier
Commission)

ICEP

Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (Volcker

IMAC
IMT
MOGE
PCGG
PLO
PNB
SA
SBA
SBC
SJC
SLORC
UBS
USMT
WCOJC
WJC
WJRO

Committee)
Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal
Matters
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
Philippine Commission on Good Government
Palestine Liberation Organization
Philippine Nation Bank
German Storm Troopers (Stiirmabteilung)
Swiss Bankers Association
Swiss Bank Corporation
Swiss Jewish Communities Association
Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Council
Union Bank of Switzerland
U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities
World Jewish Congress
World Jewish Restitution Organization

